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Abstract
This thesis addresses the security of two fundamental elements of wireless networking: neigh-
bor discovery and ranging. Neighbor discovery consists in discovering devices available for
direct communication or in physical proximity. Ranging, or distance bounding, consists in
measuring the distance between devices, or providing an upper bound on this distance. Both
elements serve as building blocks for a variety of services and applications, notably routing,
physical access control, tracking and localization. However, the open nature of wireless net-
works makes it easy to abuse neighbor discovery and ranging, and thereby compromise overly-
ing services and applications. To prevent this, numerous works proposed protocols that secure
these building blocks. But two aspects crucial for the security of such protocols have received
relatively little attention: formal verification and attacks on the physical-communication-
layer. They are precisely the focus of this thesis.
In the first part of the thesis, we contribute a formal analysis of secure communication
neighbor discovery protocols. We build a formal model that captures salient characteristics
of wireless systems such as node location, message propagation time and link variability, and
we provide a specification of secure communication neighbor discovery. Then, we derive an
impossibility result for a general class of protocols we term“time-based protocols”, stating that
no such protocol can provide secure communication neighbor discovery. We also identify the
conditions under which the impossibility result is lifted. We then prove that specific protocols
in the time-based class (under additional conditions) and specific protocols in a class we term
“time- and location-based protocols,” satisfy the neighbor discovery specification. We reinforce
these results by mechanizing the model and the proofs in the theorem prover Isabelle.
In the second part of the thesis, we explore physical-communication-layer attacks that
can seemingly decrease the message arrival time without modifying its content. Thus, they
can circumvent time-based neighbor discovery protocols and distance bounding protocols.
(Indeed, they violate the assumptions necessary to prove protocol correctness in the first
part of the thesis.) We focus on Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband, a physical layer technology
particularly well suited for implementing distance bounding, thanks to its ability to perform
accurate indoor ranging. First, we adapt physical layer attacks reported in prior work to
IEEE 802.15.4a, the de facto standard for Impulse Radio, and evaluate their performance.
We show that an adversary can achieve a distance-decrease of up to hundreds of meters with an
arbitrarily high probability of success, with only a minor cost in terms of transmission power
(few dB). Next, we demonstrate a new attack vector that disrupts time-of-arrival estimation
algorithms, in particular those designed to be precise. The distance-decrease achievable by this
attack vector is in the order of the channel spread (order of 10 meters in indoor environments).
This attack vector can be used in previously reported physical layer attacks, but it also creates
a new type of external attack based on malicious interference. We demonstrate that variants
of the malicious interference attack are much easier to mount than the previously reported
i
external attack. We also provide design guidelines for modulation schemes and devise receiver
algorithms that mitigate physical layer attacks. These countermeasures allow the system
designer to trade off security, ranging precision and cost in terms of transmission power and
packet length.
Keywords neighbor discovery, ranging, distance bounding, relay attack, formal analysis,
physical layer attacks
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Riassunto
La presente tesi affronta il problema della sicurezza di due elementi fondamentali delle reti
wireless: neighbor discovery e ranging. Neighbor discovery consiste nello scoprire apparec-
chi disponibili per una comunicazione diretta oppure in prossimita` fisica. Ranging, oppure
distance bounding, consiste nel misurare la distanza fra apparecchi oppure nel fornire un
limite superiore a questa distanza. Entrambi gli elementi costituiscono due componenti es-
senziali per diversi servizi e applicazioni, quali routing, controllo di accesso fisico, tracking e
localizzazione. Tuttavia, l’accessibilita` delle reti wireless rende piu` facile l’abuso di neighbor
discovery e ranging, compromettendo i servizi di rete e applicazioni overlay. Per prevenire cio`,
numerosi scritti hanno proposto protocolli che mettano in sicurezza questi due elementi fon-
damentali. Malgrado cio`, due aspetti cruciali per la sicurezza di tali protocolli hanno ricevuto
relativamente poca attenzione: verifica formale e attacchi sul layer di comunicazione fisico.
Essi sono infatti il fulcro della presente tesi.
Nella prima parte di questa tesi, il nostro contributo e´ un’analisi formale di protocolli
per la “secure communication neighbor discovery”. Il modello formale che vi costruiamo
comprende le caratteristiche salienti dei sistemi wireless, come la posizione dei nodi, i tempi
di propagazione dei messaggi e la variabilita` del link wireless. Inoltre, provvediamo a una
specificazione di“secure neighbor discovery”. In seguito, deriviamo un risultato d’impossibilita`
per una classe generale di protocolli che nominiamo “time-based protocols”, asserendo che non
vi siano tali protocolli che forniscano un secure neighbor discovery. Per tale risultato, offriamo
inoltre le condizioni in cui esso si manifesta. Dopodiche´, proviamo che protocolli specifici
della classe “time-based”, sotto condizioni aggiuntive, e protocolli specifici della classe che
denominiamo “time- and location-based” soddisfano le specificazioni di neighbor discovery.
Rinforziamo questo risultato tramite una meccanizzazione del modello e prove nel theorem
prover Isabelle.
Nella seconda parte della tesi, esploriamo attacchi sul layer fisico che possano appar-
entemente diminuire il tempo di arrivo di un messaggio senza modificarne il contenuto. Di
conseguenza, essi possono eludere i protocolli di neighbor discovery basati sul tempo e i pro-
tocolli di distance bounding. (In effetti, essi violano le supposizioni necessarie per provare
la correttezza dei protocolli nella prima parte della tesi.) Ci focalizziamo sull’Impulse Radio
Ultra-Wideband, una tecnologia di layer fisico particolarmente adatta per l’implementazione
di distance bounding grazie alla sua abilita` di effettuare un’accurato ranging indoor. In primo
luogo, adattiamo gli attacchi riportati negli scritti precedenti a IEEE 802.15.4a, lo standard
de facto per Impulse Radio, e valutiamo la loro performance. Mostriamo come un avversario
possa avere successo in un attacco di riduzione della distanza fino a centinaia di metri, con una
probabilita` di successo arbitrariamente elevata ed un costo minimo in termini di potenza di
trasmissione (qualche dB). Di seguito, dimostriamo un nuovo vettore di attacco che scombus-
sola gli algoritmi di estimazione basati sul tempo di arrivo, in particolare quelli sviluppati per
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essere precisi. La riduzione della distanza che puo` essere ottenuta da questo vettore di attacco
e´ nell’ordine del channel spread (nell’ordine di 10 metri in ambiente indoor). Tale vettore di
attacco puo` essere utilizzato in attacchi riportati in scritti precedenti e, inoltre, crea un nuovo
tipo di attacco basato sull’interferenza maligna. Dimostriamo che varianti dell’attacco basato
sull’interferenza maligna sono di gran lunga piu` semplici da portare a termine rispetto a at-
tacchi esterni riportati negli scritti precedenti. Inoltre, forniamo linee guida per il design di
schemi di modulazione e concepiamo algoritmi per il ricevente che mitighano attacchi al layer
fisico. Tali contromisure permettono al designer di sistema di arrivare ad un compromesso fra
sicurezza, precisione del ranging e costi in termini di potenza di trasmissione e lunghezza di
pacchetto.
Parole Chiave neighbor discovery, ranging, distance bounding, relay attack, analisi formale,
attacchi sul layer fisico
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Introduction
It is a sunny Saturday afternoon, and Jean-Luc is going shopping. As he ap-
proaches his car, the car key in his pocket is automatically detected, and the car
door is unlocked.1 “Computer, plot a course to the local supermarket” announces
Jean-Luc as he enters the car. While he is fastening his seatbelt, the car’s naviga-
tion unit acquires the GPS signal, estimates the location, fetches the latest traffic
information and computes an optimal route to the store.2 “Make it so” confirms
Jean-Luc. On route, the navigation unit records the trajectory, based on which
Jean-Luc’s account is automatically credited with appropriate road tolls.3
When Jean-Luc enters the store, his mobile phone estimates its location based on
WiFi access points in the neighborhood.4 This allows the phone to check-in online
into the store5. As it is the 10th time Jean-Luc has visited the store this month,
he obtains a 5% fidelity discount. A few minutes later, his phone informs him that
his friend Beverly (or rather her phone) was also detected in the store.6 Pleased
with this fortunate coincidence, Jean-Luc quickly finds Beverly to arrange a few
details about the barbecue that evening. On his way out, he passes by the cash
register, and waves his phone in front of the cash register to pay for the groceries;7
his fidelity discount is automatically applied.
This short scene, although not entirely grounded in reality at the time this thesis is written,
can hardly be called science-fiction. It illustrates how prominent a role wireless communi-
cation plays and will play in daily activities of people and businesses. The scene provides
just a few examples, but they are sufficient to illustrate the two factors that motivated us
for this thesis. First, many of these applications and services are security-sensitive, meaning
that there is a clear incentive (notably monetary) for an adversary to meddle with them.
Second, these services rely on two fundamental building blocks: discovering neighbors, i.e.,
wireless devices available for direct communication, or in physical proximity; and ranging,
i.e., computing the distance between wireless devices. The bad news is that the open nature
of wireless communications makes it quite easy for an adversary to disrupt neighbor discov-
ery and ranging. And through disrupting these building blocks, the adversary can abuse
overlaying applications and services.
1Passive Keyless Entry and Start systems [162].
2TomTom [10], Google Navigation [7]
3The Toll Collect system in Germany, currently for trucks [9].
4Skyhook [8].
5FourSquare [2], Facebook Places [3].
6Nokia Instant Community based on ad-hoc WiFi communications [11]
7News and rumors about Google Android [1], Apple IPhone and IPad [6], or Microsoft Windows Phone [5].
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2 Introduction
Not surprisingly, the research community has proposed a number of protocols for secure
neighbor discovery (ND) and secure ranging, traditionally termed distance bounding (DB).
However, in most cases the security of these protocols is only argued in an informal fashion.
The history of security protocols has shown that an informal analysis is often insufficient,
and many design flaws were discovered after protocol publication. This motivated us to pur-
sue the investigation that comprises the first part of this thesis: A formal analysis of secure
neighbor discovery. Another aspect that has received relatively little attention is security
at the physical-communication-layer (PHY). Distance bounding protocols, as well as many
neighbor discovery protocols, are cryptographic protocols that incorporate precise message
time-of-flight measurements. It was pointed out in [35] that an adversary can bypass such
protocols by mounting physical-communication-layer attacks that decrease the measured dis-
tance while preserving the payload of messages. The second part of the thesis is devoted to
the study of such PHY attacks, as well as countermeasures.
Contributions
In this thesis, we address the security of two fundamental elements of wireless networking:
neighbor discovery and ranging. We focus on two aspects crucial for the security of these
protocols: formal analysis and security on the physical-communication-layer. We make the
following main contributions:
1. We build a formal model that captures the characteristics of wireless systems crucial
for the security on neighbor discovery and ranging, such as message propagation time,
device location, and the neighbor relation. This framework allows us to formally reason
about two general classes of protocols: “time-based protocols” and “time-and-location-
based protocols”. We prove an impossibility result for time-based protocols: Essentially,
secure discovery of neighbors available for direct communication is not possible if the
adversary can relay messages with a delay below a threshold determined by the commu-
nication range of the honest devices. We also prove the security of concrete time-based
and time-and-location-based neighbor discovery protocols under additional realistic as-
sumptions. We thus demonstrate that time-based protocols can provide secure commu-
nication ND if the adversary cannot relay messages with a delay below the threshold.
In contrast, time-and-location-based protocols, a construct that we introduce, can pro-
vide secure communication ND as long as the adversary introduces a strictly positive
relaying delay.
2. We investigate the vulnerability of IEEE 802.15.4a to PHY attacks. IEEE 802.15.4a is
a standard for Impulse-Radio Ultra-wideband, a technology particularly well suited for
distance bounding, thanks to its ability to perform precise ranging even in indoor envi-
ronments. We adapt physical layer attacks reported in prior work to IEEE 802.15.4a and
evaluate their performance with PHY simulations. We demonstrate that an adversary
can achieve a distance-decrease of hundreds of meters with an arbitrarily high probabil-
ity of success, with only a minor cost in terms of transmission power (few dB). This is in
part due to certain features of the standard that are designed to improve performance.
We propose simple modifications to IEEE 802.15.4a; they remove the vulnerability while
retaining the performance benefits introduced by these features. Combined with simple
countermeasures implemented at the receiver side, this limits the distance-decrease that
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the adversary can achieve to a value in the order of the channel spread (in the order of
10 meters in indoor environments) at a minor cost in term of packet length.
3. We reveal a new attack vector against IR-UWB ranging that is directed at message
time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation. This attack vector can decrease the measured dis-
tance by values in the order of the channel spread. Hence, it is a threat for precise
distance bounding. It can be be used in previously reported PHY attacks, but it also
enables a new type of PHY attack, based on malicious interference. This attack is
much easier to mount than alternative external attacks, although it is less precise. We
show with simulations and experiments that the attack is effective against a number
of receivers. We also identify countermeasures that allow wireless devices to perform
distance bounding that is both secure and precise, although at a cost of significantly
increasing the packet length.
Thesis Outline
Part I is devoted to formal analysis and focuses on neighbor discovery. In Chapter 1 we
provide a general introduction of secure neighbor discovery. In Chapter 2 we define the for-
mal framework and present the results obtained within this framework. Part II is devoted
to physical-communication-layer security and focuses on distance bounding. In Chapter 3
we provide an general introduction to distance bounding, physical-communication-layer at-
tacks, and Impulse-Radio Ultra-wideband. In Chapter 4 we cover the security evaluation of
IEEE 802.15.4a, whereas in Chapter 5 we address attacks on time-of-arrival estimation and
countermeasures.
Publications
Chapter 1 is based on [113]. Chapter 2 combines the results from [130] and [131]. Chapter 3
and Chapter 4 are based on [59] and [128]. Chapter 5 is an extended version of [127]; the
Chapter content is currently under submission to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communi-
cations.

Part I
Formal Analysis of Secure Neighbor
Discovery
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Neighbor Discovery
A major benefit of wireless communications is flexibility, notably in terms of the mobility of
devices and their users. Indeed, a device equipped with a wireless interface can start com-
municating with another device, an access point, or a base station, almost instantly, without
setting up a cable connection. As a consequence, wireless connections are frequently estab-
lished, making discovering neighbors an indispensable element of wireless networks. However,
due to the open nature of wireless networks, neighbor discovery (ND) is easy to abuse: An
adversary can convince a device into falsely believing that another device is its neighbor. The
adversary can then use these false neighbor links to disrupt the applications and services that
use ND as a building block.
Securing ND has therefore attracted considerable attention from the research community,
and a number of secure ND protocols have been proposed. However, not much attention has
been devoted to the meticulous analysis of ND, and the subtleties of ND are often overlooked.
This motivated us to develop a formal framework for analysis of ND (Chapter 2), which is
the main contribution of Part I of this thesis.
Chapter Outline In this Chapter, we provide a general introduction to secure ND. In Sec-
tion 1.1 we clarify the definition of neighbor, emphasizing the difference between communica-
tion neighbor and physical neighbor; and we provide a basic taxonomy of ND protocols. In
Section 1.2 we give representative examples of using ND as a building block. In Section 1.3 we
explain how easy it is to attack ND with a relay attack, provide a classification of relay attacks,
and explain how, by abusing ND, an adversary can disrupt overlaying applications. Finally,
in Section 1.4 we provide an overview of secure ND protocols proposed in the literature.
1.1 Neighborhood and Neighbor Discovery
Devices in existing and upcoming wireless networks are diverse in their characteristics and
functionality. To introduce the problem at hand, we abstract away numerous details and
consider system entities to be generic nodes. Each node has a unique identity, a processing
unit, and a wireless transceiver.
Nodes communicate over the wireless medium, based on the state of the medium and
the capabilities of their transceivers. We do not dwell on the transceiver characteristics,
unless needed. In general, beyond technical characteristics of the transceivers (notably their
antennas), parameters and factors that determine the ability to communicate include: (i) the
7
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power of the transmitted signal, (ii) the distance between the transmitting and (intended)
receiving nodes, (iii) the ratio of the received power over that of noise and interfering signals,
and (iv) and propagation environment.
1.1.1 Communication and Physical Neighborhood
We define the communication neighborhood of a node U as the set NC(U) of nodes able to
send information directly to U . In other words, a node V is a communication neighbor of U
if and only if U is able to receive packets transmitted by node V . Equivalently, we denote
the communication neighborhood by stating that the (V,U) (wireless) link is up. Otherwise,
we say that (V,U) is down. A graph in which vertices represent nodes, and edges reflect the
state of the links is called the connectivity graph.
We define the physical neighborhood of a node U as the set NP(U, r) of nodes that are
at a distance smaller than r from U . This notion is intuitively related to communication
neighborhood. Indeed, is we set r = R, where R is the nominal communication range of the
wireless technology that nodes U and V use for communication, then node V ∈ NC(U) can
be expected to be a physical neighbor of U as well.
However, it is crucial to clarify that communication and physical neighborhood are not
equivalent in general. On one hand, communication neighborhood does not imply physical
neighborhood. For example, a node V that increases its transmission power, exceeds the
expected communication range, and thus places itself in NC(U) but not in NP(U,R). On the
other hand, physical neighborhood does not imply communication neighborhood. Consider,
for example, V ∈ NP(U,R) that cannot send information directly to U because of an obstacle
(e.g., a wall); clearly, V /∈ NC(U). The two types of neighborhood are equivalent only under
the unit disk communication model, which considers U and V communication neighbors if
and only if their (geometric) distance is below R. This model is a useful, but unrealistic
approximation: It assumes free space propagation, no interference, and non-existent isotropic
antennas.
Note that physical neighborhood is by definition symmetric. However, communication
neighborhood, as defined, may be asymmetric. Even if V ∈ NC(U), U is not necessarily able to
send information directly to V and would therefore not belong to NC(V ). For communication
neighborhood to be symmetric, both links (V,U) and (U, V ) must simultaneously be up.
1.1.2 Neighbor Discovery Protocols
Neighbor(hood) Discovery (ND) protocols attempt to determine the neighbors (communica-
tion or physical) of a given node. Therefore, their main requirement is correctness: to identify
only nodes that are actual neighbors, that is, to prevent an adversary from tricking nodes into
accepting non-neighbors as neighbors. Verifying that a given node is indeed a neighbor could
be viewed as a stand-alone part of secure neighborhood discovery functionality; we term this
as verification. For example, a node could obtain neighborhood information in an insecure
manner, but then perform verification to achieve secure ND.
In practice, ND protocols are only partial , as they may fail to discover (and verify) all
neighbors. This is because it is difficult to guarantee message delivery in wireless networks.
Furthermore, an adversary can jam communication and thereby prevent the discovery of one,
many, or even all nodes that would be otherwise part of the neighborhood.
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This problem can be avoided in restricted operating environments, where anti-jamming
or other measures guarantee the delivery of messages. We call a ND protocol complete when
it discovers all honest (or correct) neighbors, that is nodes that abide with the protocol func-
tionality. We restrict ourself to honest, correctly functioning participants because dishonest
or faulty nodes can always refrain from participating in the protocol execution.
1.1.3 Neighbor Discovery versus Distance Bounding
Distance Bounding (DB) protocols attempt to determine the distance between a verifier node
and a prover node, or more precisely, an upper-bound on this distance. Hence, they are similar
to physical ND protocols. The difference is the output of the protocol: When executed at
node U with node V , a physical ND protocol returns true if node V is located closer than r
(a parameter of the protocol), or false otherwise. In contrast, a DB protocol returns rˆ, which
is an upper-bound on the distance to V .
A DB protocol can be easily converted to an physical ND protocol, but typically only a
partial one. Indeed, if the DB protocol returns a loose upper-bound, then node V can be
declared a non-neighbor even if it is closer than r. Furthermore, a physical ND protocol with
r = R, the nominal communication range, can be converted into a (very conservative) DB
protocol. However, such a protocol would not satisfy an additional requirement that we put
on DB protocols in Part II: In a benign setting, we expect a DB protocol to provide an exact
range estimate (Section 3.1.1).
1.2 ND as a Building Block
Neighbor discovery enables different types of system functionality, as the following examples
illustrate.
Physical Access Control Receiving a packet from an RFID tag with a tag reader can be
used to authorize the access of the tag bearer to a building (Figure 1.1(a)), or to trigger the
opening of a car door in a Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES) system [162]. Packet
reception implies the tag is at most within a system-specific predefined distance (e.g., a few
centimeters or couple of meters) from the tag reader. Physical access control systems leverage
on the range-limited communication capabilities of their hardware (tags), aiming essentially
at physical ND.
Network Access Control In general, access to network resources is granted only to reg-
istered users or devices. Nonetheless, direct communication with a dedicated system entity
can be an important access control criterion in mobile wireless systems. For example, nodes
obtain connectivity with the Internet only when they are in range of a WLAN Access Point
(AP) or a cellular system base station. Here, access control relies on communication ND.
Routing In multi-hop wireless networks, all types of data communication and dissemination
(one-to-one, one-to-(m)any, or broadcast) rely on the notion of neighborhood. The neighbors
of each node are always the ones that receive and forward control traffic and data to and from
the node, for example, for route discovery and communication with another (destination)
node. If a destination is already identified as a neighbor, then no route discovery or calculation
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Figure 1.1: RFID Access Control. (a) Normal operation: a legitimate user opens the door
controlled by an RFID reader (R) using his RFID card (C). (b) The attack: the leech (L),
next to the RFID card owner, and the ghost (G), next to the RFID reader, use a long-range
link to relay transmissions between the card and the reader. As a result, the reader is misled
to believe that the legitimate card is in its physical neighborhood and opens the door.
is necessary. In the case a location-based routing protocol is employed, the neighbor closest
to the destination’s position is selected. In all of these cases, communication ND is necessary.
If efficiency or fault-tolerance are sought, a complete ND protocol would be desirable. For
example, selecting the appropriate neighbor to forward data to or using alternative paths
assume that many or even all neighbors have been discovered. Completeness of a ND protocol
would therefore prevent the adversary from disconnecting nodes from their benign neighbors.
Localization Neighbor discovery can be used for localization. In urban areas, with an abun-
dance of infrastructure nodes with publicly known locations (cellular base stations, WLAN
access points), this has become a viable alternative to GPS localization. In the simplest case,
a node that wants to localize itself performs neighbor discovery, and derives its own location,
e.g., as a center of mass of the neighbors’ locations. The node can discover neighbor’ locations
form a service like Wigle [4]. Alternatively, in services like Skyhook [8], the device sends a
query with the identifiers of its neighbors (e.g., MAC addresses), and obtains its own location.
This localization process relies on physical ND.
1.3 ND Vulnerabilities and Attacks
If security was not a concern, communication ND would be trivial: Node V sends a beacon
“Hello, I am V ”, and upon receipt of this beacon, U adds V to its communication neigh-
borhood. Or, more implicitly, U adds V to NC(U) whenever it overhears any message that
identifies V as the sender.
Such a protocol is easy to attack: An adversary M can forge and transmit a message
“Hello, I am W” and thus convince node U that W is a neighbor, even if it is not the case,
violating ND correctness. The countermeasure against this attack is equally straightforward:
Apply a cryptographic authentication mechanisms, for example sing the beacon message with
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the sender’s private key. However, this is not sufficient to secure ND. Indeed, M could still
receive a beacon from W and simply relay it, to mislead U into adding W to NC(U). Although
cryptography ensures that the received message has been created and transmitted at some
point by node W , it gives no guarantees that the message was received directly from W . Such
relay attacks constitute a fundamental attack vector against ND protocols. Also known in
the literature as wormhole attacks, they are effective not only against the naive ND protocol
described above, but can also harm the more sophisticated ND protocols that we survey in
Section 1.4.
1.3.1 Classification of Attacks
We begin by differentiating between external and internal adversaries. In contrast to an
external adversary, an internal adversary is an entity that is a legitimate, but malicious
participant of the network, typically possessing cryptographic keys as all honest participants
do. We can then distinguish between the following threat models:
i) An external adversary misleading two honest nodes that are not neighbors into estab-
lishing a neighborhood relation. A relay attack is a special case of this attack.
ii) An internal adversary misleading two honest nodes that are not neighbors into estab-
lishing a neighborhood relation.
iii) An internal adversary tricking a non-neighboring honest node to believe that he is a
neighbor, possibly with the assistance of other adversarial nodes (external or internal)
or even the unwilling assistance of an honest node.
Traditionally, communication ND protocols focus on threat models (i) and (ii). Note that
the threat models are similar to the threat models considered for distance bounding protocols
(Section 3.1): the mafia fraud (threats i and ii) and the distance fraud, the distance hijacking
attack and the terrorist fraud (threat iii).
The adversarial nodes are typically assumed to be able to communicate via fast adver-
sarial links not perceivable to the honest nodes. The number of nodes that the adversary
controls can play a crucial role: Some secure ND schemes proposed in the literature are se-
cure against a basic relay attack mounted with two adversarial nodes (2-end wormhole), but
can be circumvented with, e.g., a 3-end wormhole.
In a typical Dolev-Yao fashion [48], an adversarial node is capable of transmitting arbi-
trary messages that he is able to generate without breaking cryptographic primitives such as
encryption, digital signatures, or random nonces. In particular, the adversary can modify a
received message before he retransmit it. Furthermore, the adversary can jam node commu-
nication in a selective or brute-force manner, possibly adjusting its transmission power and
thus its impact. In the context of ND, jamming can obviously prevent the completeness of
ND (even thwart the discovery of any neighbors at all), but also allow subtle attacks against
some existing ND schemes (Section 1.4).
Relay Attacks
An important characteristic of a relay attack is the delay introduced when relaying messages.
This is a critical parameter in the case where timing bounds are used in the defense against
relay attacks, as explained in Section 1.4. We can classify attackers as:
i) Store-and-forward relays, if they need to receive the entire message before they are able
to relay it.
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ii) Fast relays, if they can start retransmitting the message while it is being received.
iii) Distance-decreasing relays, if they can relay a message with seemingly negative delay,
by mounting appropriate attacks on physical-communication-layer [35]. We deal with
such attacks in Part II of the thesis.
The store-and-forward relay is relatively easy to implement. In contrast, faster relay
attacks require more sophistication from the adversary (Section 1.4).
We also differentiate between short-range and long-range relay attacks. The former
resulting in fictitious links shorter than the nominal node communication range R, and the
latter in links longer than R. This distinction is meaningful because short-range relays, as
opposed to long-range ones, do not violate the correctness of physical ND. As a result, they
cannot be detected by mechanisms protecting physical ND.
We further differentiate relay attacks according to the adversarial node behavior: they can
either always forward packets or do so selectively. Moreover, they can relay messages using
omnidirectional or directional antennas.
Tunneling Attacks It is important to point out the difference between relay attacks and
tunneling attacks [112], which were introduced in the context of routing. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that two internal adversarial nodes participate correctly in their respective ND protocols,
but “tunnel” (i.e., encapsulate and transmit to each other) control traffic, so that they ap-
pear as neighbors on routes discovered by the routing protocol. In contrast to relay attacks,
tunneling attacks cannot be thwarted by any secure ND protocol.
We note that in the literature the term wormhole attack is used differently by different
authors, and some authors use it do describe both relay and tunneling attacks (and adding
prefixes such as open/closed or hidden/exposed wormholes). In this thesis, we assume that a
wormhole attack is synonymous to a relay attack.
1.3.2 Attacks on Overlaying Applications
Next, we discuss the implications of successful relay attacks for the upper-layer protocols and
services discussed in Section 1.2.
Physical Access Control We consider an attack against an RFID-based system that con-
trols physical access to a building, illustrated in Figure 1.1(b). For this attack [81], whose
practical implementation was reported in [67], the adversary must control two nodes. The
first adversarial node, the leech, is placed close to the victim’s RFID tag. The second, the
ghost, is placed next to the RFID reader controlling the building’s entrance. Independently
of the distance from the victim’s tag to the reader, the leech and the ghost relay messages
between them, thereby misleading the reader into believing that the legitimate RFID tag
is close, granting access to the ghost’s bearer. A similar attack against PKES systems was
implemented in [61].
As pointed out in Section 1.2, such a physical access control system should guarantee
physical ND. However, it fails because its design considers communication and physical neigh-
borhood as equivalent and it relies on a naive communication ND approach. As a result, the
attack violates the correctness of communication ND and thus the correctness of physical ND.
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Figure 1.2: Relay Attack on Network Access. Mobile Node 1 cannot directly connect to the
Access Point because it is out of range. Similarly, Mobile Node 2 cannot directly connect
to the AP due to an obstacle. However, the Attacker Nodes can act as relays between the
Mobile Nodes and the Access Point, misleading them they can communicate directly, and
thus control the communication.
Network Access Control We consider an attack, illustrated in Figure 1.2, against mobile
nodes trying to connect to an Access Point (AP). As Mobile Node 1 (MN1) is out of the AP’s
range, Adversary Node 1 can easily act as a relay between MN1 and AP. A relay attack is also
possible when two nodes are physical neighbors (with r equal to the nominal communication
range) but are not communication neighbors; this is the case for Mobile Node 2 and AP in
Figure 1.2. In both cases, the correctness of communication ND is violated.
One could argue that the adversarial nodes provide a service to the system, as they
essentially extend the AP coverage. But, in doing so, the adversary takes control of the
node-to-AP connections. It can then intercept the relayed messages, as well as modify and
delete them at will. In wireless networks eavesdropping is easy, yet, without the adversarial
relays there would be no communication to eavesdrop on. Moreover, data modification would
be more difficult without the relay attack. If MN1 were in range of the AP, the adversary
would need at least two strategically positioned and synchronized nodes: one node jamming
the AP, to prevent it from receiving the messages of MN1, and the second node recording
MN1’s transmissions and replaying their modified version.
Eavesdropping can be prevented by encryption, whereas message modification and deletion
can only be detected (for example, with the help of digital signatures and message sequence
numbers) but not prevented. Nonetheless, the relaying adversaries can delete messages ef-
fectively and, more important, stealthily: unlike jamming, the victim nodes (notably, the
sending one) can detect the message loss but not its cause. Even worse, the adversary can
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Figure 1.3: Relay Attack on Routing (I). By creating an artificial link (A,B), the adversary
M attracts routes, e.g. (U, V )-routes that would otherwise use link (C,D). In this way, acting
only locally, M gains control over the communication of remote nodes, e.g. U and V .
choose the point in time to delete messages in order to cause the most harm.
Routing We consider relay attacks against ND in a multihop ad hoc network, such as a
sensor network. The significance of such wormhole attacks was first mentioned in [74, 112].
In Figure 1.3, nodes A and B are close to each other but unable to communicate directly due
to the terrain and their transceiver limitations. The adversary places a node M within range
of A and B, where M acts as a relay, making A and B believe that they are communication
neighbors. Then, it is highly likely that U and V will communicate across a route that
includes the adversary-controlled link (A,B). Such a U − V route would be shorter than one
that includes (C,D), and shorter routes are in general preferable. The result of this attack
can be devastating. At first, the adversary-controlled link attracts considerable traffic. In
addition, if the network relays a time-critical alarm, the adversary can stealthily cut-off its
“link” and prevent the event detection by the network user.
The attacker’s control over route establishment can be further enhanced, as shown in
Figure 1.4. M1, M2, and M3 are nodes controlled by the attacker, acting as simple relays.
At the same time, the adversarial nodes N1 and N2 relay messages across a private out-of-
band N1 ↔ N2 channel. Again, these attacks form short routes for many pairs of nodes,
empowering the adversary to control significant amounts of network traffic.
Localization We consider attacks on a ND-based localization system. The attack deceives
a node that is trying to localize itself into believing it is at a location chosen by the adversary.
If an ND protocol without authentication is used1, the adversary can simply spoof: The
adversary 1) jams the ND messages from the true neighbors of the node, and 2) transmits
forged ND messages from infrastructure nodes located at a chosen location. Such an attack
against the Skyhook system has been demonstrated in [147]. In contrast, if the ND protocol
incorporates authentication, forging of the ND messages is not possible. In that case, step 2
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Figure 1.4: Relay Attack on Routing (II). By relaying transmissions between nodes A1 and B1,
the adversarial nodes M1, M2, and M3 create an artificial, long-range link (A1,B1). Similarly,
nodes N1 and N2 can use an out-of-band channel to relay transmissions between A2 and B2.
In both cases, the artificial link offers a route much shorter then alternative ones, and thus
attracts traffic the adversary has control over.
of the attack can be replaced with a relay attack, as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
1.4 Survey of ND Protocols
We provide an overview of ND (and related) protocols, dividing them into the following basic
categories. Two-party protocols are protocols that involve only the two nodes discovering if
they are neighbors. Such protocols can be applied in any context, including the examples we
provided for physical and networks access control. Multi-party protocols, in contrast, require
the assistance of at least one extra node, and in some cases require a complete multi-hop
network, which limits their applicability. Furthermore, schemes differ in hardware require-
ments, and work under different assumptions; we comment on the practicality of those. By
default, we assume that the nodes share some cryptographic materials that allows them to
authenticate each other.
We note that, traditionally, most ND protocols focus on the case where both participating
nodes are honest. In other words, they only provide protection against threats (i) and (ii),
but not (iii).
1.4.1 Two-Party Protocols
Time-based In a time-based approach, node V exchanges one or more messages with a
potential neighbor U , measures the message time-of-flight, and multiplies it by the propagation
1The most obvious reason for no performing authentication is the lack of shared cryptographic material
(e.g., shared symmetric keys, public keys, or certificates) between a node trying to localize itself and the
infrastructure nodes. Without such material, authentication is not possible.
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Figure 1.5: Relay Attack on ND-based localization. Adversary Node 1 jams the communi-
cation between the Mobile Node and the Access Points in its neighborhood at Location 1.
Next, AN1 and AN2 relay the communication between the Mobile Node and Access Points
at Location 2. As a result, the Mobile Node believes that the Access Points at Location 2 are
its neighbors, and computes its position to be at Location 2.
speed of the wireless medium v to obtain the distance to U . If the distance is below a threshold
r, node V concludes that U is a neighbor. The time-of-flight measurement is combined with
authenticating U to V . The threshold r is typically the nominal communication range R of
the wireless technology used by the nodes. The wireless medium is typically RF, and v = c,
the speed of light, which has an important security implication: The adversary is not able to
make the message travel faster than the speed of light, i.e., he cannot decrease the measured
distance. (Unless he resorts to physical-communication-layer attacks [35] which seemingly
reduce the propagation time, see Part II of the thesis).
This approach can guarantee physical ND, assuming that the physical-communication-
layer is secure against distance-decreasing attacks. On the contrary, a fast short-range relay
attack can deceive two nearby nodes that cannot communicate directly into believing they
are communication neighbors. In Chapter 2 we prove that no time-based protocol can, in
general, provide communication ND. Nevertheless, time-based protocols can be used as an
approximation of communication ND: they are secure against long-range relay attacks, and
against adversaries that introduce a relatively long delay when relaying. We elaborate on this
in Section 2.4.
Time-based ND protocols are related to distance bounding protocols (as mentioned in
Section 1.1.3). We provide a survey of distance bounding protocols in Section 3.4. Here,
we discuss time-based protocols that were designed to provide (approximate) communication
ND, under the assumption that both participating nodes are honest.
Temporal packet leashes [74] assume that nodes have precisely synchronized clocks (down
to a nanosecond or microsecond level). A node V broadcast an authenticated message that
includes a time-stamp of the time of transmission. Any node U that receives this message
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can, thanks to clock synchronization, estimate the message time-of-flight, and proclaim V
a neighbor if it is below a threshold (typically equal to R/c plus some fixed and known
processing time). The big advantage of this scheme is its low communication cost: One
message is sufficient to allow all neighbors to securely discover V . It also allows making ND
implicit, by attaching an authenticated time-stamp to every message. The obvious drawback
of the scheme is the requirement of precise (and secure) clock synchronization, which is non-
trivial: It can be achieved with setting the clock time when a node is deployed and using
high quality clocks with very small drift. Or, the nodes can run secure clock synchronization
algorithms, but this is shown to be as difficult as secure ND ([32], see Section 2.5.1). Or,
the nodes can obtain the time from a GPS (or similar) module, which increases the cost and
power-consumption of the nodes, and is susceptible to spoofing [76]. Another drawback is that
temporal packet leashes do not allow to perform secure ND with an adversarial node, as it can
easily forge a time-stamp. In addition, time-stamping the message at the necessary level of
precision can be technically challenging on platforms with non-programmable or proprietary
medium access control (MAC) layer.
To remove the requirement of clock synchronization, a number of works have proposed
to replace a single-message beacon scheme with a challenge-response scheme [174, 55, 105].
In particular, the Truelink protocol [55] is integrating the challenge-response scheme into
the RTS/CTS mechanism of IEEE 802.11. As with temporal packet leashes, implementing
such a scheme can pose a technical challenge, as the authors of [55] report: They were not
able to implement TrueLink on the IEEE 802.11 devices they had available, because of the
proprietary firmware. Another drawback of such schemes is the communication overhead: A
group of n fully connected nodes needs O(n2) messages to perform secure ND, versus only
O(n) messages requires with packet leashes. This can be a problem notably in highly mobile
and highly connected networks such as Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). Nevertheless,
in many systems challenge-response time-based ND protocols can be a viable solution, if the
MAC layer is sufficiently open. In particular, successful implementations of such schemes for
wireless sensor networks have been reported [14, 142].
Location-based If available, trustworthy location information can be utilized for secure
ND. Such information can be provided at deployment time (for static networks), or from a
GPS (or similar) module. Or, it can be provided by a secure localization scheme that uses
the same wireless channel as the ND protocol [155, 89, 90, 156]; however such schemes are
often based on ND or distance bounding, creating a vicious dependency circle.
Geographical packet leashes [74] are based on loose clock synchronization. Similar to
temporal packet leashes, node V broadcasts an authenticated message that contains a time-
stamp and a location-stamp. Any node U that receives such a message, can check if the
message is not expired (thanks to loose clock synchronization). If not, U computes the distance
to V, and declares V a neighbor if it is closer than R. This provides physical ND. To provide
communication ND, the authors of [74] propose that U , knowing V and its own location,
can decide if direct communication is possible based on a radio propagation model. This
requirement is impractical and hard to satisfy in general in a communication environment that
is not known a priori or highly dynamic. The scheme has similar advantages and disadvantages
to temporal packet leashes.
Another scheme that provides secure physical ND by using location information is pro-
posed in [173]. The scheme relies on a concept of location-based keys, with the goal of
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preventing not only relay attacks, but also Sybil, replication and sinkhole attacks.
An alternative way to provide communication ND is to combine time-based protocols with
location-based protocols, as we propose in Section 2.3.
Device Fingerprinting Another ND approach relies on device RF fingerprinting, that is, the
identification of characteristic signal patterns induced by radio transmitters. These techniques
exploit the fact that transmitters, being physically distinct, generate slightly different wireless
signals. This, in theory, allows the node receiving a signal to uniquely identify the source of
that signal, and thus provide communication ND [134].
A number of works for device fingerprinting have beed presented in the literature, e.g.,
[34, 153, 134, 154, 24, 78, 42, 40, 139, 170], designed for different technologies and using differ-
ent techniques. In particular, transient-based techniques are often considered for enhancing
the authentication of RFID systems, and prevent RFID tag cloning [42, 139, 170]. These
approaches can provide high identification accuracy, but – currently – at the cost complex
and expensive hardware (typically an oscilloscope with a few GSamples/s sampling rate). In
addition, in such systems the tag is typically placed in a fixed position very close to the reader,
such that the wireless channel is known and constant. Generalizing such techniques to vari-
able environments can prove challenging, because the machine learning techniques underlying
such approaches would have to distinguish between device-specific factors and the influence
of the wireless channel. Furthermore, in [41] it was shown that a sophisticated adversary,
by recording the transient and replaying it with a waveform generator can successfully spoof
such systems.
Other works propose device fingerprinting based on features that are both more robust
to variable propagation environments and easier to measure with commodity hardware. For
example, Brik et al. [24] propose a “modulation-based” technique based on several PHY fea-
tures: frequency error, SYNC correlation, I/Q offset error, magnitude error, and phase error.
It allows for accurate identification of IEEE 802.11 devices from up to 25m away. Zanetti et
al. [170] propose another technique based on time interval error that allows for classification
of UHF RFID chips from up to 6 meters away. In [78], the authors propose to perform device
fingerprinting of IEEE 802.11 access points based on their clock skews. However, such tech-
niques proved relatively easy to spoof: [15] proposes an off-the-shelf-hardware attack against
the method proposed in [78]. In [41], the authors use GNU software radios to successfully im-
personate devices fingerprinted with the modulation-based method [24]. It is an open question
whether it is possible to design device fingerprinting that is robust to environmental factors
(distance, antenna orientation, propagation environment), implementable on low- or mid-end
devices, and resilient to spoofing.
Channel Fingerprinting In most environments, notably indoor, the wireless channel is
much “richer” than wireline channels. On its way from a transmitter to a receiver, the wire-
less signal traverses multiple paths, and is reflected from various obstacles such as walls,
furniture, or people. This makes the design or wireless communication systems challenging.
In particular, it is a challenge for device fingerprinting techniques, as they must distinguish
between device-specific and channel-induced effects. It also creates vulnerabilities in precise
ranging that we explore in Part II of the thesis.
However, the wireless channel has properties that make this diversity useful for security
purposes: 1) Channel decorrelation: The channel state, which can be characterized by the
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channel impulse response (CIR), is location-specific. Two devices U and W that receive a
message from device V observe CIRs that are not correlated, if they are located more than
the RF wavelength apart. This is referred to as spatial decorrelation. The channel also
decorrelates over time, although this happens less rapidly in static settings. 2) Reciprocity:
The CIR that device U observes when communicating with V is the same as the CIR that V
observes when communication with U , if measured at the same time instant.
These two properties allow two devices to derive a shared (thanks to reciprocity) and
secret (thanks to spatial decorrelation) key. Indeed, most research on using the channel for
security purposes is devoted to this topic; a recent overview of such efforts is provided in
[91]. Beyond key extraction, spatial decorrelation allows for a form of message authentication
[166]. A receiver can record, for every received packet, the CIR estimate, or a similar channel
fingerprint that its hardware allows it to estimate. Assuming that the channel does not change
(significantly) between packet transmissions, two packets transmitted by the same sender U
would have similar fingerprints; whereas a transmission from another device W , e.g., trying
to impersonate U would have a different fingerprint. It was shown it possible to apply such
techniques if the channel varies over time [165] and even if nodes are mobile [164].
Finally, combining such channel-based authentication with channel reciprocity could be
used to provide communication ND: Devices V and U need to estimate the channel fingerprints
on their ends, and exchange them in a (cryptographically) authenticated fashion. If their
estimates are (almost) identical, they can conclude that they are communication neighbors.
However, this approach would not be effective against a relay that preserves the CIR of the
relayed transmission, e.g., an analog relay. Indeed, consider that node W is such an analog
relay, and that the CIR of the V ↔ W channel is f and the CIR of the W ↔ U channel is
g. Then the CIR of the V → W → U channel, as well as U → W → V channel is f ∗ g, as
convolution (∗) is commutative.
Beyond the analog relay attack, the security of both authentication and communication
ND based on channel fingerprinting relies on the difficulty of spoofing a channel fingerprint
by an adversary. This topic requires further investigation.
Directional Antennas-based The use of directional antennas to prevent relay attacks is
proposed in [73], under the assumption of the unit disk model, the availability of antennas
with an even number n of non-overlapping zones each spanning an angle of 2pin , and the
ability to have zones identically oriented for all nodes (e.g., using a compass). If two nodes
are communication neighbors, a message sent over some zone zi should be received at the
opposite zone zi. Information (cryptographically protected) on the used zone is included in
messages to detect simple relay attacks. However, it is possible that the zones match even
under a wormhole attack, if the wormhole end are positioned appropriately with respect to
the honest nodes. To detect such cases, two extensions of the scheme with a third verifier
node is proposed. The extended schemes can prevent 2-end wormholes spanning over more
than 2-hops; but a relay attack spanning 2-hops is possible. Furthermore, a k-end wormhole,
k > 2, can defeat this scheme. In the most extreme case, it is clear that an adversary can
place a relay node in every zone of every honest node, and relay messages in a selective
fashion to completely defeat the scheme. But even a 3-end wormhole can create a number of
false links. A further disadvantage of the extended schemes is the need for an appropriately
located verifier node. If one is not available, a valid link cannot be verified. This limits the
applicability of the extended schemes in low density networks. In addition, the applicability
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is further restricted by the requirement of identically oriented directional antennas.
A scheme based on a similar idea, but designed for underwater acoustic networks is pro-
posed in [171].
1.4.2 Multi-Party Protocols
Time- and Distance-based A scheme proposed in [142] extends simple time-based proto-
cols with additional verification based on simple geometric tests performed in a 2-hop neigh-
borhood. This allows the scheme to provably prevent fast, short-range 2-end relay attacks.
The geometric tests require the knowledge of distances between the neighbors, which can
be measured with, e.g., ultra-sound ranging. This constitutes the biggest drawback of the
scheme: It limits the applicability of the scheme to systems where such range measurements
are possible.
Location-based If only a subset of nodes is location-aware, these nodes, termed as guards,
can help other nodes establish neighbor relations. In the scheme propose in [126], guards
broadcast beacon messages reporting their location. Afterwards, other nodes exchange infor-
mation about received beacon messages and assume they are neighbors if sufficiently many
common beacon messages (at least k) were received. Relay attacks are detected based on
two principles: 1) any beacon message should be received at most once and 2) all locations
in received beacon messages should lie in a circle with a radius two times the guard range.
This can prevent relatively simple relay attacks, but not more elaborate attackers. For ex-
ample, a selective wormhole can avoid detection based on principle 1). Moreover, one end
of a wormhole can jam and prevent reception of legitimate beacon messages, relay beacon
messages from the other end of the wormhole, and essentially “relocate” the victim node(s),
much like the attack in Figure 1.5. The scheme is probabilistic in nature, and the threshold
k is calculated in the unit disk model, based on the density of guard and node deployment,
resulting in an approximate physical ND. A similar protocol is proposed in [45].
Connectivity-based A number of schemes that use exclusively connectivity information
have been designed for multi-hop networks. Technically, for the most part such protocols do
not provide secure ND: Rather, they detect the presence of long-range wormhole attacks (2 or
more hops) based on the distortion that such wormholes create in the network topology. Only
some schemes try to localize the wormhole and/or remove affected links. The most significant
advantage of such schemes is that they do not have any hardware requirements. The biggest
drawback is that they require a relatively dense multi-hop network, and cannot be applied in
services such as physical or communication access control.
A centralized scheme is proposed in [28]. The scheme detects the presence of a wormhole
based on two connectivity graph properties: distribution of the node degree, and distribution
of the shortest path lengths. The system must known the expected values of these statistics
in the benign case, i.e., when there is no wormhole attack, which is somewhat of a drawback.
Only wormhole detection is provided.
In [158, 160] a centralized scheme is proposed, based on visualization of the connectivity
graph. The (virtual) coordinates of the nodes, necessary for visualization, are computed with
multi-dimensional scaling. The scheme requires a human operator that will manually inspect
the graph to detect and localize wormholes. Multi-dimensional scaling is also used in [167],
which proposes an automatic test for detecting wormhole attacks. The test is based on the
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k-hop neighborhood diameter. The scheme is decentralized, and only requires the knowledge
of the k-hop neighborhood.
Local network connectivity information is proposed in [93] as the basis of a heuristic to
detect wormholes and reject false links. Nodes exchange locally communication neighbor-
hood information, obtained through a non-secure ND mechanism. Afterwards they check
for forbidden structures, that is, connectivity subgraphs that would exist if a wormhole were
present (and would be unlikely otherwise). Forbidden structures depend on node density
and the connectivity model. For sufficiently high network density, simulation results show
a 100% detection rate with no false alarms, for all connectivity models considered in [93]
(unit disk, as well as more realistic models). However, the simulations assume a relatively
naive relay, whereas a selective wormhole establishing only one or few fake links would be less
likely to create a forbidden structure. Furthermore, although the wormhole detection scheme
is evaluated, it is unclear how the link rejection scheme would perform: the authors point
out that it might reject valid links. An additional drawback of the scheme is that it requires
some knowledge of the connectivity model to determine the parameters defining the forbidden
structures.
A similar approach that uses a different feature of the local neighborhood (generalized
edge-clustering coefficient) is present in [175]. In [49] a scheme that does not require the
knowledge of the connectivity model is proposed. The scheme is based on a topological
methodology, assuming that the network is a 2-manifold of genus 0. The authors show that
their scheme outperforms [93]. However, their approach is specific to 2D networks, and it is
not clear if it would reasonably generalize to 3D networks.
A connectivity-based secure communication ND scheme is proposed in [47]. In this scheme,
node V accepts a new node U as a neighbor, if there exists a short U -V path consisting
exclusively of previously verified neighbors of U and V . The drawback of the scheme is that
is requires a bootstrapping phase free of wormhole attacks.
1.4.3 ND and Routing
In many systems, secure ND is only a step towards secure routing. Hence, there are a number
of proposals that integrate detection and prevention of relay attacks with routing protocols.
Often, such schemes detect tunneling attacks as well as wormhole attacks.
Two time-based examples of such schemes are [33] and [124]. Essentially, in those schemes
the source measures the round-trip-time (RTT) to the destination, and compares it with the
number of hops. If the RTT is too large, the source assumes that a wormhole or tunneling
attack is present. A similar approach, based on location, is proposed in [159]: Each node on
the route must provide its location; a wormhole/tunnel is detected if subsequent nodes are
too remote to be communication neighbors. In the scheme proposed in [161], location of the
source and destination is used to compute their distance, and compare it against the number
of hops. A route it rejected if the number of hops is too small. We should also mention the
LiteWorp protocol [82, 83] in which a set of guard nodes monitors the behavior of other nodes,
and excludes nodes that do not forward packets correctly. However, as the relay nodes are
“invisible” to such a scheme, LiteWorp can only prevent tunneling attacks. An extension of
LiteWrop to mobile network, MobiWorp is presented in [84].
The scheme proposed in [133] measures how frequent each link is used in established
routes. It detects a wormhole/tunnel attack by identifying link(s) with significantly higher
utilization frequency. This is based on the observation that, typically, a wormhole/tunnel
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creates a shortcut across the network and hence attracts a significant amount of traffic. Once
detected, such links can be avoided.
Finally, there are proposals of secure routing protocols that provide reliable data trans-
mission in a failure/attack agnostic fashion. Simply put, in protocols such as SSP, SMT [114]
or Sprout [54] the source measures the reliability of the route by counting the number of
(cryptographically protected) acknowledgments received from the destination. Routes that
offer poor reliability, or links which constitute such routes, gain a “bad reputation” and are
eventually avoided. In a similar fashion, in the Castor protocol [63] each node measures the
reliability of each neighbor, and avoids neighbors with poor reliability when forwarding pack-
ets. Such protocols opportunistically use a wormhole, as long as it is delivering packets, and
start avoiding it only when it starts dropping packets.
The security of such protocols benefit from secure ND, as it allows them to instantly avoid
wormholes. In particular, the authors of Sprout [54] recommend that the protocol is used
with their TrueLink ND protocol [55]. This is because while Sprout can eventually recover
from a wormhole attack that starts dropping packets, the number of false links introduced
by a wormhole makes this process slow; In contrast, Sprout can recover relatively fast from a
tunnel attack.
This is confirmed in the performance comparison shown in Figure 1.6. In the illustrated
scenario, no secure ND protocol is used. At time 300s, a wormhole which was previously
relaying all packets, starts dropping all data packets. Among all the evaluated protocols, only
Castor is able to fully recover from the attack in a reasonable amount of time. (Note that
SEAD and AODV do not include a component that would estimate route reliability, hence
they do not recover from the attack.)
A drawback of such robust routing schemes is that they cannot prevent an adversary from
temporarily disrupting the network operation, which can be sufficient to prevent or delay
the delivery of a critical message. Furthermore, an adversary that creates the wormhole to
attract traffic and eavesdrop or perform traffic analysis on it, cannot be mitigated by such
approaches.
1.4.4 ND and Localization
A number of secure localization schemes have been proposed that are based directly on ND
with location-aware guard nodes [89, 88, 30], or – more generally – estimate the distance to
guards based on the number of hops [163]. To protect against relay attacks, these schemes
apply rules very similar to [126]. However, this makes them vulnerable to the jam-and-relay
attack illustrated in Figure 1.5. To prevent against such an attack, the ROPE protocol [90]
combines the principle of [89] with distance bounding that provides secure physical ND.
1.4.5 Relay Attacks
From a practical point of view, a store-and-forward relay is relatively easy to implement on
off-the-shelf hardware, as access to the physical-communication-layer is not necessary: The
adversary simply needs to receive a message on the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer (or
higher layer), and retransmit it. Recently, such a relay attack using off-the shelf Nokia NFC-
capable mobile phones was implemented in [62] against NFC (Near-Field Communication).
The implementation relies on APIs public to every application, i.e., it does not require root
access. No delay figure for the relay is given.
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Fig. 4. Bandwidth utilization under the blackhole attack. Left: no mobility. Right: mobility. The
experimental setup identical to Fig. 2.
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and observed no significant differences between Castor and the
other protocols. For details, see [19].
Grayhole attacks. We have also evaluated all the protocols
under various variants of grayhole attacks, as well as pure
blackholes dropping all packets. The overall behavior across
all protocols was similar, with the average PDR higher but
recovery time longer. We omit the details here, the complete
set of results is available in the technical report [19].
B. Wormhole Attack
We set up a wormhole with three exit points forming an
equilateral triangle, each pair of points separated by 1000m.
The wormhole is implemented at the radio layer. The wormhole
exit transceivers are the same as in the other nodes. Initially,
the wormhole forwards all the packets. At the 5 minute mark,
the wormhole stops retransmitting any data traffic, but still
keeps retransmitting the control traffic and broadcasted PKTs.
Out of all the evaluated wormhole behaviors, this one had the
most severe impact on the performance of all the protocols.
We measure how the PDR changes in response to the attack
(Fig. 5).
All protocols except Castor fail to recover completely from
the wormhole attack. The reasons are similar as for the
blackhole attack: ADOV and SEAD do not recover as they
continue to route through the lossy wormhole, whereas SRP
and Sprout route around the wormhole but they are slower and
less successful in finding adversary-free routes than Castor.
Note that Sprout has not been designed to defend against
wormhole attacks [12]; instead, its authors recommend relying
on solutions such as TrueLink [21]. We did not simulate Tru-
eLink. Castor recovers from wormholes without any additional
wormhole defense mechanisms and their overhead.
Other attacks. We did not evaluate tunnel, rushing or Sybil
attacks, as from our perspective they are very similar in nature,
though weaker, than the wormhole attack. We also omit replay
attacks; as argued in §VI-B, they are not a significant threat.
C. Performance under Mobility
To test how node mobility influences the protocols’ ability to
detect the adversary, we set the number of blackholes to 20%,
and vary the node pause time in the random waypoint model.
We measure the PDR (Fig. 6).
Castor’s local failure detection and repair can rapidly reroute
the PKTs, when nodes go beyond the radio range or the new
neighbor turns out to be a black hole. Sprout and SRP need
to route more PKTs to determine which routes are reliable
and often this process is slower than the rate of change in
the topology. AODV and SEAD display constant performance,
confirming that it is not the mobility, rather the attack, that
affects them.
D. Scalability
We next measure the performance of the protocols for
different network sizes, keeping node density constant. 20%
of the nodes are blackholes under zero pause time mobility.
The results are shown in Fig. 7.
The routing paths become longer with the increasing net-
work size, thus finding an adversary-free path becomes more
challenging. Longer paths are also more likely to break due
to mobility. Under these conditions Castor still outperforms
the other protocols and maintains a 60% packet delivery rate
on a 6km by 6km plane with 400 mobile nodes and 80
blackholes. With increased size and mobility, Castor resorts to
PKT flooding more often, which the bandwidth measurements
confirm. The bandwidth utilization of the proactive protocols
(SEAD and Sprout) significantly increases. At 400 nodes
Sprout experiences a congestion collapse as the network is over-
flooded with link-state updates.
E. Flooding Attack Resilience
Without the flood rate-limiting (FRL) mechanism (§V-E)
Castor is vulnerable to the flooding attack (§VI-B). In what
follows, we experimentally demonstrate the ability of FRL to
thwart such an attack.
An attacker controls a single node, which starts 200 new
dummy flows per second by broadcasting PKTs, each PKT
containing a new unique flow authenticator. With FRL inactive,
the attack prevents a large fraction of the traffic from passing
through (Fig. 8). With FRL active, however, the nodes quickly
detect and contain the attacker and the attack’s impact is greatly
reduced. Complete recovery may not be possible; in some
cases the source or destination reside in the neighborhood of
the rapidly broadcasting attacker, which effectively prevents
local communication. In a larger network, the routing paths are
longer on average and it is easier for the malicious PKT flood
to disrupt them. However, when FRL is active in the larger
network, the attack is contained to a smaller area relative to
the whole plane size and the performance decrease is smaller.
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2010 proceedings
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Figure 1.6: Performance (packet delivery rate) of routing protocols under a wormhole attack
without secure ND (taken from [63]): Castor [63], Sprout [54], SRP+SSP [112, 114], SEAD
[75], AODV [123]. The wormhole relays all packets until the 300s mark, and afterwards drops
all data packets and only relays control traffic.
In contrast, faster relay attacks require a more sophisticated adversary, typically able to
put together dedicated hardware. In [67], a relay attack against ISO 14443A contactless smart
card systems is constructed for under £100. The relay achieves a delay of 15 − 20µs. The
delay comes mostly from the need to demodulate the received signal and to modulate it again
for transmission.
In [61], the authors construct analog relays against a LF wireless link used in Passive
Keyless Entry and Start systems. Such relays offers a much lower relaying delay. A relay
with a 2.5GHz wireless link connecting two relay ends can achieve a relaying delay as low as
15-20ns (not counting the propagation delays). The delay is even lower for a wireline relay,
but the propagation speed of the coaxial cable that connects two relay ends is only 66% of the
speed of light. This introduces a non-negligible additional delay if the relay ends are remote.
We discuss the related work on distance-decreasing relay attacks in Section 3.4. For a
more elaborate overview of relay attacks, we refer the reader to [70].
1.4.6 Related Attacks
The wormhole attack, in its symptoms, bears similarity to two other fundamental and hard to
detect attacks. On one hand, a wormhole end can be perceived as a Sybil node, with messages
tied to different identities being transmitted by a single node. Hence, seemingly, a Sybil node
detec ion mechanism [108] c uld be used to war relay attacks. However, a wormhole can
selectively relay the messages of a single node, and still be effective.
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On the other hand, as in the node replication attack, messages tied to a single identity
are transmitted by more than one node. However, node replication is harder to detect than
a wormhole attack: Schemes that address node replication [116, 37] focus on probabilistically
detecting replicas located in remote parts of the network and require that nodes are location-
aware. Obviously, a long-range wormhole can be easily (and deterministically) prevented
using geographical packet leashes.
1.5 Summary
In this Chapter, we have provided a general introduction to neighbor discovery (ND). We
have clarified the definitions of neighborhood and the adversary model, provided an overview
of the applications of ND protocols and the consequences of attacks against ND. We have also
given a survey of the literature on ND. This explains the context and motivation for the rest
of the thesis, notably for Chapter 2, where we introduce a formal framework for reasoning
about ND protocols.
Chapter 2
Formal Analysis of Secure Neighbor
Discovery
Analysis of protocols, notably security protocols, has proven time and again to be notoriously
tricky if done in an informal fashion. The canonical example is the Needham-Schroeder
protocol [107] published in 1978; only in 1995 did Lowe discover a subtle flaw using formal
methods [92]. Informal arguments, in particular those that iterate through a list of possible
attack scenarios, are likely to miss the often subtle interaction between participants of the
protocol and the adversary, especially if parallel sessions of the protocols are involved. For
an example closer to the topic of the thesis, we refer to an informal framework for distance
bounding protocol analysis proposed in [16]. This framework does not take into account the
distance hijacking attack, recently discovered in [38] (see Section 3.4).
The limitations of informal analysis can be overcome by formal analysis. On one hand, a
formal model allows for impossibility results to be proved. Such results establish the limita-
tions of a given class of protocols to solve a particular problem. Hence, they serve as important
guidelines in protocol design, highlighting the need to consider a different or broader class of
protocols, or modify the problem formulation. On the other hand, with a formal framework it
is possible to prove the correctness of concrete protocols, or at least discover their incorrect-
ness. A number of methods for formal verification of security protocol have been proposed,
many of which can be computer-verified, or even automatized, thus limiting the fallible “hu-
man factor”. In particular, a number of approaches deal with authentication protocols. At
first glance, ND protocols can be considered a form of authentication protocols. However, as
these approaches were developed for Internet-like environments, they abstract away features
essential for ND protocols, notably the very notion of being neighbors. In this Chapter, we
propose a framework that incorporates such features. More precisely, we make the following
contributions:
I We build a formal model of wireless networks. The model captures characteristics of
wireless communications essential for reasoning about ND such as node location, message
propagation time, and the discrepancy between physical ND and communication ND (i.e.,
nodes that are physically close are not necessarily able to communicate directly). With
the model, we propose a specification of two-party communication ND, and distinguish two
classes of protocols: time-based protocols (T-protocols), for which nodes exchange messages
and are able to measure time with perfect accuracy, and time-and-location-based protocols
(TL-protocols), for which nodes in addition are aware of their location.
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I We prove the following impossibility result : No T-protocol can provide secure communica-
tion ND if adversarial nodes are able to relay messages with a delay below a certain threshold.
This threshold is closely related to the communication range of the nodes. On the contrary,
if the minimum relaying delay is above the threshold, we show it is possible to achieve secure
communication ND.
I Within the T-protocol class we distinguish between beacon (B) protocols and challenge-
response (CR) protocols. We define one protocol in each of these classes and prove that they
satisfy the secure ND specification, under the assumption that the adversarial relaying delay
is above the threshold identified by the impossibility result. Furthermore, we propose two
novel TL-protocols (a B/TL-protocol and a CR/TL-protocol) and prove that they can provide
secure ND under the assumption that the relaying delay is strictly positive. We reinforce these
results by mechanizing the model and some of the proofs in Isabelle/HOL.
Chapter Outline In Section 2.1 we define the framework and the ND specification. In
Section 2.2 we derive the impossibility result. We extend the model in Section 2.3, define the
protocols and prove that they satisfy a refined ND specification. We also give an overview of
the Isabelle/HOL mechanization. We discuss the assumptions and compare the protocols in
Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we discuss the related work and open problem, before concluding
in Section 2.6.
2.1 System Model
We build a model of wireless networks that captures features essential for ND protocols and
their security. To keep the model tractable, we make a number of simplifying assumptions,
which we explain and justify in Section 2.4.1. The model presented in this section is used in
Section 2.2 for the impossibility result. To reason about the security of concrete protocols,
we extend the model in Section 2.3.
The basic entities in a wireless network, nodes, are processes running on computational
platforms equipped with transceivers communicating over a wireless channel. We assume that
nodes have synchronized clocks (although not all protocols we consider in this paper make
use of this assumption) and are static (not mobile). Nodes either follow the implemented
system functionality, in which case we denote them as correct or honest, or they are under
the control of an adversary, in which case we denote them as adversarial nodes. Adversarial
nodes can behave in an arbitrary fashion, also acting as correct nodes or lying dormant for
any period of time.
We model communication at the physical layer rather than at higher layers (data link,
network, or application), in order to capture the inherent characteristics of ND in wireless
networks. For simplicity, correct nodes are assumed to use a single wireless channel and om-
nidirectional antennas, but we do not require them to have equal transmission power and
receiver sensitivity. On the contrary, adversarial nodes use directional antennas to communi-
cate across the wireless channel used by correct nodes, but they can also communicate across
a dedicated adversarial channel imperceptible to correct nodes.
Our system model comprises: (i) a setting S that describes the type (correct or adversarial)
of nodes, their location and the state of the wireless channel; (ii) a protocol model P that
determines the behavior of correct nodes; (iii) an adversary model A that establishes the
capabilities of adversarial nodes.
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We assume that looking at the system at any point in time reveals one or more phenomena.
We are interested in those relevant to the wireless communication and the system at hand
and thus to our analysis. We denote these phenomena, associated with nodes, as events
(Definition 3). Then, we model the system evolution over time using the notion of trace, i.e.,
a set of events (Definition 4). More precisely, we use feasible traces, which satisfy constraints
specified by S (correspondence between wireless sending and receiving of messages), P (correct
nodes follow the protocol), and A (adversarial nodes behave according to their capabilities).
The constraints are defined by logical formulas we call rules.
2.1.1 System Parameters
Our model includes a number of parameters, listed below, which are determined by the
technologies used by correct and adversarial nodes.
• v ∈ R>0, the signal propagation speed, defining how fast messages propagate across the
wireless channel, determined by the communication technology,
• vadv ≥ v, the information propagation speed over the adversarial channel ; as vadv ≥ v
this is also the maximum speed at which information can propagate,
• Λ ⊂ 2R3 , the set of antenna patterns that adversarial nodes can utilize with their
directional antennas,
• ∆relay ∈ R, the minimum relaying delay introduced by a node when relaying a message;
this delay is due to processing exclusively, it does not include propagation time or any
other delay.
• M, the message space; we keep the message space unspecified for the impossibility result
in Section 2.2; we provide a concrete message space when we talk about specific protocols
in Section 2.3.
• |.| : M→ R>0, the message duration function.
Further, V denotes the set of unique node identifiers, which for simplicity we will consider
equivalent with the nodes themselves.1
2.1.2 Settings
A setting describes the type and location of nodes, and how the state of the wireless channel
changes over time.
Definition 1. A setting S is a tuple 〈V, loc, type, link ,nlos〉, where:
• V ⊂ V is a finite set of nodes. An ordered pair (A,B) ∈ V 2 is called a link.
• loc : V → R3 is the node location function. As we assume nodes are not mobile, this
function does not depend on time. We define dist : V 2 → R≥0 as
dist(A,B) = d(loc(A), loc(B)), where d is the Euclidean distance in R3. We require
the loc function to be injective, so that no two nodes share the same location. Thus,
dist(A,B) > 0 for A 6= B.
• type : V → {correct , adversarial} is the type function; it defines which nodes are correct
and which are adversarial. This function does not depend on time, as we assume that
the adversary does not corrupt new nodes during the system execution. We denote
Vcor = type
−1({correct}) and Vadv = type−1({adversarial}).
1Although this implies that every node is assigned a single identifier, it does not prevent an adversarial
node from using (in the messages in sends) any identifier.
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• link : V 2 × R≥0 → {up, down} is the link state function. Accordingly, we say that
at a given time t ≥ 0, a link (A,B) ∈ V 2 is up (denoted link(A→B, t)) or down
(denoted link(A9B, t)). We use abbreviations link(A↔B, t) =def link(A→B, t) ∧
link(B→A, t) and link(A=B, t) =def link(A9B, t) ∧ link(B9A, t). We extend the
“link(A→B, t)” notation from single time points to sets as follows: link(A→B, T ) =def
∀t ∈ T. link(A→B, t). We establish the convention link(A9A,R≥0).
• nlos : V 2 → R≥0 is the non-line-of-sight delay (NLOS) function. If two nodes A and
B can communicate over a line of sight, then nlos(A,B) = 0. Otherwise, nlos(A,B)
specifies the additional distance that the signal has to propagate compared to line-
of-sight propagation dist(A,B). We assume this function is symmetric, because of
reciprocity of wireless links.
We denote the set of all settings by S.
The ability to communicate directly, without the intervention or ’assistance’ of relays, is
expressed in our model by a link being up, thus the following definition:
Definition 2. Node A is a neighbor of node B in setting S at time t, if link(A→B, t). If
link(A↔B, t) we will say that nodes A and B are neighbors at time t.
For simplicity of presentation, we use “link(A→B, t)” to denote the neighbor relation and
the link relation.
2.1.3 Events and Traces
We use the notion of trace to model an execution of the system. A trace is composed of events.
We model events related to the wireless communication and the ND protocols operation. Each
event is primarily associated with (essentially, takes place at) a node we call the active node.
Definition 3. An event is one of the following terms:
• Receive(A; t;m)
• Bcast(A; t;m)
• Dcast(A; t;α;m)
• Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′)
where A ∈ V is the active node, t ∈ R≥0 is the event start time, denoted by start(.), m ∈M is
the transmitted/received message, α ∈ Λ in an antenna pattern, B,C ∈ V are node identifiers
and t′ ∈ R≥0 is a time instant.
The first three events are related to communication on the physical layer. Receive repre-
sents message reception. Bcast represents sending a message with an omnidirectional antenna.
Dcast represents sending a message with a directional antenna using a pattern α ∈ Λ. The
pattern α is a subset of R3 indicating which nodes receive the message, assuming the sending
node A is located at (0, 0, 0). We use the notationB ∈ α(A), meaning that loc(B)−loc(A) ∈ α.
The set of allowable antenna patterns, Λ, depends on the antenna used by the adversarial
nodes. We do not dwell on the details of the structure of Λ, except for one requirement:
R3 ∈ Λ. This is because, to facilitate proof presentation, we assume that adversarial nodes
use Dcast only. Having R3 ∈ Λ allows the adversarial nodes to use their antenna in an
omnidirectional fashion.
Neighbor can be thought of as an internal outcome of a ND protocol (possibly reported to
some higher layer): Node A declares that B is a neighbor of C at time t′. Having t′ a single
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S1 ∀A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃B ∈ V. link(B→A, [t, t+ |m|])
∧ (Bcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;m) ∈ θ ∨ (∃α ∈ Λ. A ∈ α(B)
∧ Dcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;α;m) ∈ θ))
S2 ∀A,B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Bcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;m) ∈ θ
∧ link(B→A, [t, t+ |m|])) =⇒ Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ
S3 ∀A,B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M, α ∈ Λ. (Dcast(B; t− (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1;α;m) ∈ θ
∧ A ∈ α(B) ∧ link(B→A, [t, t+ |m|])) =⇒ Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ
S4 ∀A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M, α ∈ Λ. (Receive(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ V )
∧ (Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ Vcor) ∧ (Dcast(A; t;α;m) ∈ θ =⇒ A ∈ Vadv)
Figure 2.1: Setting-feasibility rules.
point in time is for simplicity only, and we could easily generalize to arbitrary sets. Next,
traces comprising the above events are defined.
Definition 4. A trace θ is a set of events.
We denote the set of all traces by Θ. Given a a setting S, a protocol P and an adversary
A, we denote the set of traces feasible with respect to S by ΘS , the set of traces feasible with
respect to S and P by ΘS,P , and the set of traces feasible with respect to S, P and A by
ΘS,P,A.
2.1.4 Setting-Feasible Traces
The feasibility of a trace θ with respect to a setting S = 〈V, loc, type, link ,nlos〉 ensures a
causal and strict time relation between send and receive events; it is formally defined by rules
S1 – S4 (Figure 2.1). Rule S1 ensures that every message that is received was previously
sent. Dually, rules S2 and S3 ensure that a message broadcasted or sent with a directional
antenna is received by all nodes enabled to do so by the link relation and, in the latter
case, the antenna pattern used. In other words, communication is causal (a receive is always
preceded by a sent), and reliable as long as the link is up. Unreliability, expected and common
in wireless communications, is modeled by the state of the link being down. Furthermore,
these rules introduce a strict time relation between events, reflecting the propagation delay
from A to B, across the channel, with speed v: (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1. Rule S4 is a
technical one: It ensures that no communication events are performed by nodes not present
in setting S, and that Bcast and Dcast events are used exclusively by correct and adversarial
nodes, respectively. Note that this is not a restriction of the adversary: Bcast(A; t;m) can be
emulated (i.e., trigger exactly the same Receive events) by Dcast(A; t;R3;m).
2.1.5 Protocol-Feasible Traces
Intuitively, a trace is feasible with respect to protocol P if correct nodes behave according to
a particular protocol P. To formalize this, we first define the notion of a local view.
A trace is essentially a global view of the system execution. To describe what a node
observes during a system execution, we use the notion of local view, primarily comprising a
local trace composed of local events. We define these next.
Definition 5. A local event is one of the terms:
• Bcast(t;m)
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P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ||A,t)
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t, t′ ∈ R≥0, B,C ∈ V. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′) ∈ θ =⇒ Neighbor(B,C, t′) ∈ P(θ||A,t)
P3 ∀A ∈ Vcor. ∀t ∈ EA.  ∈ P(θ||A,t)
where EA = R≥0 \ start(θ|A ∩ I)
and I = {Bcast(t;m) | m ∈M, t ∈ R≥0} ∪ {Neighbor(t;B,C, t′) | B,C ∈ V, t, t′ ∈ R≥0}
Figure 2.2: Protocol-feasibility rules for protocol model P.
• Receive(t;m)
• Neighbor(t;B,C, t′)
where B,C ∈ V, m ∈M, t, t′ ∈ R≥0. For a local event e, start(e) is defined as in Definition 3.
Definition 6. A local trace is a set of local events. Given a node identifier A ∈ V, time t ≥ 0
and trace θ ∈ Θ, we calculate the local trace of node A at time t in trace θ, denoted θ|A,t, as
follows:
θ|A,t ={Bcast(t1;m) | t1 < t ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ} ∪
{Receive(t1;m) | t1 + |m| < t ∧ Receive(A; t1;m) ∈ θ} ∪
{Neighbor(t1;B,C, t′) | t1 < t ∧ Neighbor(A; t1;B,C, t′) ∈ θ}
We call θ|A,∞ a complete local trace of A in θ and denote it shortly θ|A.
We identify two variants of the local view notion: an T-local view, as the basis for defining
the class of time-based protocols, and an TL-local view, used to define the class of time- and
location-based protocols.
Definition 7. Given a trace θ, an T-local view of node A at time t in θ is a tuple 〈A, t, θ|A,t〉;
we denote it θ||A,t.
Definition 8. Given a trace θ and a setting S, an TL-local view of node A at time t in θ is a
tuple 〈A, t, loc(A), θ|A,t〉; we denote it θ||S,A,t, or θ||A,t is setting S is clear from the context.
Note that S is part of Definition 8 as the location of node A is defined only within
a specific setting. With the notion of the local view in hand, we can proceed with the
definition of a protocol model. This definition captures the property of protocols essential to
our investigation: the fact that protocol behavior depends exclusively on the local view of the
node executing the protocol.
Definition 9. An T(TL)-protocol model P is a function which given a T(TL)-local view θ||A,t,
determines a finite, non-empty set of actions; an action is one of the terms: , Bcast(m) or
Neighbor(B,C, t′), where m ∈M, B,C ∈ V, t′ ∈ R≥0.
The interpretation of Bcast and Neighbor actions is natural. The  action means that the
node does not execute an event, with the exception of possible Receive event(s). Note that
modeling the protocol output (i.e., the protocol model codomain) as a family of sets of actions
allows for non-deterministic protocols.
The feasibility of a trace θ with respect to a protocol model P ensures that all correct
nodes follow the protocol; it is formally defined by rules P1 – P3 (Figure 2.2). Rules P1 and
P2 ensure that Bcast of Neighbor actions taken by a node are allowed by the protocol. Rule
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A1 ∀A ∈ Vadv, t ∈ R≥0, α ∈ Λ,m ∈M. Dcast(A; t;α;m) ∈ θ =⇒
∃B ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(B,A)v−1adv. Receive(B; t− δ;m) ∈ θ
Figure 2.3: Adversary-feasibility rule for adversary model A∆relay .
P3, with EA the set of all time instance in θ at which no event other than Receive happens at
node A, ensures that the protocol allows for a node to not perform an action.
Note that our definition of a protocol model only requires that the behavior of the protocol
is determined by the local view. This is much broader than a possible alternative approach,
in which a protocol is modeled by a Turing machine. But as our definition is an over-
approximation, the impossibility result remains valid for more realistic protocol models.
2.1.6 Adversary-Feasible Traces
For the purpose of the impossibility result, we consider first a relatively limited adversary,
that is only capable of relaying messages. Note that a weak adversary model strengthens
the impossibility result. We denote this model as A∆relay , with the ∆relay > 0 parameter the
minimum relaying delay introduced by an adversarial node; this delay is due to processing
exclusively, it does not include propagation or transmission time.
Formally, the feasibility of trace θ with respect to A∆relay is defined by rule A1 in Figure 2.3.
It states that every message sent by an adversarial node is necessarily a replay of a message
m that either this or another adversarial node received. In addition, the delay between
receiving m and re-sending it, or more precisely the difference between the start times of
the corresponding events, needs to be at least ∆relay, plus the propagation delay across the
adversary channel (in case another adversarial node received the relayed message). This
condition reflects the structure of the adversarial channel: Any two adversarial nodes can
establish direct communication.
2.1.7 ND Specification
We consider two classes of properties ND protocols should satisfy. The first class pertains
to correctness and is expressed through property ND1 (Figure 2.4): If two correct nodes2 are
declared neighbors at some time, then they must indeed be neighbors at that time. More
precisely, there are two cases: (i) Node A can declare that B is its neighbor (i.e., A can
receive messages from B) or (ii) A can declare that it is a neighbor of C (i.e., C can receive
messages from A). In the latter case, property ND1 requires link (C,A) to be up at not exactly
time t′, but rather dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1 (propagation delay) after t′. As our model
mandates that the link state is determined at the receiving end (node), if A declares that it
is a neighbor of C at time t′, a message sent by A at t would be indeed received by C. In
other words, A is not forced to estimate the propagation delay to make a correct neighbor
statement.
The second class of properties pertains to availability and is expressed through property
ND2 (Figure 2.4), tailored to T-protocols. An additional notion needs to be introduced to for-
mulate satisfiable availability properties: neighbor discovery (ND) range, R ∈ R>0. Typically,
R is equal to the nominal communication range for a given wireless medium and transceiver
2The requirement that B and C be correct is explained in Section 2.4.
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ND1 ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B,C ∈ Vcor, t, t′ ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ link(B→A, t′)) ∨ (B = A ∧ link(A→C, t′ + (dist(A,C) + nlos(A,C))v−1))
ND2 ∀d ∈ (0,R]. ∀A,B ∈ V, A 6= B. ∃S ∈ S. V = Vcor = {A,B} ∧ dist(A,B) = d
∧ link(A↔B,R≥0) ∧ ∃θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. Neighbor(A; t;B,A, t′) ∈ θ
Figure 2.4: Basic ND properties.
technology, however, we use R more freely as the communication range3 for which ND infer-
ences are drawn. In other words, nodes at a communication range larger than R will not be
required to declare each other neighbors.
Property ND2 requires that for every distance d in the desired ND range R, there should
be at least some setting, in which the protocol is able to conclude that a node is a neighbor (in
some, not all executions); this setting should contain exactly two nodes at distance d, being
neighbors, and both correct. The “two-nodes setting” requirement clarifies why we call this
two-party ND. The ND2 property is the least that can be required from a usable two-party
ND protocol: Indeed, a protocol not satisfying this property would be unable to conclude,
for some distance(s) in the ND range, that nodes are neighbors. This makes the impossibility
result in Section 2.2 more meaningful: impossibility with respect to a weak property implies
impossibility for any stronger property.
2.2 Impossibility for T-protocols
We show in this section that no time-based protocol can solve the two-party neighbor discovery
problem as specified by properties ND1 and ND2 in Figure 2.4. We base the proof on the
fact, captured in Lemma 1, that it is impossible for a correct node to distinguish between
different settings based on a T-local view. The impossibility result in Theorem 1 stems from
showing two settings which are indistinguishable by a correct node, one in which two nodes
are neighbors and one where they are not. We elaborate on the assumptions and implications
of this result in Section 2.4.
We emphasize that the non-restricted form of the message space M encompasses all pos-
sible messages including, for example, time-stamps and any type of cryptography, thus con-
tributing to the generality of the impossibility result.
Lemma 1. Let P be a T-protocol model, S and S ′ be settings such that Vcor = V ′cor, and
θ ∈ ΘS,P and θ′ ∈ ΘS′ be traces such that local traces θ|A = θ′|A for all A ∈ Vcor. Then θ′ is
feasible with respect to T-protocol model P.
Proof. We need to prove that P1, P2, and P3 (Figure 2.2) hold for θ′.
P1 Take any event Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ′. Based on Definition 6, we have that Bcast(t;m) ∈
θ′|A = θ|A. Using Definition 6 again, we get that Bcast(A; t;m) ∈ θ. Since θ is feasible
with respect to T-protocol model P, P1 gives us Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ|A,t). Using again the
assumption θ′|A = θ|A we get the desired Bcast(m) ∈ P(θ′|A,t).
P2 The proof is almost identical as for P1.
P3 As θ satisfies P3, we have ∀t ∈ EA.  ∈ P(θ|A,t). Since θ′|A = θ|A, we have E′A = EA
and P(θ′|A,t) = P(θ|A,t), which proves that θ′ satisfies P3.
3By “communication range” we understand the actual distance plus NLOS effects.
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Figure 2.5: Settings used in the impossibility result proof. Settings Sa =
〈{A,B}, loca, typea, linka,nlosa〉, Sb = 〈{A,B,C}, locb, typeb, link b,nlosb〉 and Sc =
〈{A,B,C,D}, locc, typec, link c,nlosc〉. In all settings, nodes A and B are correct, nodes C and
D are adversarial. The location functions are such that distb(A,C) + distb(B,C) + v∆relay ≤
dista(A,B) ≤ R and distc(A,C) + distc(D,B) + vvadv−1distc(C,D) + v∆relay ≤ dista(A,B).
The state of links does not change over time and is shown in the figure (lack of arrow means
that the link is down). For all links and settings, nlos = 0. The dashed arrow in (c) denotes
the adversarial channel. The shaded areas in (b) are antenna patterns αA and αB.
Theorem 1. If ∆relay <
R
v then there exists no T-protocol model which satisfies ND1 and
ND2 (Figure 2.4) for the adversary model A∆relay .
Proof. To prove that under the assumptions of the theorem no T-protocol model can satisfy
both ND1 and ND2, we show that any T-protocol model that satisfies ND2 cannot satisfy ND1.
Take any T-protocol model P satisfying ND2. Pick some distance d ≥ v∆relay in the ND
range (d ≤ R). Property ND2 guarantees the existence of a setting such as the one shown
in Figure 2.5(a) (we denote it Sa) and the existance of a trace θ ∈ ΘSa,P,A∆relay such that
Neighbor(A; t;B, t′) ∈ θ. As θ is feasible with respect to setting Sa, this trace has to be of the
form:
θ =
{
Bcast(A; ti;mi) | i ∈ IA
} ∪ {Receive(B; ti + ∆;mi) | i ∈ IA} ∪{
Bcast(B; ti;mi) | i ∈ IB
} ∪ {Receive(A; ti + ∆;mi) | i ∈ IB} ∪{
Neighbor(A; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAA
} ∪ {Neighbor(A; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBA } ∪{
Neighbor(B; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAB
} ∪ {Neighbor(B; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBB }
where ∆ = dista(A,B)v−1, ti, t′i ∈ R≥0 and IA, IB, JAA , JBA , JAB , JBB are pairwise disjoint index
sets with JBA 6= ∅ (all the other index sets can be empty).
In setting Sb, shown in Figure 2.5(b), we have link(B=A,R≥0). Consider the following
trace θ′, which is is essentially the same as θ, but for node C relaying all the communication
between nodes A and B:
θ′ =
{
Bcast(A; ti;mi) | i ∈ IA
} ∪ {Receive(C; ti + δ1;mi) | i ∈ IA} ∪{
Dcast(C; ti + δ2;αB;mi) | i ∈ IA
} ∪ {Receive(B; ti + ∆;mi) | i ∈ IA} ∪{
Bcast(B; ti;mi) | i ∈ IB
} ∪ {Receive(C; ti + δ3;mi) | i ∈ IB} ∪{
Dcast(C; ti + δ4;αA;mi) | i ∈ IB
} ∪ {Receive(A; ti + ∆;B,mi) | i ∈ IB} ∪{
Neighbor(A; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAA
} ∪ {Neighbor(A; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBA } ∪{
Neighbor(B; ti;A,B, t
′
i) | i ∈ JAB
} ∪ {Neighbor(B; ti;B,A, t′i) | i ∈ JBB }
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where δ1 = dist
b(A,C)v−1, δ2 = ∆ − distb(C,B)v−1, δ3 = distb(B,C)v−1 δ4 = ∆ −
distb(C,A)v−1, and αA, αB are the antenna patterns shown in Figure 2.5(b).
It is simple to check that this trace is feasible with respect to setting Sb. It is also
feasible with respect to T-protocol model P: This follows from Lemma 1, as θ|A,t = θ′|A,t
and θ|B,t = θ′|B,t. Finally, θ′ is feasible with respect to the adversary model A∆relay , because
δ2 − δ1 = δ4 − δ3 ≥ ∆relay. Therefore θ′ belongs to ΘSb,P,A∆relay and together with S
b forms
the counterexample that we were looking for: A concludes B is a neighbor whereas it is not.
Thus, T-protocol model P does not satisfy ND1. As P was chosen arbitrarily, this concludes
the proof.
Note that in the above proof, the adversary did not need to make use of the adversarial
channel. The same proof technique can be used with settings Sa and Sc (Figure 2.5) in
which the adversary makes use of the adversarial channel, but does not need to resort to
directional transmissions (i.e., relies on Dcast(.; .;R3; .)). Furthermore, note that the above
proof would be easy to extend to a model in which the correct nodes are allowed to use
directional antennas, i.e., using directional antennas does not lift the impossibility result.
2.3 ND Protocols
In this section, we consider four types of ND protocols, and one representative protocol per
type. We distinguish between (i) beacon-based protocols (B-protocols), represented by PB/T
and PB/TL, which require the transmission of one message by one of the protocol participants
and synchronized clocks, and (ii) challenge-response protocols (CR-protocols), represented by
PCR/T and PCR/TL, which require a transmission of messages by both participants but no
synchronized clocks. Within and across these categories, we distinguish protocols according
to their capability to perform time measurements (T-protocols) or time measurements and
location awareness (TL-protocols).
Fundamentally, beyond authentication mechanisms, all the ND protocols we consider
measure the signal time-of-flight (ToF) between two nodes: B-protocols, with tightly syn-
chronized clocks, are able to estimate ToF by transmitting a single beacon message, whereas
CR-protocols require two messages, a challenge and a response, for the same purpose. T-
protocols accept neighbor relations as valid if the ToF distance is below a threshold, whereas
TL-protocols require this distance to be equal to the geographical distance calculated based
on nodes locations.
2.3.1 Message Space
We define the message space M as follows. Any of the following is a message:
• an identifier A ∈ V,
• a timestamp t ∈ R≥0,
• a location l ∈ R3,
• a nonce n ∈ Nonces.
Moreover, two messages m1,m2 can be concatenated to form a message 〈m1,m2〉. Fur-
thermore, an asymmetric authenticator authA(m) and a symmetric authenticator authAB(m)
where A,B ∈ V and m ∈ M, are also messages.4 We assume that symmetric authenticators
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are symmetric: authAB(m) = authBA(m). Essentially, messages are terms, with the subterm
relation is denoted by v.
Every message m has a duration |m| ∈ R≥0, which determines the transmission delay (not
including the propagation delay), reflecting the bit-rate of the underlying communication
technology. We assume that message duration is preserved by concatenation, but not by an
authenticator. For m = 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mk〉, the duration is |m| = |m1| + |m2| + . . . + |mk|
and the position of mi in m is pos(mi v m) = |m1| + . . . + |mi−1|, with pos(m1 v m) = 0;
in the case of multiple occurrences of m′ v m, pos(m′ v m) gives the position of the first
occurrence. When we use the duration function for any concatenated message, we omit the
brackets: |m1,m2, . . . ,mk|. Finally, we assume that the duration of identifiers, timestamps,
locations, nonces and authenticators in M is upper-bounded by some constant.
2.3.2 Events
For the purpose of proving protocol correctness, we extend the set of available events defined
in Definition 3 as follows:
Definition 10. An event is one of the following terms:
• Receive(A; t;m)
• Bcast(A; t;m)
• Dcast(A; t;α;m)
• Fresh(A; t;n)
• Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t′)
• NDstart(A; t)
• NDstart(A; t;B)
where A ∈ V is the active node, t ∈ R≥0 is the event start time, denoted by start(.), and
m ∈ M is the transmitted/received message, n ∈ Nonces is a nonce, α ∈ Λ is an antenna
pattern, B,C ∈ V are nodes, and t′ ∈ R≥0 is a time instant.
Assuming that m1 v m2, we use Bcast(A; t;m1 v m2) to denote the event Bcast(A; t −
pos(m1 v m2);m2); likewise for Dcast and Receive.
The interpretation of the events Receive, Bcast, Dcast and Neighbor remains unchanged.
Fresh is used to declare that nonce n is (freshly) generated by A at time t or, in other words,
that it was not sent before t. With NDstart, node A declares that an instance of a ND protocol
has been initialized: either with a specific node B or with all neighbors.
2.3.3 Protocol-Feasible Traces
In Section 2.1.5 we have defined feasibility rules for arbitrary protocols. However, for reasoning
about specific protocols, it is more convenient to define them with rules, rather than specifying
a protocol model function, and applying the general rules in Figure 2.2.
The rules that specify this type of feasibility are protocol-dependent and are defined in
Section 2.3.6. However, we introduce one general rule that dictates the behavior of correct
nodes with respect to nonces. Rule F1 (Figure 2.6) guarantees that if a nonce n is freshly
generated at time t then (i) the node that generated n will not broadcast it before t, (ii)
any other correct node who broadcasts a message containing nonce n must have receive it
(possibly in a different message) at least ∆relay before broadcasting; this time difference is
measured with respect to the positions of the nonce in the respective messages.
4Examples of asymmetric authenticators are digital signatures, and of symmetric authenticators: message
authentication codes (MACs).
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F1 ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ Nonces,m1 ∈M. n v m1 ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(B; t2;n v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (A = B ∧ t2 ≥ t1) ∨ (A 6= B ∧ ∃δ ≥ ∆relay,m2 ∈M.
n v m2 ∧ Receive(B; t2 − δ;n v m2) ∈ θ)
A1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ Vadv, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, α ∈ Λ, n ∈ Nonces,m1 ∈M. n v m1 ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ Dcast(B; t2;α;n v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃C ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(C,B)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. n v m2
∧ Receive(C; t2 − δ;n v m2) ∈ θ
A2 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M, α ∈ Λ. m = authB(m0) v m1
∧ Dcast(A; t;α;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃C ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(C,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Receive(C; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
A3 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B,C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M, α ∈ Λ. m = authBC(m0) v m1
∧ Dcast(A; t;α;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (C ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃D ∈ Vadv, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Receive(D; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
Figure 2.6: Adversary- and common protocol-feasibility rules.
ND2B/T ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t) ∈ θ ∧ link(A→B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B) ≤ R =⇒ ∃t′ ∈ [t,∞), t′′ ∈ [t, t+TP ]. Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2B/TL ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ link(A→B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ nlos(A,B) = 0 =⇒ ∃t′ ∈ [t,∞), t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2CR/T ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ link(A↔B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R =⇒
∃t1, t2 ∈ [t,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t, t+TP ]. Neighbor(A; t1;A,B, t′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ
ND2CR/TL ∀S ∈ S, θ ∈ ΘS,P,A. ∀A,B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t;B) ∈ θ ∧ link(A↔B, [t, t+ TP ])
∧ nlos(A,B) = 0 =⇒ ∃t1, t2 ∈ [t,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t, t+ TP ]. Neighbor(A; t1;A,B, t′) ∈ θ
∧ Neighbor(A; t2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ
Figure 2.7: ND availability properties.
2.3.4 Adversary-Feasible Traces
For the purpose of reasoning about protocol security, we consider an adversary model AP∆relay ,
stronger than the model defined in Section 2.1.6. Intuitively, adversarial nodes are allowed to
send arbitrary messages, except for messages which would violate properties of authenticators
or freshness; these have to be relayed with the relaying delay at least ∆relay.
A trace θ is feasible with respect to AP∆relay if rules A1 - A3 (Figure 2.6) are satisfied.
Rules A2 and A3 deal with authenticators: An adversarial node is allowed to send a message
containing arbitrary authenticators, as long as these authenticators can be generated by an
adversarial node (itself or other). This implies that adversarial nodes can share cryptographic
keys or any material used for authentication. Furthermore, rules A2 and A3 reflect that the
adversary cannot forge authenticated messages: Any message sent by an adversarial node that
contains a correct node authenticator must be relayed. In other words, some (possibly the
same) adversarial node must have received a message containing this authenticator earlier, at
least ∆relay plus the propagation delay between the two nodes over the adversarial channel.
This condition reflects the structure of the adversarial channel: Any two adversarial nodes can
establish direct communication. Rule A1 is similar to A2, but it is responsible for freshness:
An adversary sending a message with a nonce generated by a correct can only be relaying the
message (nonce). In this sense rule A1 is an adversarial equivalent of rule F1.
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1: on NDstart(A; t1)
2: Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉)
3: on Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉)
4: if t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1
5: Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2)
Figure 2.8: Pseudo-code for protocol PB/T.
P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1) ∈ θ =⇒ Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1, t ∈ R≥0,m ∈M. authB(t) v m ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ
=⇒ m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1
=⇒ Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A,C ∈ V, t2, t ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ =⇒ C = B
∧ ∃t1 ∈ R≥0. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1
∧ t = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|
Figure 2.9: Rules defining protocol PB/T.
2.3.5 ND Specification
The correctness property ND1 introduced in Figure 2.4 is also part of the ND specification
that we use for reasoning about concrete protocol security. However, we provide stronger, and
class specific availability properties. Informally, if two nodes are neighbors for a long enough,
protocol-specific time TP , the protocol must declare them neighbors.
Figure 2.7 displays ND2 properties for all types of protocols we consider. These proper-
ties differ in four aspects, one depending on whether the protocol is T or TL, whereas the
other three aspects depending on the protocol is beacon or challenge-response. The first
aspect is the NDstart event: For CR-protocols, a particular neighbor B with which ND is
started is specified, whereas no such specification is necessary for B-protocols. Second, it
may be required that link (A,B) be up in only one direction (B-protocols) or both direc-
tions (CR-protocols). Third, for T-protocols an upper-bound on propagation distance in
enforced (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R), whereas for TL-protocols line-of-sight propagation
is required (nlos(A,B) = 0). Forth, different forms of neighbor declaration are possible. The
node making the declaration might be the same as (CR-protocols) or different (B-protocols)
from the one initiating the ND protocol. Moreover the declaration might be uni-directional
(B-protocols) or bi-directional (CR-protocols).
2.3.6 Protocol Definitions
The protocols are formally defined with rules such at the ones in Figure 2.9. To make the
presentation more approachable, we present the protocols informally in the form of pseudo-
code, and describe how the rules model the behavior of the protocol. The pseudo-code is
divided into blocks starting with a triggering event (on clause). If the triggering event occurs,
the body of the block is executed, i.e., other events take place.
We start with a simple B/T-protocol we denote PB/T, which is essentially the temporal
packet leash protocol proposed by Hu, Perrig and Johnson in [74]. The pseudo-code is shown
in Figure 2.8, the rules defining the protocol are presented in Figure 2.9. Block 1-2 describes
the behavior after the ND protocol is started at node A (e.g., by a higher layer protocol);
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01: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
02: Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
03: Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
04: on Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉)
05: Fresh(B; t+ ∆;n2)
06: Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈n2〉)
07: let τ > ∆
08: Bcast(B; t+ τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉)
09: on Receive(A; t; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉)
10: if occurred Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
11: if occurred Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
12: if occurred Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉)
13: if v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)
14: Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;A,B, t1)
15: Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;B,A, t2)
Figure 2.10: Pseudo-code for protocol PCR/TL.
P1 and P2 are the two rules that correspond to this block. Block 3-5 describes the behavior
of a node after it receives a beacon message, and it is modeled by rules P3 and P4. Rule P1
is straightforward: if ensures that if the triggering event of block 1-2, NDstart(A; t1), occurs
in the trace, the event in the body of the block also occurs. In the same fashion, rule P3 is
defined for block 3-5, with an additional condition coming from the if clause.
These two rules are already sufficient to prove the ND2 property, but they only define half
of aspects of the the protocol functionality. Indeed, nothing prevents a node running this
protocol from making arbitrary neighbor declarations. Rule P4 addresses this, stating that if
a node makes a neighbor declaration, this has to be done according to block 3-5, i.e., the node
had to receive a “fresh enough” beacon message. Only one aspect remains: Correct nodes
are still allowed to broadcast arbitrary messages, including bogus beacon messages. This is
addressed by rule P2. To motivate the definition of P2, let us consider an alternative rule
would still be coherent with the pseudo-code: If a correct node broadcasts a message at time
t1, this message is 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉. We can prove that such a defined protocol satisfies the
ND specification. However, this is a weak result, precisely because that rule states that correct
nodes cannot send any other messages than beacons. If the ND protocol were used along with
or by any other protocol, obviously using other forms of messages, the result would no longer
apply. To circumvent this undesired composability restriction, rule P2 is defined as follows.
It only requires that if a correct node broadcasts at t1 a message m of a particular form, i.e.,
containing authB(t) as a subterm, then m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉. Hence, rule P2 gives a much
less restrictive condition on protocols that can be securely composed with PB/T: basically,
it mandates that any other protocol does not use authenticated timestamps of this form.5
Rule P4, in terms of composability, implies that the node cannot run any other ND protocol
(i.e., a protocol making neighbor declarations), but we do not see this as a real restriction.
Next, we describe PCR/TL, a CR/TL-protocol (pseudo-code Figure 2.10, rules Figure 2.11).
This protocol has a practical design twist: As authentication of a message can be a time-
5If this would pose a problem, the protocol can be modified, by e.g., authenticating a timestamp concate-
nated with some constant in place of simple the timestamp.
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P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces.
Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀B ∈ Vcor, t ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃n2 ∈ Nonces, τ > ∆.
Fresh(B; t+ ∆;n2) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(B; t+ τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, l ∈ R3,m ∈M. authC(n1, n2, l) v m
∧ Bcast(B; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ ∃τ > 0. m = 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉
∧ Receive(B; t− τ −∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(B; t− τ ;n2) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(B; t− τ ; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
P4 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2, t ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3.
Receive(A; t; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t2−t1−∆) = 2d(loc(A), l) =⇒
Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;A,B, t1) ∈ θ
∧ Neighbor(A; t+ |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|;B,A, t2) ∈ θ
P5 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t, t0 ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ ∃n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t0; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t− |l, authB(n1, n2, l)|; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
∧ v(t0 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l))
∨
(B = A ∧ ∃n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t2 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Fresh(A; t0 + |C|;n1) ∈ θ
∧ Bcast(A; t0; 〈C, n1〉) ∈ θ ∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t− |l, authC(n1, n2, l)|; 〈l, authC(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
∧ v(t2 − t0 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l))
Figure 2.11: Rules defining protocol PCR/TL
consuming process, in this protocol we remove it from the time-critical ToF estimation phase.
Otherwise, if the response needs too much time to be calculated, the clock of the challeng-
ing node can drift beyond an acceptable accuracy level. A protocol parameter ∆ ∈ R≥0
determines exactly how long after the challenge reception a node replies.
Note that we assume that a node keeps track of all the events it observes, and it can
always refer to this ’history,’ as in 10-12. Note also that there is no explicit block responsible
for receiving the 〈n2〉 response sent by B in 06, because in this case node A does not take any
action other than recording the event occurrence, for later reference in line 11.
Considering again that “triggering event implies block body events,” rule P1 is defined for
block 01-03, P2 for block 04-08, and P4 for block 09-15. We do not define rules that restrict the
occurrence of Fresh events (in lines 02 and 05) or the form of broadcasted messages (in lines
03 and 06), so that there is no obstacle for composability. For line 08, rule P3 is defined: If a
node broadcasts a message m containing an authenticator of the form authB(n1, n2, l), then
m is precisely the message defined in line 08, and all the other events from block 04-08 occur.
Finally, rule P5 is defined based on block 09-15. There is only one rule, despite two Neighbor
events in lines 14 and 15, because both events match the universally quantified Neighbor event
in P5; The rule uses a disjunction, as there are (small) timing differences in the node behavior
depending on which of these two event is considered.
The pseudo-code defining the two remaining protocols (PB/TL and PCR/T) is shown in
Figure 2.12 and in Figure 2.14. These protocols are similar to the two previous protocols,
hence we omit a detail explanation. We note, however, that opposite to the other protocols,
PB/TL relies on symmetric authenticators. The purpose of this is to demonstrate that the
protocols can be modified to work with symmetric cryptography. There is no specific reason
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1: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
2: Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉)
3: on Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉)
4: if t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1
5: Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)|;A,B, t2)
Figure 2.12: Pseudo-code for protocol PB/TL.
P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒
Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t1, t ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3,m ∈M. authCB(t, l) v m ∧ Bcast(A; t1;m) ∈ θ
=⇒ m = 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ
∧ t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1 =⇒ Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, l, authA(t1, l)|;A,B, t2) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A,C ∈ V, t2, t ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ =⇒ C = B
∧ ∃t1 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3. Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ ∧ t2−t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1
∧ t = t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)|
Figure 2.13: Rules defining protocol PB/TL
why we chose PB/TL for this demonstration.
The rules defining the protocols (Figure 2.13, Figure 2.15) are also very similar to the
rules for PB/T and PCR/TL. The only noteworthy difference is the rule P2 for PCR/T, which
has no equivalent rule in the definition on PCR/TL. This rule states that whenever a node
sends a the challenge message, the message needs to be fresh (we could also demand that the
NDstart event is in the trace, but we omit that for simplicity). This restriction is necessary
to prove the correctness of the protocol.
2.3.7 Proofs
We prove that protocols defined in Section 2.3.6 satisfy the ND1 property and the appropriate
ND2 properties. First, we present three simple lemmas which facilitate subsequent proofs.
Lemma 2 deals with freshness and is an extension of rules S2 and F1, whereas Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4 deal with authenticators, extending A2 and A3, respectively. We start with the
01: on NDstart(A; t1;B)
02: Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
03: Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
04: on Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉)
05: Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈authB(n1)〉)
06: on Receive(A; t2; 〈authB(n1)〉)
07: if occurred Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1)
08: if occurred Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉)
09: if v(t2 − t1 −∆) ≤ 2R
10: Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;A,B, t1)
11: Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;B,A, t2)
Figure 2.14: Pseudo-code for protocol PCR/T.
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P1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R≥0. NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ =⇒
∃n1 ∈ Nonces. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P2 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1 ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒
Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
P3 ∀B ∈ Vcor, A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces. Receive(B; t; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ =⇒
Bcast(B; t+ ∆; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ
P4 ∀B ∈ Vcor, C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n1 ∈ Nonces,m ∈M. authC(n1) v m
∧ Bcast(B; t;m) ∈ θ =⇒ m = 〈authB(n1)〉 ∧ Receive(B; t−∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
P5 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, n1 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0.
Receive(A; t2; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ v(t2 − t1 −∆) ≤ 2R =⇒
Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;A,B, t1) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t2 + |authB(n1)|;B,A, t2) ∈ θ
P6 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B,C ∈ V, t, t0 ∈ R≥0. Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ =⇒
(C = A ∧ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces, t1 ∈ R≥0. Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t0; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t0 − t1 −∆) ≤ 2R)
∨
(B = A ∧ ∃n1 ∈ Nonces, t2 ∈ R≥0. Fresh(A; t0 + |C|;n1) ∈ θ ∧ Bcast(A; t0; 〈C, n1〉) ∈ θ
∧ Receive(A; t2; 〈authC(n1)〉) ∈ θ ∧ v(t2 − t0 −∆) ≤ 2R)
Figure 2.15: Rules defining protocol PCR/T
L1 ∀A ∈ Vcor, B ∈ V, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0, α ∈ Λ, n ∈ Nonces,m ∈M. A 6= B ∧ n v m ∧ Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ
∧ (Bcast(B; t2;n v m) ∈ θ ∨ Dcast(B; t2;α;n v m) ∈ θ) =⇒ t2 ≥ t1 + dist(A,B)v−1adv + ∆relay
L2 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M, α ∈ Λ. m = authB(m0) v m1
∧ Dcast(A; t;α;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃C ∈ Vcor, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(C,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Bcast(C; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
L3 ∀A ∈ Vadv, B,C ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0,m,m0,m1 ∈M, α ∈ Λ. m = authBC(m0) v m1
∧ Dcast(A; t;α;m v m1) ∈ θ =⇒ (B ∈ Vadv) ∨ (C ∈ Vadv)
∨ (∃D ∈ Vcor, δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,A)v−1adv,m2 ∈M. m v m2 ∧ Bcast(D; t− δ;m v m2) ∈ θ)
Figure 2.16: Rules for Lemmas.
proof of Lemma 3, because the proof of Lemma 2 follows a similar patter, but is slightly more
involved. The proof of Lemma 4 is virtually identical to the proof of Lemma 3, and thus
omitted.
Lemmas
Lemma 2. Rule L1 (Figure 2.16) holds for every trace θ feasible with respect to the adversary
model AP∆relay (∆relay > 0), some setting S and rule F1
Lemma 3. Rule L2 (Figure 2.16) holds for every trace θ feasible with respect to the adversary
model AP∆relay (∆relay > 0) and some setting S.
Lemma 4. Rule L3 (Figure 2.16) holds for every trace θ feasible with respect to the adversary
model AP∆relay (∆relay > 0) and some setting S.
Proof. (Lemma 3)
The 1st disjunct of L2, (B ∈ Vadv), follows immediately from A2, so we assume that B ∈ Vcor
and focus on the 2nd disjunct. We we prove it by contradiction. Fix m = authB(m0). Our
goal is to show that by assuming:
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(1) m v m1 and
(2) Bcast(C; τ ;m v m2) /∈ θ,
for any correct C, τ ≤ t−∆relay − dist(C,A)v−1adv and m2 st. m v m2, and
(3) Dcast(A; t;α;m v m1) ∈ θ
we can derive a contradiction. To achieve this, we show, by induction, that for every N :
(3)N Dcast(A; tN ;α;m v mN ) ∈ θ where tN ≤ t−N∆relay and m v mN
The base case (3)0 follows directly from (3). In the inductive step, we show that (3)N+1
follows from (3)N .
Apply A2 to (3)N and obtain:
(4) Receive(D; tN − δ;m v m′) ∈ θ,
where D ∈ Vadv, m v m′ and δ ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,A)v−1adv.
Next, apply S1. We can rule out the Bcast disjunct of S1 based on S4 and (2) because:
tN − δ − (dist(E,D) + nlos(E,D))v−1 ≤ t−∆relay − dist(E,A)v−1adv
This inequality follows from vadv ≥ v, the inductive assumption tN ≤ t − N∆relay an the
condition on δ in (4). Hence, S1 gives us:
(5) Dcast(E; tN − δ − (dist(E,D)− nlos(E,D))v−1;α′;m v m′) ∈ θ
Obviously, we can define mN+1 = m
′ and tN+1 as:
tN+1 = tN − δ − (dist(E,D)− nlos(E,D))v−1 ≤ t− (N + 1)∆relay
which gives us (3)N+1, completing the inductive proof.
The final contradiction follows swiftly: Given ∆relay > 0, for large enough N , the time tN is
negative. This is in contradiction with event start times being non-negative.
Proof. (Lemma 2)
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. We show that we can derive a contradiction
by assuming:
(1) Fresh(A; t1;n) ∈ θ, where A is correct, and
(2) for some B 6= A, m st. n v m, and t2 < t1 + dist(A,B)v−1adv + ∆relay either:
(a) Bcast(B; t2;n v m) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(B; t2;α;n v m) ∈ θ
To this end, we use induction over N ∈ N to prove:
(2)N for some CN 6= A, mN st. n v mN , and
τN < t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv − (N − 1)∆relay − dist(B,CN )v−1adv either:
(a) Bcast(CN ; τN ;n v mN ) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(CN ; τN ;α;n v mN ) ∈ θ
The base case (2)0 follows directly from (2). In the inductive step, we shown that (2)N+1
follows from (2)N .
We have two cases of (2)N to cover. First, consider (a). Given (1), F1 implies:
(3) Receive(CN ; τN − δ1;n v m′) ∈ θ, for some δ1 ≥ ∆relay and m′ st. n v m′
Apply S1 and S4 to obtain:
(4) for some D ∈ V and δ2 = δ1 + (dist(D,CN ) + nlos(D,CN ))v−1:
(c) D ∈ Vcor ∧ Bcast(D; τN − δ2;n v m′) ∈ θ or
(d) D ∈ Vadv ∧ Dcast(D; τN − δ2;α′;n v m′) ∈ θ
We can define CN+1 = D, mN+1 = m
′, and τN+1 as:
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τN+1 = τN − δ2 ≤ τN −∆relay − (dist(CN+1, CN ) + nlos(CN+1, CN ))v−1 <
< t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv −N∆relay − dist(B,CN+1)v−1adv
The inequality follows from the triangle inequality for dist and non-negativeness of nlos.
The last step is to show CN+1 6= A. In case (d) this is trivial, as A /∈ Vadv. In case (c) assume
that CN+1 = A and observe a contradiction with F1 because:
τN+1 < t1 + dist(A,B)v
−1
adv −N∆relay − dist(B,CN+1)v−1adv < t1
This completes the proof of the inductive step in case (a). Now consider case (b) of (2)N .
Given (1), A1 implies:
(5) Receive(E; τN − δ3;n v m′′) ∈ θ,
for some E ∈ Vadv, δ3 ≥ ∆relay + dist(E,CN )v−1adv and m′′ st. n v m′′
Apply S1 and S4 to obtain:
(6) for some F ∈ V and δ4 = δ3 + (dist(F,E) + nlos(F,E))v−1:
(e) F ∈ Vcor ∧ Bcast(F ; τN − δ4;n v m′′) ∈ θ or
(f) F ∈ Vadv ∧ Dcast(F ; τN − δ4;α′′;n v m′′) ∈ θ
We can define CN+1 = F , mN+1 = m
′′, and τN+1 as:
τN+1 = τN − δ4 ≤ τN < t1 + dist(A,B)v−1adv −N∆relay − dist(B,CN+1)v−1adv
The inequality follows from the triangle inequality for dist and non-negativeness of nlos.
The last step is to show CN+1 6= A. In case (f) this is trivial, as A /∈ Vadv. In case (e) we
get a contradiction with F1 if we assume that CN+1 = A. This completes the proof of the
inductive step.
The final contradiction follows as in Lemma 3: Given ∆relay > 0, for large enough N , the
time tN is negative. This is in contradiction with event start times being non-negative..
Protocol PB/T
Theorem 2. Protocol PB/T satisfies ND1 and ND2B/T under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay ≥ Rv−1
(B) TPB/T = sup{|A, t, authA(t)|A ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0}+ Rv−1
Proof. Property ND1 (Figure 2.4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/T,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ for some A,B,C ∈ Vcor
As B is correct, apply P4 to get:
(2) C = B and
(3) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ, where t = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)| and
(4) t2 ≤ t1 + Rv−1
We need to show:
(?) link(A→B, t2)
Apply S1 to obtain:
(5) link(D→B, [t2, t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|]) and
(6) for δ1 = (dist(D,B) + nlos(D,B))v
−1
(a) Bcast(D; t2 − δ1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(D; t2 − δ1;α; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ.
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Consider case (a). From S4 we get D ∈ Vcor and then from P2 we get D = A. Thus, given
(5), we have shown (?).
Consider case (b). Let τ = pos(authA(t1) v 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉). Apply L2 to obtain:
(7) Bcast(E; t2 + τ − δ1 − δ2; authA(t1) v m) ∈ θ,
where δ2 > ∆relay and m ∈M is st. authA(t1) v m
S4 gives E ∈ Vcor. Then, apply P2 to get:
(8) E = A and
(9) m = 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉 and
(10) t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 < t2 −∆relay ≤ t2 −Rv−1, given (A)
From (10) derive t2 > t1 + Rv
−1. This is a contradiction with (4), thus (b) cannot be true.
Consequently, (a) is the only valid option, and ND1 is satisfied.
Property ND2B/T (Figure 2.7)
Consider a setting S, where:
(1) A,B ∈ Vcor and
(2) dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R and
(3) link(A↔B, [t1, t1 + TPB/T ])
Next, take any trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/T,A such that:
(4) NDstart(A; t1) ∈ θ
We need to show:
(?) Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) for some t′ ≥ t1 and t′′ ∈ [t1, t1 + TPB/T ]
Start by applying P1 to obtain:
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉) ∈ θ
Given (2), (3) and (B), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, authA(t1)〉), where t2 = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (2) we obtain t2 − t1 ≤ Rv−1. Then P3 implies:
(7) Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)|;A,B, t2)
As t′ = t2 + |A, t1, authA(t1)| ≥ t1 and t′′ = t2 ∈ [t1, t1 + TPB/T ] we have shown (?).
Protocol PCR/TL
Theorem 3. Protocol PCR/TL satisfies ND1 and ND2CR/TL under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay > 0
(B) vadv = v
(C) TPCR/TL =∞6
Proof. Property ND1 (Figure 2.4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/TL,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ, where A,B,C ∈ Vcor, and t, t0 ∈ R≥0.
Applying P5 gives two cases:
〈I〉 C = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(B→A, t0)
〈II〉 B = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(A→C, (t0+(dist(A,C)+nlos(A,C))v−1))
6We set TPCR/TL =∞ for simplicity: Otherwise, we would need to assume a maximum distance between A
and B to have an upper-bound on the protocol execution time.
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We will consider both cases simultaneously. In both cases, if we rename C to B, P5 gives, for
some n1, n2 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2, t3 ∈ R≥0, l ∈ R3:
(2) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ and
(3) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(4) Receive(A; t2; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
(5) Receive(A; t3; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ and
(6) v(t2 − t1 −∆) = 2d(loc(A), l)
Further, in case 〈I〉:
(7/I) t2 = t0
whereas in case 〈II〉:
(7/II) t1 = t0
Given (5), we apply S1 to obtain for some D ∈ V :
(a) Bcast(D; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(D; .; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ
(“.” means that we are not concerned with the value.) Assuming (b), S4 implies D ∈ Vadv.
Apply L2 to obtain Bcast(E; .;m) for some E ∈ Vcor and m st. authB(n1, n2, l) v m. Then P3
gives for some t4 ∈ R≥0:
(8) Bcast(B; .; 〈l, authB(n1, n2, l)〉) ∈ θ and
(9) l = loc(B) and
(10) Receive(B; t4 −∆; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ and
(11) Bcast(B; t4; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
(12) Fresh(B; t4;n2) ∈ θ
The same is obtained under (a) via S4 and P3. Apply S1 to (4) to get for some F ∈ V :
(13) link(F→A, [t2, t2 + |n2|]) ∧ (Bcast(F ; t′′; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ ∨ Dcast(F ; t′′; .; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ)
where t′′ = t2 − (dist(F,A) + nlos(F,A))v−1. We have two cases: (c) F = B and (d) F 6= B.
For case (c), given (12), F1 implies:
(c) F = B ∧ t4 ≤ t2 − (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
In case (d), under (12), L1 implies t4 + dist(F,A)v
−1
adv + ∆relay ≤ t′′ ≤ t2 − dist(F,A)v−1.
Using (B) and the triangle inequality we derive:
(d) F 6= B ∧ t4 ≤ t2 − dist(A,B)v−1 −∆relay
Given (10), apply S1 to get for some G ∈ V :
(14) link(G→B, [t4 −∆, t4 −∆ + |〈B,n1〉|]) ∧
(Bcast(G; t′′′; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∨ Dcast(G; t′′′; .; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ),
where t′′′ = t4 −∆− (dist(G,B) + nlos(G,B))v−1.
Again, there are two cases: (e) G = A and (f) G 6= A. In case (e), given (3), F1 implies:
(e) G = A ∧ t4 ≥ t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1 + ∆
In case (f), given (3), L1 implies t1 + |B| + dist(A,G)v−1adv + ∆relay ≤ t′′′ + |B| = t4 − ∆ −
(dist(G,B)+nlos(G,B))v−1+|B|. After simple transformations using the triangle inequality,
(B), and omitting the non-negative nlos:
(f) G 6= A ∧ t4 ≥ t1 + dist(A,B)v−1 + ∆ + ∆relay
Given (6) and (9) obtain:
(15) t2 − t1 −∆ = 2dist(A,B)v−1
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There are now four possible cases to consider: (c)+(e), (c)+(f), (d)+(e) and (d)+(f).
Consider case (c)+(e):
(16) t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v
−1 + ∆ ≤ t4 ≤ t2 − (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (15), both inequalities in (16) need to be equalities and nlos(A,B) = 0. As F =
B, (13) implies link(B→A, t2), which is what we needed to prove in case 〈I〉 given (7/I).
Furthermore, G = A and (14) implies link(A→B, (t4 −∆)). In case (e), given (15) and (16),
t4 − ∆ = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1, which given (7/II) means that property ND1 is
also satisfied in case 〈II〉. Finally, given (A), it is easy to see that the remaining three cases
are in contradiction with (15), which concludes the proof of ND1.
Property ND2CR/TL (Figure 2.7)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/TL,A.
Given (C), we assume that:
(1) NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ
(2) link(A↔B, [t1,∞))
(3) nlos(A,B) = 0
We need to prove:
(?) Neighbor(A; t′1;A,B, t′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t′2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ for some t′1, t′2 ∈ [t1,∞), t′, t′′ ∈
[t1, t1 + TPCR/TL ].
First apply P1 to obtain:
(4) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
Next, given (2) and (3), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ, where t2 = t1 + dist(A,B)v−1
Apply P2 to get:
(7) Bcast(B; t2 + ∆; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ and
(8) Bcast(B; t2 + τ ; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ, where τ > 0.
Given (2) and (3), S2 implies:
(9) Receive(A; t4; 〈n2〉) ∈ θ, where t4 = t2 + ∆ + dist(A,B)v−1 = t1 + ∆ + 2dist(A,B)v−1
and
(10) Receive(A; t5; 〈loc(B), authB(n1, n2, loc(B))〉) ∈ θ
Given (10), (4), (5), (9), and v(t4 − t1 −∆) = 2dist(A,B) we conclude the proof by P4.
Protocol PB/TL
Theorem 4. Protocol PB/TL satisfies ND1 and ND2B/TL under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay > 0
(B) vadv = v
(C) TPB/TL =∞7
Proof. Property ND1 (Figure 2.4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/TL,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(B; t;A,C, t2) ∈ θ for some A,B,C ∈ Vcor
7We assume TPB/TL =∞ for simplicity: : Otherwise, we would need to assume a maximum distance between
A and B to have an upper-bound on the protocol execution time.
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As B is correct, apply P4 to get:
(2) C = B and
(3) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ, where t = t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)| and
(4) t2 − t1 = d(loc(B), l)v−1
We need to show:
(?) link(A→B, t2)
Given (3), apply S1 to obtain:
(5) link(D→B, [t2, t2 + |A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)|]) and
(6) for δ1 = (dist(D,B) + nlos(D,B))v
−1
(a) Bcast(D; t2 − δ1; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(D; t2 − δ1;α; 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉) ∈ θ.
Consider case (a). From S4 we get D ∈ Vcor and then from P2 D = A. Thus, given (5), we
have shown (?).
Consider case (b). Let τ = pos(authAB(t1, l) v 〈A, t1, l, authAB(t1, l)〉). Apply L3, to obtain:
(7) Bcast(E; t2 + τ − δ1 − δ2; authAB(t1, l) v m) ∈ θ,
where δ2 ≥ ∆relay + dist(E,D)v−1adv and m ∈M is st. authAB(t1, l) v m
S4 gives E ∈ Vcor. Then, apply P2 to get one of the two cases:
(c) E = A ∧ m = 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉 ∧ t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 or
(d) E = B ∧ m = 〈B, t1, loc(B), authAB(t1, loc(B))〉 ∧ t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2
First consider (c). Using the triangle inequality, (B) and (A), we derive t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 ≤
t2 − (dist(D,B) + nlos(D,B))v−1 −∆relay − dist(A,D)v−1adv ≤ t2 − dist(A,B)v−1 −∆relay <
t2 − dist(A,B)v−1. As l = loc(A), this is a contradiction with (4), thus (c) cannot be true.
Consider case (d). In this case l = loc(B), and (4) implies t1 = t2. This is in contradiction
with t1 = t2 − δ1 − δ2 ≤ t2 −∆relay < t2. Hence (d) cannot be true, and thus (b) cannot be
true. Consequently, (a) is the only valid option, and ND1 is satisfied.
Property ND2B/TL (Figure 2.7)
Consider a setting S, where:
(1) A,B ∈ Vcor and
(2) nlos(A,B) = 0 and
(3) link(A↔B, [t1,∞))
Next, take any trace θ ∈ ΘS,PB/TL,A such that:
(4) NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ
We need to show:
(?) Neighbor(B; t′;A,B, t′′) for some t′ ≥ t1 and t′′ ≥ t1
Start by applying P1 to obtain:
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉) ∈ θ
Given (3), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))〉), where t2 = t1+(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (2) we obtain t2 − t1 = dist(A,B)v−1. Then P3 implies:
(7) Neighbor(B; t2 + |A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))|;A,B, t2)
Obviously, t′ = t2 + |A, t1, loc(A), authAB(t1, loc(A))| ≥ t1 and t′′ = t2 ≥ t1, and we have
shown (?).
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Protocol PCR/T
Theorem 5. Protocol PCR/T satisfies ND1 and ND2CR/T under the following assumptions:
(A) ∆relay > 2Rv
−1
(B) TPCR/TL = sup{|B,n|+ |authB(n)|B ∈ V, t ∈ R≥0, n ∈ Nonces}+ 2Rv−1
Proof. Property ND1 (Figure 2.4)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/T,A such that:
(1) Neighbor(A; t;B,C, t0) ∈ θ, where A,B,C ∈ Vcor, and t, t0 ∈ R≥0.
Applying P6 gives two cases:
〈I〉 C = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(B→A, t0)
〈II〉 B = A: according to ND1, we need to prove link(A→C, (t0+(dist(A,C)+nlos(A,C))v−1))
We will consider both cases simultaneously. In both cases, if we rename C to B, P6 gives, for
some n1 ∈ Nonces, t1, t2 ∈ R≥0:
(2) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ and
(3) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(4) Receive(A; t2; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ and
(5) t2 − t1 −∆ ≤ 2Rv−1
Further, in case 〈I〉:
(6/I) t2 = t0
whereas in case 〈II〉:
(6/II) t1 = t0
Given (4), we apply S1 to obtain for some D ∈ V :
(7) link(D→A, [t2, t2 + |authB(n1)|]) and for t3 = t2 − (dist(A,D) + nlos(A,D))v−1:
(a) Bcast(D; t3; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ or
(b) Dcast(D; t3; .; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ
First consider (a). Apply S4 to get D ∈ Vcor and then P4 to get:
(8/a) B = D ∧ Bcast(B; t3; authB(n1)) ∈ θ and
(9/a) Receive(B; t3 −∆; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ
Given (9/a), apply S1 to obtain for some F ∈ V , t′ = t3 − ∆, and t′′ = t′ − (dist(F,B) +
nlos(F,B))v−1:
(10/a) link(F→B, [t′, t′+|B,n1|]) ∧ (Bcast(F ; t′′; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ ∨ Dcast(F ; t′′; .; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ
Two cases arise: (c) F = A and (d) F 6= A. Given (3), in case (c) apply F1, and in case (d)
apply L1 to obtain:
(c/a) F = A ∧ t′′ ≥ t1 or
(d/a) F 6= A ∧ t′′ ≥ t1 + ∆relay + dist(F,A)v−1adv
Consider case (c/a). As F = A, given A ∈ Vcor and S4, (10/a) states that
Bcast(A; t′′; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ. Apply P2 to get:
(11/ac) Fresh(A; t′′ + |B|;n1) ∈ θ
Given (11/ac) and (2), F1 implies t′′ ≤ t1, which under (c/a) gives t′′ = t1. Thus, t1 =
t2−2(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v−1−∆. Given B = D, (7) implies link(B→A, t2), which proves
〈I〉 given (6/I). Further, F = A and (10/a) give link(A→B, t1 +(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v−1),
which given (6/II) proves 〈II〉. All that remains to show is that cases (d/a) and (b) are not
possible.
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Consider case (d/a). It is straightforward to derive t2 − t1 − ∆ ≥ ∆relay. Thus, given (A),
t2 − t1 −∆ > 2Rv−1, which is in contradiction with (5). Hence (d/a) is not possible.
Next, consider (b). Apply S4 to get D ∈ Vadv and then L2 followed by P4 to obtain:
(8/b) Bcast(B; t3 − δ1; authB(n1)) ∈ θ, where δ1 ≥ ∆relay + dist(D,E)v−1adv and
(9/b) Receive(B; t3 − δ1 −∆; 〈A,B, n1〉) ∈ θ
The only difference between (9/a) and (9/b) is a different timestamp, which in case (b) is
t′ = t3 − δ1 −∆. We can thus repeat a nearly identical reasoning, deriving (10/b), (c/b) and
(d/b). However, as the timestamp t′ in case (b) “includes” ∆relay, we can easily show that
(c/b) and (d/b) are in contradiction with (5). This concludes the proof of ND1.
Property ND2CR/T (Figure 2.7)
Consider a setting S and a trace θ ∈ ΘS,PCR/T,A.
Given (C), we assume that:
(1) NDstart(A; t1;B) ∈ θ
(2) link(A↔B, [t1, t1 + TPCR/T ])
(3) dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B) ≤ R
We need to prove:
(?) Neighbor(A; t′1;A,B, t′) ∈ θ ∧ Neighbor(A; t′2;B,A, t′′) ∈ θ
for some t′1, t′2 ∈ [t1,∞), t′, t′′ ∈ [t1, t1 + TPCR/T ].
First apply P1 to obtain:
(4) Fresh(A; t1 + |B|;n1) ∈ θ and
(5) Bcast(A; t1; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ
Next, given (2) and (3), S2 implies:
(6) Receive(B; t2; 〈B,n1〉) ∈ θ, where t2 = t1 + (dist(A,B) + nlos(A,B))v−1
Apply P3 to get:
(7) Bcast(B; t2 + ∆; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ and
Given (2), S2 implies:
(8) Receive(A; t3; 〈authB(n1)〉) ∈ θ,
where t3 = t2+∆+(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v
−1 = t1+∆+2(dist(A,B)+nlos(A,B))v−1
Given (4), (5), (8), (3), and t3 − t1 −∆ ≤ 2Rv−1 conclude the proof by P5.
2.3.8 Isabelle/HOL Mechanization
We formalize the proposed model, with a few minor modifications, in the theorem prover
Isabelle [110] and higher-order logic (HOL). This allows us to mechanically verify the proofs
presented in Section 2.3.7, greatly increasing the confidence in the results. The source code
is available is available in [129].
In the formalization process, we make two noteworthy modifications:
• We remove the Dcast event, making both the correct nodes and the adversarial nodes
use the Bcast event. This simplifies the model and the proofs, and it does not actually
restrict the ability of the adversary to use directional transmissions. Indeed, a directional
transmission can be modeled by the state of the link relation (between the transmitting
adversarial node and receiving nodes) – in the same fashion as we model jamming
(Section 2.4.1). In the pen-and-paper model and proofs, we found that using the Dcast
event is a more straightforward way of illustrating to the reader that the nodes can
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use directional transmission, and that it is worth the overhead (minor in pen-and-paper
proofs).
• We model concatenated messages as lists of simple messages (identifiers, timestamps,
locations, nonces, authenticators). With this representation, we have a one-to-one map-
ping between the messages in the model, and “real-world” messages. Whereas one
“real-world” message concatenated from more than 2 simple messages has multiple term
representation, depending on the order of concatenation.
In the Isabelle formalization, we use an extension of HOL, the HOL-Complex logic that
defines complex and real numbers, because our model requires the latter. Types, such as
messages or events, are defined using datatype ([110], Section 2.5). Settings, for convenience,
are defined not as tuples, but with record ([110], Section 8.2). Recursive functions, such as
message duration, or the sub-term function are defined with primrec and fun ([110], Section
3.5). Finally, the simplest constructs such as non-recursive functions, constants and feasibility
rules, are defined with definition ([110], Section 2.7.2).
We mechanized the most essential proofs: Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, availability and cor-
rectness of the PB/T protocol and correctness of the (most involved) PCR/TL protocol. The
proofs follow the pen-and-paper proofs in Section 2.3.7 very closely. Each step of the pen-
and-paper proof (i.e., each application of a feasibility rule) translates into an application of
a number of Isabelle methods. The Isabelle source code for the model and proofs is roughly
2500 lines long.
2.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the abstractions and simplifications introduced in our framework for
the sake of modeling and reasoning about secure ND. We also outline the differences between
protocols in terms of requirements and satisfied properties.
2.4.1 Abstractions and Simplifications
Mobility and NLOS Delay We assume nodes are static and non-line-of-sight (NLOS) de-
lay is constant over time. This simplifies the model quite significantly, because otherwise
propagation delay would vary during the transmission of a message. This is a reasonable
assumption, because mobility and NLOS delay changes are very minor at the ND protocol
execution time scale. For example, during 100µs, nodes moving at 100kmph traverse 2.7mm,
which is below the accuracy of most RF ranging systems. However, in general, mobility can
have security implications. To see why, consider the PCR/TL protocol. If nodes move during
the protocol execution, it is important when they estimate their location. At the very least,
A should estimate its location once when it sends the challenge, and again when it receives
the response; whereas the responding node B should estimate its location when it sends the
response. But even this might be insufficient under high mobility: If A measures its location
at the beginning of the message, while B measures the ToF at the end of the message, there
may be space for a stealthy relay attack. Introducing mobility and a dynamically changing
NLOS delay in our model is a possible direction for future work.
Medium Access Control and Jamming For simplicity, we do not introduce any MAC
restrictions into the model. Hence, a node is able to simultaneously receive any finite number
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of messages, even though in reality it is limited (to one message, or more for CDMA-like
technologies). We could introduce additional rules that model radio interference, e.g., set
links down if two (or more, depending on the node transceiver capabilities) simultaneous
transmissions take place. However, this would not affect any of our results. Notably, the
availability properties require links to be up, but they are agnostic as to why links are up or
down. Similarly, jamming would not affect our results either: we capture jamming with links
being down, thus availability implies, among other things, no jamming.
Inaccuracies We assume correct nodes have accurate time and location information. How-
ever, in reality, inaccuracies are inevitable. Regarding time, clocks may be coarse-grained and
they can drift. Furthermore, there is always some error in estimating the message reception
time (time-of-arrival) over a noisy channel. Regarding location, infrastructure (e.g., the Global
Positioning System (GPS), or base stations) providing location information may be temporar-
ily unavailable, and the location provided also includes some measurement error. Some of the
inaccuracies can be decreased: For example, the error in message time-of-arrival can be de-
creased by averaging over many messages or introducing long physical-communication-layer
preambles (see Part II). But some inaccuracy in time and location is unavoidable.
Inaccuracies do not diminish the impossibility result; Rather, they make it stronger. In-
deed, we prove the impossibility result holds even in an idealized environment, in which nodes
have access to information more accurate than in reality. In contrast, as secure ND protocols
rely on distance estimates, their effectiveness can be negatively affected by such inaccuracies.
For T-protocols, and even more so for TL-protocols, inaccuracies hinder availability: they
can lead to ToF estimates seemingly above the threshold for T-protocols, and make the two
distance estimates diverge for TL-protocols. The only way to cope with these is to introduce
some tolerance margins for measurements. Nonetheless, this affects correctness: The higher
the tolerance margin, the more space is left for fast relay attacks. This manifests the unsur-
prising tension between correctness and availability. Introducing inaccuracies explicitly into
the framework is a possible direction for future work.
Physical Layer Attacks The messages considered in our framework, albeit at the physical
layer, are composed of “atomic” components, such as nonces and identifiers, typically assumed
in formal security frameworks. In [35], Clulow et al. pointed out a number of physical
layer attacks, working at the symbol (or bit) level, and able to decrease message reception
time. In the case of external adversaries, as considered in our ND specification, the attacks
proposed in [35] can result in a (perceivably) negative ∆relay. This can be expressed in our
model. Furthermore, the external malicious interference attack we introduce in Chapter 5
can be modeled with minor extensions, e.g., making the nlos depend on time and allow
negative values. Hence our framework (notably the “atomicity” assumptions) is not limited
with respect to those attacks. However, this is not the case for physical-communication-layer
attacks introduced by internal adversaries. We discuss this in Section 2.5.
Fingerprinting In Section 1.4 we described device fingerprinting and channel fingerprinting,
and how it can be used to secure ND. The framework proposed in this section does not cap-
ture the capabilities of wireless receivers to perform such fingerprinting. This has implications
notably for the impossibility result. If the model would include some form of fingerprinting,
then the indistinguishability of local views (Lemma 1) would not hold, and the impossibility
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result would be lifted. It is not clear how such capabilities could be introduces into a formal
framework, notably because these techniques are relatively recent, and there is no clear un-
derstanding of the hardness of fingerprint spoofing. Integrating these into a formal framework
is a possible direction of future work.
2.4.2 Protocol Comparison
T-protocols versus TL-protocols On one hand, TL-protocols provide stronger security than
T-protocols in term of correctness. First, they do not need the notion of ND range, R, needed
by T-protocols. More importantly, they are secure as long as ∆relay > 0. In contrast, T-
protocols require that ∆relay ≥ Rv−1. On the other hand, TL-protocols suffer in terms of
availability: (i) they require location-aware nodes with secure and precise location informa-
tion, a far from trivial requirement, and (ii) they do not work for links with substantial NLOS
delay.
In light of these shortcomings, notably (i), T-protocols can be a viable solution to provide
communication ND, depending on the environment, the communication technology, and the
sophistication of the adversary. First, T-protocol provide a good approximation of commu-
nication ND in environments where two nodes in nominal communication range are able to
directly communicate, for example in outer-space. However, many environments (notably in-
door) do not display such characteristics. Second, if the ND range R is low, than the adversary
needs to be able to relay with a small ∆relay. For example, if we consider relatively short-range
IEEE 802.11 radios, with R in the order of 100 meters, ∆relay ≈ 100mc−1 ≈ 333ns. This is
significantly below the 15−20µs achievable by the non-trivial relay constructed by Hancke in
[67]. Simple store-and-forward relays are also thwarted easily. In contrast, for WiMAX, with
a range up to 50km, the lower-bound on ∆relay is around 166µs leaving much more space for
attacks. In fact, as R→∞, T-protocols become useless for securing ND.
Consider more powerful relay attacks (covered in Section 1.4.6). One example is the
analog relay of Francillon et al [61], with ∆relay ≈ 20ns. A ND range R secure against such a
relay is only a few meters. Furthermore, for many wireless technologies, 20ns falls below the
accuracy of the message time-of-arrival estimation. This implies that for practical purposes
this relay can be assumed to achieve ∆relay ≈ 0, which defeats not only T-protocols, but also
TL-protocols. Furthermore, using physical-communication-layer attacks [35] it is possible
to construct a relay with a (seemingly) negative ∆relay, which also defeats both classes of
protocols.
Hence, it might appear that for a sophisticated enough adversary, communication ND is
impossible not only for T-protocols, but also for TL-protocols. However, there is a significant
difference between these two “impossibility results”. In case of TL-protocols, the difficulty
stems from the inaccuracy of time- and location-measurements. These can be decreased by,
e.g., increasing the signal-to-noise ratio through making the message preambles (on which the
time-of-arrival is estimated) longer. Furthermore, as we show in Part II of the thesis, physical-
communication-layer attacks can be mitigated with appropriate countermeasures deployed on
the receivers. In contrast, the T-protocol impossibility is fundamental, and holds even in an
idealized model with no inaccuracies and no physical layer attacks.
B-protocols versus CR-protocols We provide a comparison of time-based B-protocols and
CR-protocols in Section 1.4; much of this applies to TL-protocols as well. In addition, we
note that B-protocols have less stringent requirements for availability, requiring that links
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be up for shorter periods than those needed by CR-protocols. In terms of correct (secure)
operation, CR/T-protocols require ∆relay, the minimum relaying delay, to be twice as large
as that required by B/T-protocols (for the same R).
Symmetric Authenticators Contrary to other protocols, the PB/TL protocol uses a sym-
metric authenticator. For this reason, this protocol might seem at the first glance susceptible
to a reflection attack: An adversarial node could after receiving the beacon message from node
A relay it back to A. Yet, as proven in Section 2.3.7, the protocol is actually secure. Further-
more, we could modify all the other protocols by simply replacing asymmetric authenticators
with symmetric ones, and they would still be secure under the same assumptions as their
asymmetric counterparts. However, if we would remove the time and location information
from the symmetric versions of the protocols, in an attempt to use them as regular authenti-
cation protocols, they would be all be vulnerable to the reflection attack. This demonstrates
an interesting interplay between authentication and time/location features of ND protocols.
2.4.3 Physical ND and Distance Bounding
In this Chapter, we focus on communication ND, but it is straightforward to express a spec-
ification for physical ND, as well as distance bounding (DB)8 in the proposed framework.
However, as we explain in Section 2.5, most DB protocols presented in the literature cannot
be directly modeled in our framework in a meaningful fashion. The fundamental reason for
this is that DB protocols attempt to provide a secure distance bound even if the DB protocol
is executed with an adversarial node. This opens a new space of internal attacks which are not
represented in our model. Communication ND protocols, in contrast, traditionally assume
that participating nodes are correct. The framework we propose is sufficient for capturing
this case.
2.5 Related Work and Open Challenges
We have provided a broad overview of the literature on ND schemes, relay attacks, and related
issues in Section 1.4. Here we review works that focus on analysis of neighbor discovery and
distance bounding protocols. The importance of formalizing the analysis of security protocols
in wireless networks has been recognized by a number of authors, e.g., in the context of security
of routing [106, 12, 111, 168], local area networking [72], or broadcast authentication [71].
2.5.1 Impossibility Results
In [32] the authors study the problem of secure clock synchronization under relay attacks,
which turns out to be closely related to communication ND. Compared to our model, the
model in [32] includes clock skews and an adversary model with the distinction of half-duplex,
full-duplex and double full-duplex transceivers, rather than the relaying delay. The authors
obtain impossibility and possibility results for the considered transceiver types, which are
complementary to the results obtained in this Chapter. In contrast to our work, the authors
abstract away the cryptographic aspect of the protocols – hence their framework cannot be
directly use to prove the correctness of concrete protocols in the same way as our framework.
8The difference between physical ND and DB is discussed in Section 1.1.3.
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This work is further extended in [138] to propose protocols for network-wide clock synchro-
nization and topology discovery, but again abstracting away the cryptographic aspects.
2.5.2 Formal Verification of Protocols
A number of formal frameworks designed for protocol verification have been proposed. How-
ever, contrary to our work, they tend to focus on distance bounding (DB) rather than com-
munication ND. We provide an introduction to DB in Section 3.1, and assume here that the
reader is familiar with the information provided in that section.
One of the first works where DB has been treated formally is [95] by Meadows et al. The
authors build on top of existing formal approaches [29, 118] tailored to “classical” security
protocols, and augments it with a notion of distance based on time-stamps. It is not clear
how communication neighborhood would be defined in this framework, nor how to model
a protocol that uses location information. Beyond this, an interesting characteristic of this
approach is that there is no explicit definition of an adversary. On the contrary, our approach
starts with a model of a wireless environment, including node location, state of wireless
links, and an explicit adversary, controlling a number of nodes in the network. A potential
advantage of this is that attack scenarios can be expressed in our model, whereas in [95] a
collusion attack is described in an informal manner.
In [141], Schaller et al propose a framework based on the inductive active approach of
Paulson [117]. The framework is formalized in the theorem prover Isabelle using Higher Order
Logic. Similar to our approach, the authors model directly the link relation, node location
and propagation time. The authors use their framework to verify an authenticated ranging
protocol (i.e., DB with a trusted prover), and ultrasound DB protocol, and in addition a
delayed key disclosure protocol. The authors further extend this approach in [20], where they
propose an elegant way of dealing with message spaces based on equational term theories.
This, in particular, allows them to include the exclusive or (XOR) operation used in the
Brands-Chaum style DB protocols [23] into the message space.
In [94], the authors extend the stand space model with timing information. The approach
is automatized using the constrained solving techniques proposed in [97] for bounded-process
analysis. The authors analyze 4 distance bounding protocols, including a simplified version
of the Brands-Chaum protocol, and a protocols proposed in [95]. They replace the XOR
operation with symmetric encryption, and the commitment is removed. The authors report
that the constraint solver is able to efficiently find attacks in flawed versions of the protocols.
In particular, they discover the distance hijacking attack [38] against these protocols.
The authors of [146] extend the strand space formalism [145] with notions of message
propagation time and device location to be able to reason about the security of simple DB
and related protocols. No mechanization of the security proofs is provided.
2.5.3 Probabilistic Approach and Open Challenges
Interestingly, in none of the above frameworks is it possible to prove the correctness of the
(non-simplified) Brands-Chaum protocol, or the Hancke-Kuhn protocol [66]. This is for a
number of reasons, most of which are related to modeling of internal attacks that DB pro-
tocols should cope with. First, although the XOR operation is modeled in [95] and in [20],
both frameworks deem the way the XOR is used in the Brands-Chaum protocol as insecure.
In reality, it is secure because it is combined with the commitment. In the same vain, the
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look-up operation used in the Hancke-Kuhn protocol is not modeled in any of the frameworks.
Second, all frameworks assume that all messages are instantaneous (i.e., have no duration),
which is not the case in reality, and leads to overlooking of some attacks (such as the attack
in Figure 3.3). In our model, we incorporate message duration. However, we assume that
the message components such as nonces are atomic, not composed from bits, which leads to
abstracting away crucial attacks (such as the attack in Figure 3.2). Third, all frameworks are
non-probabilistic, which means that they only capture attacks that can occur with probabil-
ity one. In contrast, malicious prover (distance fraud) attacks on DB protocols work with
probability that is non-negligible, but lower than 1 (e.g., Figure 3.2). We believe these types
of attacks should be possible to capture in any framework to prove the security of ND or DB
protocols against internal adversaries. This would require a shift from a non-deterministic,
message-based models to a probabilistic symbol/bit-based model.
One formal approach takes this leap: the framework of Pavlovic and Meadows introduced
in [120]. It includes probabilistic derivation based on the notion of guards, it models messages
on the bit level, and it incorporates the Hancke-Kuhn look-up operation. In fact, [120] pro-
vides the first formal analysis of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol. [120] is an extension of [95], thus
propagation time, distances, and node locations are not modeled directly. Furthermore, the
analysis in [120] has a few limitations. Foremost, it is limited to two specific guessing attack
scenarios: one distance fraud and one mafia fraud; nothing is mentioned about the terrorist
fraud, to which the Hancke-Kuhn protocol is vulnerable. Such approaches that are based on
iterating over a list of high-level attack scenarios offer limited security, as they miss undis-
covered attack scenarios. An example of this limitation is the recently discovered distance
hijacking attack scenario [38], which is different from the traditional distance fraud, mafia
fraud, and terrorist fraud. In contrast, the strength of most formal approaches lies in con-
sidering a much broader scope of adversarial actions, and only restricting the adversary from
violating causality, physical time and location constraints, and the security of cryptographic
primitives. In [94], such an approach allowed the authors to detect the distance hijacking
attack.
Second, the framework in [120] uses the notion of negligible probability, abstracting away
the exact probability of attack. However, many DB protocols are designed specifically to
lower an already negligible probability, with the goal of making the protocols more efficient.
It would prudent to allow formal approaches to capture such quantitative results. Third,
the approach is not mechanized, and experience has shown that a lack of mechanization can
overlook some flaws even in a formal analysis (in [20], an attack against one of the protocols
proven correct in [95] is demonstrated). Nevertheless, we believe that this work takes an
important step in the right direction.
Finally, we would like to note that beyond the challenges mentioned above, the years of
work on distance bounding protocols have lead to the discovery of a number of interesting
attacks, surveyed in Section 3.4.3. Ideally, a formal framework should be capable of capturing
all these attacks.
2.6 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we contribute a formal analysis of secure communication ND. We build
a formal framework, and provide a specification of communication ND or, more precisely,
its most basic variant, two-party ND. We consider two general classes of protocols: time-
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based protocols (T-protocols) and time-and location-based protocols (TL-protocols). For
the T-protocol class, we identify a fundamental limitation governed by a threshold value
depending on the ND range: We prove that no T-protocol can provide secure communication
ND if and only if adversarial nodes can relay messages faster that this threshold. This result
is a useful measure of the security achieved by ND T-protocols, which we believe are one of
the more practical and universal solutions to ND.
We use the proposed framework to analyze and design concrete provably secure commu-
nication ND protocols. We prove that two T-protocols – one beacon (B) and one challenge-
response (CR) – can provide secure communication ND if the adversary relaying delay is
lower-bounded by the threshold. Further, we show that location information, if available, can
improve the security. We propose novel TL-protocols (a B/TL protocol and a CR/TL pro-
tocol) and prove that they can provide secure communication ND as long as the adversarial
relaying delay is strictly positive. In practice, this implies that the protocol is secure as long
as the adversarial relaying delay exceeds the timing and location inaccuracies.
We argue that the proposed framework is adequate for reasoning about ND (and dis-
tance bounding) under the assumption that both participating nodes are honest. However,
if one of the nodes is allowed to be adversarial – a common assumption for distance bound-
ing protocols – then this opens a whole new range of attacks, in particular attacks on the
physical-communication-layer. This mandates, in our opinion, a shift from (non-)deterministic
message-oriented models to probabilistic models that explicitly consider bits or even symbols
at the physical-communication-layer. This is an interesting direction for future work, but it
requires a good understanding of the possible physical layer attacks and countermeasures.
This motivated us to pursue the investigation that constitutes Part II of the thesis.
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Chapter 3
Introduction to Distance Bounding,
PHY Attacks and Impulse Radio
In this part of the thesis, we focus on physical-communication-layer (PHY) attacks that
cause a (seeming) shift of the message reception time, without changing the content of the
message. These attacks were first discovered in [35]. Clearly, they are a threat to the time-
based (and time-and-location-based) ND protocols1 that we consider in Part I, but they are
equally relevant to ranging and distance bounding (DB) protocols. DB protocols allow a
(wireless) device to estimate, in a secure manner, the distance from itself to another device,
or more precisely, the upper-bound on this distance. DB protocols can provide physical ND
in applications such as physical access control. Furthermore, they can be used in applications
such a secure tracking [100] or secure localization [155].
We concentrate on DB protocols in this part of the thesis because traditionally DB proto-
cols consider the case where one of the participants is adversarial. In contrast, ND protocols
typically assume that both participants are honest. The former leads to a broader class of
PHY attacks. However, as PHY attacks work on the packet level, not the protocol level, the
external attacks that we investigate apply to ND protocols, as well as DB protocols. Further-
more, we focus on DB protocols that aim at providing a strict upper-bound (i.e., the precise
distance) whenever possible. For such protocols, distance-decreasing attacks are especially
relevant. We focus on a particular PHY: Impulse-Radio Ultra-Wideband (IR-UWB or simply
IR), because it is an ideal candidate for implementing DB protocols [66], thanks to its ability
to perform precise ranging.
Distance-decreasing PHY attacks can be classified into malicious prover attacks (inter-
nal), distance-decreasing relay attacks (external) and malicious interference attacks (exter-
nal). In Chapter 4, we adapt the first two attacks, originally introduced in [35], to the IEEE
802.15.4a standard [77] and evaluate their effectiveness. Beyond the security analysis of IEEE
802.15.4a, this investigation also gives us insight into how different performance-enhancing
features (such as convolutional coding and time-hopping) affect security of a PHY against
distance-decreasing attacks. In Chapter 5 we identify a new attack vector against IR rang-
ing, based on disrupting the ToA estimation. This allows us to introduce the last class of
PHY attacks (malicious interference), and in particular a low-complexity variant: the cicada
attack. We also show how the ToA attack vector can be used in malicious-prover and relay
attacks. We evaluate the attacks against a broad class of modulation schemes and a number
1For the relation between ND and DB see Section 1.1.3
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of receivers. Furthermore, in both Chapters, we examine countermeasures that can mitigate
PHY attacks.
Chapter Outline In this Chapter, we provide an introduction to ranging and DB proto-
cols (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2, we give an overview of PHY attacks. In Section 3.3 we
introduce Impulse Radio, we define the multipath channel model, we give an overview of
wireless transceivers and the simulation environment. Finally, we survey the related work in
Section 3.4.
3.1 Distance Bounding
Distance bounding (DB) protocols allow one device, the verifier V, to securely compute an
upper-bound on the distance to another device, the prover P. Figure 3.1 shows an example of
three DB protocols: the Brands-Chaum protocol [23], the Hancke-Kuhn protocol [66], and the
Cˇapkun-Hubaux protocol [155]. Like regular ranging protocols, DB protocols perform dis-
tance estimation based on time-of-flight measurements of ranging messages: the challenge(s)
sent by V and the response(s) of P. Additional messages are employed to guarantee authen-
tication, which is typically based on a common shared secret.
Providing a secure upper-bound implies that DB protocols only attempt to prevent distance-
decrease attacks. It is easy to see that no protocol can prevent an adversary from increasing2
the measured distance: First, a malicious prover can delay the response. Second, the ad-
versary can place itself in between the two honest devices, and relay the ranging messages
without any modification, but adding some delay.
Three threat scenarios are traditionally considered [46, 25]. In the mafia fraud , the ad-
versary interferes with a DB session between an honest V and an honest P, and decreases
the measured distance below the actual distance. In the other scenarios, a malicious P con-
vinces V that it is closer than it actually is, working alone (distance fraud), or in collusion
with other malicious devices (terrorist fraud). More recently, a new threat scenario termed
distance hijacking was added to this list [38]. In this scenario, a malicious prover tricks a
honest prover P’ to perform the ranging, and then “hijacks” the authentication part of the
protocol, making V believe that the distance to the malicious prover is that to P’.
Setting PHY attacks aside, all DB protocols are secure against the mafia fraud. In par-
ticular, it is easy to see that a relay attack cannot decrease the measured distance, because
that would imply introducing a negative delay when relaying the messages, or transmitting
messages at a speed faster than the speed of light. However, some protocols (referred to as
authenticated ranging or DB with a trusted prover) are by design only secure against the mafia
fraud. The Cˇapkun-Hubaux protocol is an example of such a protocol, where the prover sends
the response to the challenge after a delay. The verifier takes this delay into account when
computing the distance. A malicious prover can respond faster than the declared delay, thus
decreasing the measured distance. In contrast, the two other protocols are secure against this
attack, because the response is assumed to be send instantly after the challenge is received.
This leaves a malicious prover no room for an early response.
In fact, both the Brands-Chaum protocol and the Hancke-Kuhn protocol incorporate a
more sophisticated scheme, called the rapid bit exchange (RBE). In the RBE, the verifier
sends a number of single-bit challenges, one after the other. The prover replies instantly to
2Unless some additional assumptions are made [148].
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Figure 3.1: Examples of distance bounding protocol: (a) The Cˇapkun-Hubaux protocol, secure
only against the mafia fraud, (b) The Brands-Chaum protocol and (c) The Hancke-Kuhn
protocol, both secure against the distance fraud and the mafia fraud. V estimates the distance
to P with the formula dV P = c(tRTT − tTA)/2, where c is the channel propagation speed.
MACVP stands for Message Authentication Code with a symmetric key shared between V
and P, C,R,NV and NP are freshly generated nonces, h is a cryptographic one-way function,
|| denotes concatenation, tTA is a constant turn-around time that V and P know, and which
is assumed 0 for protocols (b) and (c), and tRTT is the round-trip-time measured by V.
each challenge with a single-bit response. To see why the RBE is needed, consider a simple
modification of the Cˇapkun-Hubaux protocol with no delay between the multiple-bit challenge
and response. Then, as shown in Figure 3.2, a malicious prover can reply prematurely by
guessing only a few bits (challenge or response) [35]. In contrast, with the RBE, any attempt
at an early response implies that the adversary needs to guess all the bits.
3.1.1 Distance Bounding and Secure Ranging
Distance bounding protocols, as defined so far, are only required to provide a secure upper-
bound on the distance. Hence, a physical ND protocol with proximity threshold r = R, the
nominal communication range, can be trivially converted to a DB protocol. Indeed, a protocol
that returns R when a node is at a distance closer than R, and fails otherwise, is a valid DB
protocol.
However, we can also add an additional requirement: If there is no adversarial activity, a
DB protocol should return an exact distance to the prover (or at least the best-effort upper-
bound of such distance). With this extended definition, DB protocols can be considered a
form of secure ranging. By this we mean that the integrity of the computed range is preserved
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Figure 3.2: Malicious prover attack against a DB protocol without RBE. The response R that
the verifier expects is an arbitrary function of the challenge f(C). The malicious prover sends
the response one bit early, guessing the first bit of R (denoted by ∗). The remaining bits of
R, i.e., bits (2. . . n) of f(C), can be computed with the challenge C that is fully received after
the first response bit is sent. The probability of success of this attack is 12 . The adversary
can decrease the distance by the duration of k bits with probability (12)
k.
(to the possible extent, keep in mind that the distance can be increased by an adversary);
However, the ranging is not confidential (private). In this Part, we concentrate on such DB
protocols.
3.1.2 One-way Ranging and Pseudo-Ranging
DB protocol are build on top of two-way ranging, that uses a two message, challenge-response
scheme. However, ranging between two devices can also be performed with only a single
message, assuming that the clocks of the two devices are tightly synchronized. In terms of
security, such a scheme cannot be secure against an internal adversary (who can send the
message prematurely or with a delay); but it can be secured against external adversaries.
Furthermore, time-difference of arrival localization algorithms also rely on a single mes-
sage pseudo-ranging. In these schemes, a transmitter sends a single message, and a number of
synchronized receivers estimate the differences in time-of-arrival (ToA) of this message, which
then allows them to estimate the location of the transmitter. Or the other way around - a
number of synchronized transmitters sends messages to a single receiver, which estimates the
differences in ToA of the messages and computes its location accordingly, exactly like in GPS
and other GNSS systems. Both TDOA schemes can be secured against external attackers, or
even internal attackers, if some additional assumptions are made ([156, 31], or military GPS).
The PHY attacks presented in this Part work by decreasing the time-of-arrival of a single
message, hence they apply to such single-message schemes, as well as DB protocols.
3.1.3 Time-of-Arrival Estimation
The description above abstracts away the PHY issues, which have implications for security.
In wireless communication, a packet, and in particular a ranging packet, is typically prefixed
with a preamble, which the receiver knows in advance. The preamble allows the receiver to
perform packet detection, synchronization and time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation in an efficient
fashion in the harsh wireless environment, and at relatively low SNR (signal-to-noise ratio).
In fact, to improve the performance of packet detection and the ToA estimation precision, the
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Figure 3.3: Malicious prover attack on the naive implementation of RBE with preamble.
The malicious prover replies tgain earlier than an honest prover would, but still receives the
challenge bit Ci early enough to compute the response Ri. This decreases the measured
distance by c · tgain/2.
preamble is often relatively long. For example, in the IEEE 802.15.4a standard, by “default”
(mandatory LPRF mode, Section 4.1.1) the preamble is as long as 248 data symbols, which
allows the receiver to combine hundreds of preamble frames for processing gain.
A naive implementation of a DB protocol would put a (long) preamble in front of every
single-bit packet in the RBE. However, this would not only be inefficient, but also insecure.
Normally, an honest prover would receive the entire challenge (preamble + data bit) before
starting to send the response (preamble + data bit). As shown in Figure 3.3, a malicious
prover could start to transmit its response prematurely, while the challenge is being received,
and still obtain the challenge bit in time to compute the response properly. Essentially, as
was observed in [35], an adversary can exploit the presence of any fixed part at the beginning
of the ranging packet.
We propose to divide the RBE into two phases (Figure 3.4(a)): In the ranging phase,
V and P exchange (long) ranging preambles to estimate the ToA precisely (but insecurely).
Second, the verifier verifies that the ToA estimates are correct, by sending a number of
single-bit challenges without preamble to which the Prover instantly replies with single-bit
responses (also without preamble). The verification phase is performed assuming the ToA
values estimated in the ranging phase. This allows the challenge and response to be short
and free of any fixed parts, preventing the attack in Figure 3.3. Note that it can be possible
to perform fine-tuning of the ToA estimate on the challenges and responses.
Note that the range-and-verify scheme can also be applied if the devices use traditional
ranging packet structures (Figure 3.4(b)), although this requires full-duplex capabilities from
the device [135]. In addition, a number of “buffer” bits should be added at the beginning of
the challenge’s data part, of total duration equal to the duration of the preamble. This is
necessary because the prover cannot start sending the response preamble before it detects the
challenge preamble and performs ToA estimation. This is a way to make RBE compatible
with the IEEE 802.15.4a, and we are going to assume such an implementation in Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.4: Two phase rapid bit exchange implementation (a) compatible with half-duplex
transceivers (b) compatible with traditional packet format (in particular, IEEE 802.15.4a),
requires full-duplex transceivers.
3.1.4 Security Level and Performance
The challenge and response messages in a DB protocol (Figure 3.1) are essentially random
nonces (of length Nnonce each), at least from the perspective of the adversary. At the end
of the protocol execution, the verifier learns both the true and the received values of these
nonces. The verifier accepts a distance measurement only if the received challenge and re-
sponse messages contain less than Nerr erroneous bits each. The parameters Nnonce, Nerr
jointly determine 1) the maximum bit error rate (BER) that the protocol tolerates and 2)
the security level, i.e., the the probability that the adversary will succeed in decreasing the
measured distance below the actual distance. We derive simple formulas that captures the
relation between these two parameters (used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). For more elaborate
results on this relation, we refer the reader to [144, 122, 98].
We set aside PHY attacks, and assume that the DB protocol is cryptographically secure
and that the authenticator is too long to be guessable. Then, the adversary is limited to
guessing attacks on the nonces: 1) a malicious P guesses the challenge or response and replies
early to V’s challenge; 2) an external adversary guesses the response and replies early in
place of the honest P; 3) an external adversary guesses the challenge, sends it early to P to
extract the correct response, and sends this response to V. For the Brands-Chaum protocol
the success probability of such guessing attacks is:
PBCguess = FBIN(Nerr|Nnonce,
1
2
) (3.1)
where FBIN(x|n, p) is the CDF of a binomial distribution with parameters n and p. For the
Hancke-Kuhn protocol the adversary’s probability of successfully guessing one bit is 34 . This
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is because for half of the challenges the response is the same, and hence in case 1) no guessing
is required and in case 3) an incorrect guess of the challenge will go unnoticed. Hence the
security level is:
PH−Kguess = FBIN(Nerr|Nnonce,
1
4
) (3.2)
We focus on the Brand-Chaum protocol. Inverting the CDF yields the maximum Nerr
achieving a desired security level Pguess:
Nerr = F
−1
BIN(Pguess|Nnonce,
1
2
) (3.3)
Interestingly, for a fixed security level, this allows a Brands-Chaum-like DB protocol to
operate at virtually any bit error rate by simply increasing Nnonce and Nerr. (We will see in
Section 4.4.1 why this is an important property for potential countermeasures). Indeed, we
have that:
Nerr = F
−1
BIN(Pguess|Nnonce, 1/2) = F−1N (Pguess|Nnonce/2, Nnonce/4) (3.4)
where F−1N (x|µ, σ2) is the inverse of the CDF of a normal distribution with mean µ and
variance σ2 and the second equality follows from a normal approximation of the the binomial
distribution. The protocol succeeds as long as there are no more than Nerr errors in a nonce
of length Nnonce, resulting in a bit error rate of BER
max = Nerr/Nnonce. From (3.4) it then
follows that, as the length of the nonce increases, the maximum sustainable bit error rate
BERmax tends to the worst case of 1/2, i.e.,
lim
Nnonce→∞
BERmax = lim
Nnonce→∞
Nnonce/2 +
√
Nnonce/4Φ
−1(Pguess)
Nnonce
=
1
2
(3.5)
where Φ−1(x) denotes the inverse CDF of a standard normal distribution. In contrast, for
Hancke-Kuhn style protocols the maximum sustainable bit error rate tends to 1/4. Unless
stated otherwise, we assume that a Brands-Chaum style protocol is used throughout the
thesis.
3.1.5 Choosing the Nonce Length
DB protocols make use of both ranging and communication packets. We have seen in Sec-
tion 3.1.4 that ranging packets carrying nonces can support very high bit error rates and still
achieve the desired security level Pguess, provided that the coding rate is properly adjusted
through the parameters Nnonce and Nerr. In contrast, communication packets do not neces-
sarily offer the same flexibility because the coding rate can be fixed (as in the case of IEEE
802.15.4a, see Section 4.1.1). Consequently, if we define a performance goal in terms of the
maximum tolerable packet error rate for communication packets of a given length PERcomm,
there is a minimum signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) SNRmin required to reach this goal. Given
PERcomm, SNRmin can be established analytically or with simulations.
We can define a similar performance goal for ranging packets by fixing their maximum
tolerable packet error rate PERdb. Now, if ranging and communication ought to have the
same operating range, ranging packets should achieve PERdb at SNRmin. To guarantee this,
we can first establish (again analytically or with simulations) the bit error rate BERdb that
ranging messages experience at SNRmin. A ranging packet of length Nnonce subject to BERdb
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Figure 3.5: Attack types: a) malicious prover attack b) distance-decreasing relay attack c) ma-
licious interference attack. A/H TX/RX stands for adversarial/honest transmitter/receiver.
Arrows denote transmissions, the dashed line denotes the adversarial channel.
is considered to be in error if it contains more than Nerr errors. We can thus derive Nnonce
and Nerr by solving the system of equations formed by (3.3), that ensures the desired security
level, and
Nerr = F
−1
BIN(1− PERdb|Nnonce,BERdb) (3.6)
that ensures the required PERdb. Note that we assumed here that the packet reception errors
due to factors other than the failure of data demodulation are negligible.
3.2 PHY Distance-Decreasing Attacks
PHY attacks aim at decreasing the estimated packet time-of-arrival while keeping the data
payload of the packet unchanged. Hence, in our investigation we focus on the transmission
and reception of a single ranging packet. The extension of such an attack to the entire protocol
session is straightforward.
Distance-decreasing PHY attacks can be classified as follows (Figure 3.5):
• Malicious prover attack : an internal attack mounted by a malicious prover against an
honest verifier. The malicious prover acts as a adversarial transmitter (ATX), and the
honest prover acts as a honest receiver (HRX).
• Distance-decreasing relay attack : an external attack in which the adversary relays a
packet between two honest devices, an honest transmitter (HTX) and an HRX. In the
relaying process, the packet is received by an adversarial receiver (ARX), forwarded to
ATX, which then retransmits the packet to HRX.
• Malicious interference attack : an external attack that consists in introducing interfer-
ence. This interference, generated by ATX, interferes with an honest packet transmitted
by HTX at HRX.
In Chapter 4 we deal with the first two attack, whereas Chapter 5 is mostly devoted to the
latter attack.
Intuitively, we define the distance-decrease of a PHY attack as the difference between
the actual distance between the prover and the verifier, and the distance that the verifier
computes under the PHY attack. A more precise definition is given in Section 4.2.
3.2.1 Attacks on Overlaying Applications
Physical Access Control Consider the RFID physical access control example discussed in
Section 1.2 and depicted in Figure 1.1(a). Assume that the normal relay attack (Section 1.3,
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Figure 3.6: Secure localization with verifiable multilateration. (a) Normal operation: The
small triangles are the actual locations of the verifiers Vi, the square is the actual location of
the malicious prover P, the large shaded triangle (verifier triangle) is the area for which the
verifiers can verify location claims, and the dashed circles centered at the verifiers (verifier
circles) represent the distance from the respective verifier to P. Observe that any location
within the verifier triangle (other than the location of P) lies strictly inside at least one of the
verifier circles. This implies that to claim such a location, P needs to decrease at least one
of the distances measured by a verifier with a DB protocol. (b) Effect of distance-decreasing
malicious prover attacks. Assume that P can decrease the distance to V2 and V3 by a small
amount d (denoted by the dotted circles). Then P can claim any location within the red
shaded area. In particular, this can be the location marked by the dashed square, which is
remote from P’s true location compared to d. Furthermore, a prover P’ that can decrease
the measured distance by a large amount can claim any location within the verifier triangle,
even if it is itself located outside this triangle.
Figure 1.1(b)) is prevented by a physical ND protocol or a DB protocol. However, if the PHY
is susceptible to a distance-decrease relay attack in the order of, e.g., 100 meters, then an
adversary can use this attack to gain access to the physical resource protected by the reader
(the building in Figure 1.1). The adversary simply needs to find a card at distance d < 100m
form the reader, and use the distance-decreasing relay attack, setting the distance-decrease
to d.
Next, consider a car PKES system that uses IR for communication between the car key
and the car. Imagine that the car owner, with the key in her pocket, parks the car in front of
a small store, and goes inside. An adversary can then mount a malicious interference attack
with distance-decrease of 19 meters. This will make the car believe that the car key is 1 meter
away, whereas it is actually 20 meters away. As a result, the car door will open, giving the
adversary access to anything the owner might have left inside.
Secure Localization Consider a secure localization system based on verifiable multilatera-
tion [155]. In such a system, three (or more) honest anchor nodes that know their location
(verifiers), verify the location claim of a (malicious) prover (Figure 3.6(a)). The location claim
needs to be positioned with the verifier triangle. Each verifier performs DB with the prover,
and checks if the measured distance corresponds to the distance between the verifier own
location and the prover’s claimed location. The claimed location is accepted only if all checks
are successful. The security of this schemes stems from properties of DB: To successfully
claim any false location within the verifier triangle, the malicious prover has to decrease at
least one of the prover-verifier distances.
Assume that the PHY is susceptible to malicious prover distance-decreasing attacks.
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Then, even if the maximum achievable distance-decrease d is small, the malicious prover
P can spoof its location quite considerably, as depicted in Figure 3.6(b). If the achievable
distance-decrease is large, than even a prover P’ located outside the verifier triangle can claim
any location within this triangle. Also a prover outside of the nominal communication range
can achieve this, assuming that it uses a high gain antenna to increase its communication
range.
3.3 IR System Model and Assumptions
Ultra-wideband (UWB) is a physical-communication-layer technology that is characterized by
a very large bandwidth. The FCC defines a signal as UWB is its absolute bandwidth is above
500MHz, or it its fractional bandwidth is above 20%. Because of this, UWB transmissions are
by regulation required to have relatively low power, not to interfere with existing narrow-band
systems. These restrictions result in a relatively low communication range (20-30 m).
Impulse-Radio Ultra-Wideband (IR-UWB or simply IR) is one flavor of UWB3, charac-
terized by the use of nanosecond pulses. Such narrow (in the time-domain) pulses give IR
the capability of high (sub-meter) precision indoor ranging, even in dense multi-path environ-
ments, and with relatively low complexity [64]. IR-UWB is envisioned to be used for tracking
and access control with a new generation of RFID [100], as well as high-precision localization
[64], including secure localization [172]. It has been also advocated as a PHY for distance
bounding protocols [66].
3.3.1 Multipath Channel
We adopt the tapped-delay-line channel model, which is commonly used for UWB. The chan-
nel impulse response is:
h(t) =
L−1∑
l=0
αlδ(t− τl) (3.7)
where L is the number of paths (taps), τl and αl are the delay and attenuation of the lth path,
and δ is the Dirac delta function. We assume that the channel is invariant for the duration
of one packet. We note that the first path is not necessarily the strongest path; we term such
a channel non line of sight.
A channel parameter most relevant for our investigation is the channel delay spread (or
simply channel spread), that determines how much the wireless channel spreads a single pulse
in time. We can define it as the time difference between the last the the first path. However,
in practice the last path is hard to determine, because it depends on acceptable attenuation.
For this reason, the channel spread is defined such that it captures the majority of the received
energy.
The signal observed at a receiver is:
r(t) = s(t) ∗ h(t− ν0) + n(t) (3.8)
where s(t) is the transmitted signal, ν0 is the unknown (line-of-sight) propagation delay, ∗
denotes convolution, and n(t) accounts for thermal noise assumed to be a zero-mean AWGN
process with power spectral density N0/2.
3The other flavor being Multi-Band Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (MB-OFDM).
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3.3.2 Wireless Transceivers
We assume that honest devices engaging in distance bounding are equipped with appropriate
IR-UWB transmitters and receivers; in particular, in Chapter 4 they are IEEE 802.15.4a com-
pliant. Adversarial devices are equipped with similar transmitters and/or receivers (depending
on the attack), but we assume that the adversary can transmit pulse sequences not compliant
with the modulation scheme used by honest devices, and can ignore regulatory transmission
power limits. The adversary may further equip his devices with high gain antennas, thus
allowing him to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) observed by both adversarial and
honest devices. Such an increase in SNR can also be achieved by the adversary moving his
devices closer to the honest devices. The receivers used by the adversary are modified versions
of the receivers uses by honest devices.
The choice of transmitter is of little consequence to our investigation We consider two
basic classes of receivers: a low-cost and low-complexity non-coherent energy-detection receiver
(we also use the term energy detector), and a more sophisticated rake receiver. An energy-
detection receiver is composed of an antenna, a bandpass filter (500MHz), followed by a
squaring device and an integrator that outputs a discrete time sample every Tint. Unless state
otherwise, we assume Tint = 2ns, which gives a sampling rate high enough to allow for precise
ranging. A rake reciver is composed of an antenna, a bandpass filter (500MHz) and a filter
matched to the pulse shape p(t).
We assume that the receiver is designed to receive packets composed of a preamble and a
data part. The preamble is terminated with a sequence called start frame delimiter (SFD),
indicating that data is about to start. A receivers always operate in the following basic stages:
• Coarse synchronization – the receiver detects a packet (preamble), and achieves a rough
synchronization (typically around the strongest path).
• Fine synchronization / ToA estimation – following coarse synchronization that provides
a rough ToA estimate, the receiver finds a more precise ToA (typically around the first
path).
• Channel estimation (optional) – the receiver estimates the channel delay profile to im-
prove the performance of data demodulation.
• SFD detection – the receiver detects the SFD sequence at the end of the preamble.
• Data demodulation – the receiver demodulates the data symbols using the appropriate
demodulation method (OOK, BPSK, or BPPM).
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we describe in more detail the modulation scheme and the
stages most relevant to the respective investigation.
3.3.3 Simulations
We evaluate the effectiveness of the distance-decreasing attacks and countermeasure with a
packet-based system simulator developed in MATLAB. We simulate a full IR-UWB system
including all the receiver stages necessary to receive a packet (listed above). The physical
layer is simulated with an accuracy of 100 ps. The signal to noise ratio (SNR) is defined as
SNR =
Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per pulse (after the convolution of the pulse with
the impulse response of the channel) and N0/2 is the noise power spectral density.
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3.4 Related work
The concept of distance bounding, and the first DB protocols (notably the most referenced
protocol shown in Figure 3.1(b)), were proposed by Brands and Chaum [23] back in 1993.
It was a response to the mafia fraud introduced in [46]. It relies on the idea of accurate
time measurements fist proposed in [22]. The main contribution of [23] is the introduction of
the rapid bit exchange (RBE). The RBE involves only very simple computational operations
(XOR) that can be executed within nanoseconds. This is required to make the RBE secure
against malicious provers (the distance fraud in particular). However, it was not until the
rise of wireless communications, and notably RFID, that the research on distance bounding
gained momentum.
The Hancke-Kuhn DB protocol was proposed in [66]. The structure of this protocol is
simpler than the Brand-Chaum protocol (Figure 3.1(c)), with no commitment and no authen-
tication phase after the RBE. This results in a higher success probability of distance fraud and
mafia fraud guessing attacks: (34)
n versus (12)
n for the Brands-Chaum protocol, where n is the
number of bits exchanges (rounds) in the RBE. The Hancke-Kuhn protocol was also the first
to address noise during the RBE, by tolerating a certain number of errors. This is a crucial
feature, without which DB protocols would not be usable for wireless communications.4 We
note that although the protocol structure used in [66] came to be referred as Hancke-Kuhn
style DB in the literature, the first DB protocol that used this structure was proposed in [26]
by Bussard and Roudier.
In [155] Capkun and Hubaux propose an authenticated ranging protocol that allows for
DB only with an honest prover, i.e., the protocol is secure only against the mafia fraud, not
the distance fraud. This relaxation of security guarantees allowed the authors to get rid of the
RBE, making the protocol substantially easier to implement, as no rapid response is required
on the prover side. Almost all subsequent works on DB protocols focuses on DB protocols
that are secure to both distance fraud and the mafia fraud, and in some cases also against
the terrorist fraud. The only exception are the protocols proposed in [95]. However, in many
application security against the mafia fraud is sufficient: e.g., in physical access control, an
adversary that corrupts the prover (i.e., the card) has no need for a distance fraud – he can
simply move the card close to the honest reader.
3.4.1 Towards More Efficient DB
Much effort has been devoted to making DB protocols more efficient. For the most part this
means decreasing the attack success probability for a given number of RBE rounds n, but
other approaches are also used. For example, in [96], the authors propose a Brands-Chaum
style DB protocol, in which the there is no commitment, reducing the computational and
communication cost.
A number of works attempt to decrease the mafia fraud success probability without re-
sorting to an authentication phase. In [19], the authors propose a modification of the Hancke-
Kuhn protocol that uses a set of binary decision trees in place of linear registers for computing
the response. Be changing the high of the trees, the system designer can gradually reduce
the success probability of the mafia fraud down to O(n 12n ). The success probability of the
4Note that error tolerance increases the adversaries probability of success. For simplicity we quote security
levels (probability of attack success) for the case where error tolerance is not required.
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distance fraud depends on distance-decrease desired by the malicious prover. If the distance-
decrease divided by the signal propagation speed is lower than the delay between consecutive
challenges, then this probability is (34)
n. Otherwise, the probability gradually drops as the
distance-decrease increases. This is because knowing more of the previous challenges makes
guessing the response easier. The reduction of the mafia fraud success probability is traded
off for memory consumption: For optimal security, O(2n) memory is required, which is only
possible for low n.
Another Hancke-Kuhn style approach is proposed in [85]. This DB protocol mixes random
challenges normally used in the RBE, with fixed challenges to which the prover knows the
response in advance. Changing the ratio between these challenges allows the protocol to trade
off the probability of a successful mafia fraud with the probability of a successful distance
fraud. Achieving the optimal mafia fraud security 12n comes at a cost of no security against
the distance fraud. This trade-off is investigated further in [80]. The authors define Current
Challenge-Dependant (CCD) protocols in which a response bit depends only on the current
challenge bit. They show that for any Hancke-Kuhn style CCD protocol, for a single bit,
the probability of a successful mafia fraud attack Pmaf and the probability of a successful
distance fraud attack Pdist must satisfy Pdist ≥ 34 and Pdist + Pmaf ≥ 32 . Further, they
define the class of k-Previous Challenge-Dependent (k-PCD) protocols, in which the response
depends on the current and k previous challenges. They show that for any Hancke-Kuhn
1-PCD protocol Pdist ≥ 58 and Pdist + Pmaf ≥ 54 . They also propose two 1-PCD protocols
with optimal distance fraud and mafia fraud security, respectively. Note that the protocol in
[19] belongs to the n-PCD class. In [151], another n-PCD protocol is proposed, the Poulidor
protocol. It exploits a similar idea to [19] but replaces the decision tree with a particular
graph, resulting in linear memory consumption. It achieves a better trade-off of distance
fraud success probability, mafia fraud success probability and memory consumption than
than the protocols in [66, 19, 85, 80].
In [102], the authors propose a protocol that improves the mafia fraud security of the
Hancke-Kuhn protocol, decreasing the attack success probability from (34)
n to (35)
n. However,
this is achieved at the cost of introducing void challenges and responses, essentially moving
from a binary modulation scheme to a ternary one. Obviously, ternary modulation exhibits
a higher bit error rate than binary one (at the same SNR). In [17], the authors extend this
idea to using n-ary modulation schemes, and show how to use such schemes to improve the
security of Hancke-Kuhn style DB protocols.
In [109], the authors propose a DB protocol in which individual bits in the RBE are
replaced with short sequences of bits. This is motivated by the ease implementation. However
it makes the protocol vulnerable to packet-level attacks, as described in [35].
3.4.2 Terrorist Fraud Resilience
The first protocol resilient to the terrorist fraud was proposed by Bussard and Bagga [25, 27],
but it relies on a relatively computationally expensive proof-of-knowledge protocol. In [137]
Reid et al extended the Hancke-Kuhn protocol to be resilient against the terrorist fraud, using
much efficient symmetric cryptography primitives.
In [86], the authors propose a DB protocol secure against the terrorist fraud, that offers
an optimal security ( 12n ) against the mafia fraud, in contrast to the protocol in [137]. This
protocol also has na optional privacy feature that prevents an external adversary from learning
the identifier of the prover, albeit it is computationally expensive for the verifier.
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In [18], the authors investigate using threshold cryptography (secret sharing) to provide
security against the terrorist fraud and show that previous protocols resilient to the terrorist
fraud all involve a simple form of secret sharing. They also show that protocols in which
the threshold is 2 (this includes all previous protocols) are vulnerable to an attack in which
an adversary discovers the long-term key. However, to be able to mount such an attack the
adversary needs to be able to learn if a given round of the RBE succeeded or failed.
Other protocols secure against the terrorist fraud have been proposed, but they have all
been broken, as we discuss next.
3.4.3 Attacks and Design Flaws
A number of minor and major attacks against published DB protocols, as well as errors in
their informal analysis have been discovered over the year. This confirms that designing DB
protocols is a challenging task, and makes an argument for formal analysis.
In [152], the authors proposed a terrorist fraud resilient DB protocol. It was later extended
in [79] to to the case of multiple provers. First, in [101] the authors discovered some flaws in
the protocol design. Then both protocols were essentially broken by a severe attack discovered
in [86]. This attack allows to extract bits of the long-term secret key. It relies on introducing
an error into the RBE, and observing if the verifier accepts the prover despite the error. This
attack also applies to the variant of the Reid et al protocols published in [137], but not to
an earlier, slightly more computationally expensive version of this protocol published in a
technical report.
A full disclosure attack is discovered in [122]. The attack allows an eavesdropper to extract
the long-term secret key of the honest devices by eavesdropping on multiple (in the order of
thousands) DB sessions. The authors also propose the Hitomi DB protocol that offers a better
security against the full disclosure attack.
In terms of error in the analysis, in [98], the authors show that the security of the Reid
et al protocol [137] against the mafia fraud is (34)
n, as was claimed by the authors or the
protocol, and not (78)
n as was reported in [125]. In [103], the authors show that the security
of the noise-tolerant mutual DB protocol in [143] is considerably lower than claimed by the
authors.
In [16], the authors discover an interesting variant of the distance fraud guessing attack
against a version of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol (and other similar protocols). This attack
applies if in the phase before RBE the verifier transmits his nonce before the prover (reverse
of the nonce sending order in Figure 3.1(c)). Under normal circumstances there is a 50%
probability that in the RBE a response is identical for both possible challenge values, in
which case the prover does not need to guess the response. However, after receiving NV , the
prover can test a number of candidates for the nonce NP and choose the one that maximizes
the number of identical responses, increasing his probability of guessing attack success.
In [38], a new type of distance hijacking attack is revealed. In this attack, a malicious
prover M “hijacks” a DB protocol execution between the verifier V and an honest prover
P. As a result, V believes that M is as close as P, while in reality M can be further away.
Such an attack applies to most protocols in the Brands-Chaum style. Instances of this attack
against specific protocols were discovered by other authors, e.g., in [94, 146], but it was not
identified as a general attack class overlooked in the traditional threat model list. The authors
propose a relatively simple fix. However, they also reveal a more fundamental problem: For
any DB protocols it is possible to construct another DB protocol such that if both protocols
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are combined, the original protocol becomes vulnerable to the distance hijacking attack. The
authors recommend that different DB protocols are implemented on incompatible PHYs.
3.4.4 Analysis
The analysis of DB protocols is typically performed in an informal fashion, and the assump-
tions and terminology tend to differ from paper to paper. To partially remedy this situation,
Avoine et al propose a unified framework for analysis of DB protocols [16]. They provide a list
of threat models: the impersonation fraud (an adversary manages to impersonate an honest
prover), the distance fraud, the mafia fraud and the terrorist fraud. They define strategies for
querying the prover: pre-ask and post-ask. Furthermore, they distinguish between the black-
box and the white-box model. In the former, the malicious prover cannot modify of observe
or modify the execution of the algorithms on the card, he can only query it. Establishing the
security of the protocol boils down to evaluating all the threat models and strategies, and
computing the probability of the resulting attack scenarios. Two DB protocols proposed in
[102] are evaluated as an example, and a flaw is found in one.
Although this framework improves on ad hoc arguments for security, it has a drawback.
Notably, it only evaluates the security against known attack scenarios, and there is no guar-
antee that this list is exhaustive. As noted above, recently a new threat model, the distance
hijacking attack, has been discovered in [38]. This attack scenario is not included in [16].
Formal verification of protocols can provide stronger proofs of security, although existing ap-
proaches [95, 141, 20, 94, 146, 120] have other limitations. We survey them in in Section 2.5.
3.4.5 DB with Additional Features
In [157], a Brands-Chaum style DB protocol that allows for mutual distance bounding (MAD)
is proposed, that allows both the prover and the verifier to obtain a distance bound. In [143],
the authors extend the MAD protocol to cope with noise during the RBE. The protocol pro-
posed in [86] includes an option for mutual authentication, but not mutual distance bounding
(i.e., only the verifier obtains a distance bound). In [169], the authors propose a mutual DB
protocol based on the Hancke-Kuhn style. The protocol provides a low success probability for
a mafia fraud, (38)
n. However, it requires the ability to detect a lack of challenge in a round
(much like the void challenge in [102]).
One aspect of privacy has been addressed in [86], where the identifier of the prover remains
secret from anyone but the verifier. In [135], the authors explore a different privacy threat
introduced by DB protocols. They show that an eavesdropper can learn the distances between
and/or locations of devices performing a DB protocol. They then propose a DB protocol that
is secure against such attacks. One of the features of this protocol is performing the RBE
using the full-duplex approach (as in Figure 3.4(b)).
In [148], the authors propose a method to make DB protocols resistant to external distance-
increasing attacks. To achieve this, they assume that the honest prover is in power range of the
verifier. Then, they propose to use an on-off keying modulation scheme, which would prevent
an external adversary from “hiding” the provers message from the verifier, and replaying it
with a delay. We note that this assumption is rather hard to guarantee in practice.
In [121], the authors combine Brands-Chaum style DB with cryptographic puzzles. The
goal is to mitigate attacks from a malicious reader, by forcing the reader to solve a crypto-
graphic puzzle before the card reveals its identity to the reader. Hence, the usual DB roles of
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the reader and the tags are reversed, the card being the verifier.
3.4.6 PHY Attacks and PHY Design
Physical layer attacks against distance bounding were discovered in [35]. In particular, the
authors introduced the early detection and late commit PHY attack primitives and shown
how to use them to mount malicious prover and distance-decreasing relay attacks. In addition,
attacks exploiting clocks skews were discovered, as well as packet level attacks (Figure 3.2
and Figure 3.3 show representative examples of these attacks). The effectiveness of the late
commit attack against concrete PHYs is studied in [68] (ISO 14443 RFID and wireless sensor
networks).
An IR-UWB architecture for implementing DB protocols is proposed in [87]. The maxi-
mum distance-decrease an adversary can gain against this PHY is 3−6m. This is achieved with
the short symbol duration of 20ns, which limits the applicability of this PHY in dense multi-
path environments for which IEEE 802.15.4a was designed. An ID-based distance bounding
protocol is implemented on proprietary IR radios in [149].
In [21], the authors propose a IR-UWB PHY based on time-hopping. They propose to
encode one symbol with a number of pulses distributed according to a secret time-hopping
sequence. This approach offers a good level of security against the mafia fraud, but it is not
secure against malicious prover attacks, in which the adversary would known secret time-
hopping codes, allowing him to mount effective early detection and late commit attacks.
Beyond IR-UWB, a number of DB PHYs tailored to narrow-band HF RFID systems have
been proposed. In such systems, the distances between the prover and the verifier are below
10cm, much shorter than the IR-UWB range. At these ranges, the multipath channel spread
is practically negligible, hence the ToA estimation vulnerabilities underlaying Chapter 5 are
not relevant. In [137], the authors propose a PHY that based on experimental results achieves
a timing resolution between 37ns (at 1cm distance) and 300ns (at 5cm distance). The PHY
proposed in [104] achieves a timing resolution of 0.5µs (at 5cm distance). In [69], a solution
that integrates the HF RFID PHY with wideband pulse detection is proposed, limiting the
possible distance-decrease to 1m in case of honest prover and 11m in case of a malicious
prover, at similarly short distances.
In [51], the authors first demonstrate the credit card Chip&Pin system deployed in the UK
is vulnerable to relay attack, and then implement a DB protocol with modest modification
to the existing hardware and software. This implementation limits the achievable distance-
decrease to at most 6m. It should be noted that this system is wire-line, which eliminates the
challenges that wireless implementations have to face.
In [136] Rasmussen and Capkun propose a new, fast method for implementing the rapid
response at the prover, which they term Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection (CRCS).
This method is applicable to Brands-Chaum style DB protocols. Traditionally, it is assumed
that the challenge symbol is demodulated by the prover, which performs a simple operations
on it (like XORing it with a response), and then sends the response symbol, which incurs some
processing delay (at least a few nanoseconds). In CRCS, the challenge is reflect by the prover
after shifting it in frequency to one of the two response channels, chosen according to the
response bit. CRCS can be implemented in an analog fashion, incurring negligible processing
delay (below 1ns). In addition, the challenge is demodulated, as it must be included in
the after-RBE authentication phase, but this process is no longer time-critical. Because of
the negligible processing delay of the CRCS process, and because reflecting starts when the
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challenge symbol is starting, this method practically removes the threat of a malicious prover
using early detection for distance-decrease. To mitigate the threat of late commit attacks, the
authors propose to use auto-correlation for ToA estimation. However, this results in strongest
path detection. If DB with higher precision in NLOS environments is required, the security
issues of ToA estimation apply (Chapter 5). Note that the CRCS method cannot be applied
to a large number of DB protocols, notably the Hancke-Kuhn protocol and the protocols
which stem from it. The methods is generic, and can by applied to any modulation scheme,
including IR ones. But, it requires dedicated hardware for both the prover, and the verifier,
which needs a receiver that can simultaneously receive signals in two frequency bands.
3.5 Summary
In this Chapter, we have provided the context for Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. We have given
an introduction to distance bounding (DB). We have covered the basics of PHY attacks and
introduced Impulse Radio Ultra-wideband (IR). We have also surveyed the related work.

Chapter 4
Physical Layer Attacks against IEEE
802.15.4a
physical-communication-layer (PHY) attacks against distance bounding were first described
in [35]. In particular, two attack primitives are introduced: early detection (ED) and late
commit (LC). The adversary can use these primitives to mount a malicious prover attack, or
a distance-decreasing relay attack. The specifics of the attacks, as well as their effectiveness
depends on the PHY. In [35], amplitude shift keying is used as a running example to illustrate
and argue the feasibility of the attacks, but no quantitative analysis is given. In a follow-
up work [68], Hancke and Kuhn demonstrated with an implementation that LC attacks are
feasible for the ISO 14443 PHY and a compliant RFID receiver, as well as 433MHz ASK/FSK
modulation and a super-heterodyne receiver, popular in wireless sensor networks. However,
none of these technologies were designed for ranging.
In this Chapter, we undertake such an investigation for IR-UWB, and more precisely the
IEEE 802.15.4a standard [77] that is particularly well suited for ranging. We adapt the ED and
LC attacks to IEEE 802.15.4a and evaluate their effectiveness with detailed PHY simulations.
We also examine countermeasures that can mitigate PHY attacks, while minimally degrading
the benign-case performance. We make the following contributions:
I We show that if honest devices use energy-detection receivers (popular due to their low
cost and low complexity), an adversary can mount PHY attacks that decrease the measured
distance in the order of hundreds of meters. The adversary can achieve this with energy-
detection receivers. Furthermore, by increasing the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), the attack
success rate can be made arbitrarily large. In particular, to achieve a success rate of 99%, the
adversary needs to operate at an SNR only slightly higher (a few dB) than needed for normal
system operation. This is easily achievable by using a high-gain antenna, by transmitting at
a power exceeding the regulatory limit, or by simply moving the adversarial devices closer to
the victim devices.
I We observe that, in order to mount a distance-decreasing relay attack, it is not enough to
attack the data part of a packet. The attack also has to be extended to the preamble. We
then develop ED and LC attacks for the preamble. The cost of these attacks (in terms of
SNR) is only a few dB compared to normal system operation.
I We unveil a security issue with the convolutional code employed in IEEE 802.15.4a: it
can be exploited by an adversary equipped with a rake receiver that attacks energy-detection
receivers. It allows the adversary to decrease the distance more substantially than the attacks
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mode Tpsym Tsync Tsfd Tpre Tsym
LPRF 3968ns 254µs 31.8µs 285.8µs 1024ns
HPRF 992ns 63.5µs 7.9µs 71.4µs 1024ns
Table 4.1: IEEE 802.15.4a mandatory modes parameter values.
mentioned above, or to mount an undetectable relay attack with a more modest, but still
substantial, distance-decrease. This security issue can be patched with a small modification
to IEEE 802.15.4a.
I We show that time-hopping used in IEEE 802.15.4a allows a malicious prover to augment
the distance-decrease of PHY attacks at the cost of decreasing the probability of attack
success. A rake-equipped malicious prover can also similarly exploit the combination of BBPM
and BPSK employed in IEEE 802.15.4a. The time-hopping vulnerability can be patched with
a small modification to IEEE 802.15.4a.
I We observe that by increasing the length of nonces used in a DB protocol, we can improve
its performance (packet error rate) and preserve the security level. We use this observa-
tion to advocate a simple, efficient, and standard-compliant countermeasure to PHY attacks.
Employed in an energy-detection receiver, along with the convolutional code patch, this coun-
termeasure effectively limits the distance-decrease of distance-decreasing relay attacks to a
value in the order of the channel spread (around 10m). Employed in an energy-detection
receiver or in a rake receiver, along with the convolutional code and time-hopping patches,
the countermeasure limits the effectiveness of malicious prover attacks to a similar value. In
both cases, the cost of the countermeasure in terms of required packet length is modest. We
emphasize that these countermeasures preserve the features of IEEE 802.15.4a that improve
benign case performance, in particular time-hopping.
Chapter Outline Our basic assumptions about the wireless channel and receivers are pre-
sented in Section 3.3. In Section 4.1 we provide the IEEE 802.15.4a specification and ad-
ditional assumptions on receivers and the DB implementation. We show a range of PHY
attacks in Section 4.2, and evaluate their performance in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we
discuss countermeasures, before concluding in Section 4.5.
4.1 System Model
4.1.1 IEEE 802.15.4a Modulation Scheme
IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard for low-rate wireless personal area networks (WPAN). The IEEE
802.15.4a amendment [77] defines an IR-UWB PHY that allows for low-rate communication
and high precision ranging. The IEEE 802.15.4a standard is very flexible, allowing for many
combinations of parameter values. However, only two of these combinations need to be
implemented by a standard compliant device: one LPRF and one HPRF mode (high/low
pulse repetition frequency). We focus on the LPRF mode in our investigation. However, our
results are easily transferable to other modes (which use different parameter values). The
publicly known parameter values most important for our investigation are summarized in
Table 4.1. An IEEE 802.15.4a packet is composed of a preamble followed by data.
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Ls 
 
0 S 0 -S 0 0 -S S S S S S S S 
Figure 4.1: IEEE 802.15.4a preamble structure
Tc = 2ns
0-block 1-blockguard guard
tTHS,i Ncpb
… … … …
Tsym /4Tsym /4
Figure 4.2: IEEE 802.15.4a data symbol structure
Preamble
The preamble (Figure 4.1) consists of a SYNC part and the start frame delimiter (SFD). The
SYNC part is composed of Nsync = 64 identical preamble symbols of duration Tpsym. The SFD
is composed of a particular sequence of Nsfd = 8 preamble symbols. Each preamble symbol is
formed by C preamble frames that consist of Ls chips of duration Tc = 2ns (frame duration
TPf = Ls · Tc). Pulses are sent in the first chip of every frame and modulated according to a
ternary preamble code of length C. The transmitted signal is given by:
sP(t) =
Nsync+Nsfd∑
i=1
si
C∑
j=1
cj · p(t− jLsTc − iTpsym) (4.1)
where p(t) is the pulse shape, cj ∈ {−1, 0,+1} are the elements of the preamble code and
ν0 is the propagation delay. Each preamble symbol is modulated by the sequence si =
[1, . . . , 1, 0, 1, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0,−1] whose last eight elements denote the SFD.
Private Ranging Mode The standard includes a private ranging mode whose main purpose
is to prevent an adversary from learning sensitive ranging information. To this end the private
ranging mode allows for the encryption of timestamp information that is exchanged during
the ranging process. More importantly, the preamble codes used in the ranging packets are
secretly agreed on by the legitimate participants. However, this provides a minor increase in
security, because the nodes are only allowed to choose from a set of 8 predefined preamble
codes. We explain this in detail in Section 4.4.2.
Data
The data (Figure 4.2) is modulated using a combination of binary pulse-position modulation
(BPPM) and binary phase-shift keying (BPSK). In addition, time-hopping is used to allow
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for multiple-access and every data symbol (synonymous with data frame) is signalled through
the transmission of a burst of Ncpb pulses. The signal corresponding to the i-th data symbol
is:
sDi (t) = (2ai − 1)
Ncpb∑
j=1
bij · p(t− iTsym − diTsym/2− tTHS,i − jTc) (4.2)
where p(t) is the pulse shape, ai is the polarity bit (BPSK), di the position bit (BPPM), Tsym =
TDf = 1024ns is the symbol duration, tTHS,i ∈ [0, tmaxTHS], where tmaxTHS = Tsym/4−Ncpb·Tc, defines
the pseudo-random time-hopping offset, and the scrambling sequence bij defines the polarity
of the j-th pulse of the i-th burst. Both the time-hopping and the scrambling sequences are
derived from a fixed and publicly known linear feedback shift register that is initialized to a
publicly known state at the beginning of every packet. Both sequences are thus the same for
every packet.
Channel Coding A systematic rate 1/2 convolutional code with generator polynomials
g1 = (0, 1, 0) and g2 = (1, 0, 1) is used. Denote the bits to be transmitted by xi. Then the
position bit is di = xi and the polarity bit is ai = xi−1 ⊕ xi+1, where ⊕ denotes modulo
two addition. With this construction, an energy-detection receiver, which cannot recover
the polarity bit, can still decode the transmitted bit sequence xi; whereas a coherent receiver,
which can recover both bits, can apply convolutional decoding to improve performance. IEEE
802.15.4a also applies a systematic (55,63) Reed-Solomon (RS) code before modulation.
4.1.2 Receivers
Energy-Detection Receiver
The receiver follows the stages sketched in Section 3.3.2: It employs a traditional synchro-
nization algorithm based on a correlation with the known preamble sequence (details can be
found in Section 5.1). The receiver then performs a period of channel estimation where it
estimates the energy-delay profile of the channel by averaging a number of preamble symbols.
The default method for SFD detection is based on on-off keying demodulating (maximum
likelihood rule) the preamble symbols, and soft-decoding a sequence of length Nsfd = 8 until
the SFD sequence 01011001 is found. An alternative method is based on correlation with with
SFD template. The latter method has inferior performance: In the benign case it requires
around 2dB more in SNR to achieve the same performance as the method based on decoding.
However, we evaluate both methods for completeness.
By default, to demodulate the i-th BPPM data bit di, the receiver uses the optimum
decision rule from [39], [57], comparing the (weighted) energies in the first and second half of
the symbol:
M−1∑
m=0
ym,i · pm
di=0
≷
di=1
M−1∑
m=0
y
m+
Tf
2Tc
,i
· pm (4.3)
where ym,i denotes the m-th discrete sample of the i-th symbol. The weighting coefficients pm
are derived from the energy-delay profile of the channel. The number of samples to combine
is M = tdet/T , where tdet defines the detection time: the length of the received signal (per
half-symbol) that the receiver uses to demodulate the bits; tdet is chosen to be large enough
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to account for the channel delay spread. In our simulations we use the non-line-of-sight
residential channel model from [99] and set tdet = 60ns accordingly.
We also consider an alternative method for data demodulation, in which the receiver does
not apply the weights pm. (Note: This is equivalent to sampling at much lower rate with
integration time tdet.) The alternative method requires around 2dB more in SNR to achieve
the same performance as the default method.
Rake Receiver
The receiver with optimal performance (in a benign setting), but also with the highest com-
plexity, is an all-rake receiver using maximum ratio combining (MRC) [132]. The convolu-
tional code is decoded with the optimal symbol-wise branch metric for BPPM/BPSK given
in [13]. For this section, the crucial difference between an energy-detection receiver and a
rake receiver is that the latter can recover the polarity bits ai during data demodulation.
This diminishes the effectiveness of data PHY attacks against rake receivers (Section 4.2.4),
but also opens a new space for data attacks if a rake receiver is used against energy-detection
receivers. In our analysis of the rake receiver, we therefore focus on the data, assuming perfect
synchronization and channel estimation.
Similar to the energy-detection receiver, an important parameter for our analysis is the
detection time tdet, denoting the portion of the received signal that the rake receiver uses to
demodulate a bit. We chose tdet large enough to account for the channel delay spread.
4.1.3 Distance Bounding Protocol Assumptions
All the assumptions stated in Section 3.1 hold. In addition, we define tres as the time interval at
the prover between the start of the reception of a challenge bit and the start of the transmission
of the corresponding response bit. To make the response as “instant” as possible with IEEE
802.15.4a, we assume that tres = Tsym/2 + t
max
THS + tdet. This is the smallest tres sufficient to
demodulate symbols with maximal time-hopping offsets.
We assume that the DB protocol has access to the received bit sequence before it is decoded
with the error correcting codes (Reed-Solomon, convolutional). In a receiver implementation,
this assumption can easily be met as these bits have to be received from the channel in any
case. If this assumption is violated, the success probability of guessing attacks increases,
because coding can mask some of the erroneously guessed bits.
4.2 Distance-Decreasing Attacks
Physical layer (PHY) attacks considered in this Chapter rely on two primitives: 1) In early
detection (ED), an adversarial receiver (ARX) detects a PHY symbol (e.g., data symbol)
of duration tsym based only on the beginning part of this symbol of duration tED < tsym,
where tED is the ED delay. This leads to a detection which is less reliable, but also faster
than that of a normal receiver (which takes tres > tED of the PHY symbol into account for
detection). 2) In late commit (LC ), only the (tsym − tLC)-long end-part of the PHY symbol
is modulated based on the intended value of the symbol (e.g., whether it encodes a 0 bit or
a 1 bit), and the beginning part is modulated independently of this value. This allows an
adversarial transmitter (ATX) to delay the decision about which symbol it transmits by tLC,
where tLC is the LC delay. The PHY symbols generated with LC typically differ from regular
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Figure 4.3: Overview of the distance-decreasing relay attack. ARX and ATX are assumed to
be located on a line between HRX and HTX. The thick dotted arrow indicates time-of-arrival
corresponding to the actual distance between HTX and HRX.
symbols, but, if appropriately chosen, they can be demodulated by an honest receiver, albeit
with some performance loss.
The first type of PHY attack we consider is an internal attack mounted by a malicious
prover (consisting of an ARX and an ATX), which can be used in a distance/terrorist fraud.
In this attack, a malicious prover uses ED, LC or their combination to respond prematurely
to the verifier’s V challenge. This decreases the propagation time measured by V by an offset
tgain that we call the time-gain. The time-gain is equal to:
tgain = (tC + tres − tED)/2, for an ED-only attack (4.4)
tgain = (tLC + tres − tD)/2, for an LC-only attack (4.5)
tgain = (tLC + tres − tED)/2, for an ED+LC attack (4.6)
where tD and tC are, respectively, the detection delay and commit delay when the adversary
chooses not to perform ED and LC, i.e., the adversary performs detection without performance
loss and transmits standard-compliant symbols. Note that it is possible that tD < tres and
tC > 0 if time-hopping is involved. The time-gain translates into a distance-decrease of c·tgain,
where c is the speed of light.
The second type of attack we consider is a distance-decreasing relay attack between two
honest devices. This attack is mounted by an external adversary using a combination of ED
and LC and it can be classified as a mafia fraud. The general setup for the relay attack
is shown in Figure 4.3. The adversary should mount the distance-decreasing relay attack
on all ranging messages (challenge, response); other messages, being not time-critical, can
be relayed in an arbitrary fashion. Without loss of generality, we focus on the exchange of a
single ranging message. In this case one of the honest devices acts as a transmitter (HTX) and
the other one as a receiver (HRX), whereas one adversarial device acts as an early detection
receiver (ARX), and another as a late commit transmitter (ATX). The channel from HTX to
ARX, and from ATX to HRX is the IEEE 802.15.4a channel. ARX and ATX communicate
using a dedicated, out-of-band adversarial channel. By default, we assume that HRX does
not receive the signal transmitted by HTX, but we also explain what happens if this is not
4.2. Distance-Decreasing Attacks 83
time 
ARX 
ATX 
early SFD detection 
S S S S S 0 -S 
0 0 0 S S -S 
tED 
SFD tED 
SFD 
synchronization 
 
S 0 
tLC 
SFD 
ν0 
trelay 
tsync 
synchronization channel est. SFD det. 
Figure 4.4: Distance-decreasing relay attack on the preamble.
true. The propagation speed of both channels is c, the speed of light.
In a distance-decreasing relay attack the adversary relays messages between HTX and
HRX in such a way that to HRX they seem “shifted back in time” by a positive offset
trelay = tLC − tED (4.7)
that we call the relay time-gain (Figure 4.3). The distance measured by V is then reduced
by the relay distance-decrease c · trelay. (Assuming that ARX and ATX are located on a
line between HTX and HRX. In other configurations the distance decrease will be smaller.
Note, however, that the choice of the configuration rests with the adversary.) In the relay
attack, ATX needs to begin the transmission of the preamble at time t0 − trelay, before ARX
begins receiving the preamble from HTX a time t0. However, the adversary learns t0 only
after synchronizing to the preamble of HTX. (Guessing t0 is not practical at the nanosecond
precision required.) To escape this vicious circle, the adversary needs to mount some form
of ED and LC on the preamble, in addition to ED and LC on the data. In contrast, the
preamble attacks are not necessary in the case of malicious prover attacks.
Note that the distance-decrease that the adversary might wish to obtain is not limited
by the low communication range of IEEE 802.15.4a. Indeed, a malicious prover can increase
his communication range by using a high gain antenna and transmitting with non-regulatory
power to reach a remote prover. Further, in a relay attack, the adversary can“connect”remote
HRX and HTX by placing ARX close to HTX and ATX close to HRX, and using a long-range
ATX–ARX link to which the range limitations of IEEE 802.15.4a do not apply.
We consider three scenarios for data attack, in which the adversary uses different types
of receivers against different types of receivers used by the honest devices: Energy Detector
against Energy Detector, Rake against Energy Detector, and Rake against Rake. For each
scenario we first analyze the delay of the ED and LC primitives. Then, we elaborate on the
use of these primitives for malicious prover attacks and relay attacks. Table 4.2 summarizes
the upper-bounds on the time-gain and distance-decrease of various variants of PHY attacks.
We start by presenting the preamble attack in Section 4.2.1 because this attack applies in all
scenarios.
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4.2.1 Preamble
The attack, which is part of the distance-decreasing relay attack, is depicted in Figure 4.4;
for clarity of presentation, we assume the distance between ARX and ATX to be 0. ARX
performs synchronization in the same fashion as an honest receiver. ARX then signals the
fact that it has synchronized to ATX. Deviating from honest receivers, ARX performs early
SFD detection: It chooses an early SFD detection delay tSFDED and tries to detect the presence
of the SFD by deliberately considering only the first tSFDED seconds of every received preamble
symbol. As the SFD starts with a 0 modulated preamble symbol, as opposed to a 1 modulated
symbol used during the SYNC part, early SFD detection boils down to on-off keying (OOK)
demodulation.
At the other end of the relay, ATX chooses a late SFD commit delay tSFDLC and remains
silent until ARX signals that synchronization has been successful. Then, after an appropri-
ately chosen (we explain how shortly) delay τ < Tpsym, ATX begins transmitting a sequence
of preamble symbols S. This is repeated until ARX signals that the SFD was detected. Imme-
diately afterwards, ATX switches to the transmission of a standard compliant SFD, beginning
from tSFDLC into the SFD. This concludes the distance-decreasing attack on the preamble.
In contrast to a standard-compliant preamble, the SYNC part of the preamble generated
by ATX begins with a number of 0 modulated preamble symbols; The beginning of the SFD
corresponds to a 1 modulated preamble symbol for a duration of tSFDLC , instead of having no
signal contribution. The relay time-gain achieved by this attack is trelay = t
SFD
LC − tSFDED . This
determines the choice of τ , as Tpsym − τ = trelay mod Tpsym.
4.2.2 Data: Energy Detector against Energy Detector
Data attacks are performed on a symbol basis. As we are considering energy-detection re-
ceivers, which are blind to the signal polarity, only the position bit di is relevant.
ED ARX performs ED by deciding on the value of dRXi after an early detection delay :
tED[d
RX
i ] = t
RX
THS,i + t
A
det < Tsym/2 (4.8)
where tAdet denotes the detection time of ARX and t
RX
THS is the time-hopping offset sequence
of the received message. This implies that ARX replaces BPPM demodulation with on-off
keying (OOK) demodulation. The time tAdet can be made arbitrarily short, it determines the
attack’s performance. If ARX chooses not to perform ED, the detection delay is
tD[d
RX
i ] = Tsym/2 + t
RX
THS,i + tdet (4.9)
LC In the LC attack, ATX always transmits a burst of pulses with energy E0 (shifted by
the appropriate time-hopping offset). In the second half of the symbol, ATX acts according
to the value of dTXj : If d
TX
j = 0, ATX transmits nothing in the second part of the symbol;
if dTXj = 1, ATX transmits a burst of pulses with energy E1 > E0. This attack exploits the
fact that HRX performs a simple energy comparison to demodulate. The late commit delay
for dTXj is:
tLC[d
TX
j ] = Tsym/2 + t
TX
THS,j + tPLC (4.10)
where tTXTHS is the time-hopping offset sequence of the transmitted message, and tPLC < tdet is
the pulse LC delay, by which the transmission of the pulse can be additionally delayed, similar
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Figure 4.5: Example of a malicious prover ED+LC attack on the data. The first two symbols
use equal time-hopping offsets for corresponding symbols, hence their time-gain is identical.
The maximal time-gain for the 3rd symbol is larger than the packet-wide time-gain chosen of
the adversary. The time-gain for the 4th symbol is smaller than the packet-wide time-gain,
and the adversary is forced to guess.
to the LC attacks discussed in [35, 68]. Throughout most of the paper, notably Section 4.3,
we assume tPLC = 0. If ATX chooses to send standard-compliant symbols, it can still delay
committing to the transmitted symbol by:
tC[d
TX
j ] = t
TX
THS,j (4.11)
Malicious Prover Based on (4.4), the time-gain of the ED-only malicious prover attack for
corresponding challenge and response symbols i and j is:
tgain[i, j] = (tC[d
TX
j ] + tres − tED[dRXi ])/2 = (4.12)
= (Tsym/2 + t
max
THS + tdet − tAdet)/2 + (tTXTHS,j − tRXTHS,i)/2 = C + (tTXTHS,j − tRXTHS,i)/2
where C is a constant not dependent on i and j. The time-gain of other malicious prover
attacks can also be expressed as C+(tTXTHS,j−tRXTHS,i)/2. The latter term varies from −tmaxTHS/2 to
tmaxTHS/2, because t
TX
THS 6= tRXTHS if different channels are used for for RX and TX, but also because
i 6= j due to the “buffer” bits (Figure 3.4(b)). However, the structure of the attack demands
that the adversary chooses a constant time-gain tgain for all symbols. This leaves the adversary
with a strategic decision: The adversary can set the time-gain conservatively, to make sure
there is enough time to perform ED and/or LC on every symbol (i.e., choose tgain ≤ tgain[i, j]
for all corresponding i, j index pairs). Alternatively, the adversary can set the time-gain more
aggressively, which will force him to guess the bits with unfavorable time-hopping offsets
(i.e., i, j pairs for which tgain[i, j] < tgain). This is illustrated in Figure 4.5. In this way,
the adversary can trade-off a larger time-gain (up to 2 · tmaxTHS/2) for a lower attack success
probability. Figure 4.7 shows this trade-off for one particular case (Nnonce = 42, Nerr = 2,
mandatory LPRF mode).
Relay For the relay attack (Figure 4.6), the time-gain, based on (4.7), is:
trelay[i, j] = tLC[d
TX
j ]− tED[dRXi ] = Tsym/2 + tPLC + tTXTHS,j − tRXTHS,i − tAdet (4.13)
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Figure 4.6: Example of a malicious prover ED+LC attack on the data. The first two symbols
use equal time-hopping offsets for corresponding symbols, hence their time-gain is identical.
The maximal time-gain for the 3rd symbol is larger than the packet-wide time-gain chosen of
the adversary. The time-gain for the 4th symbol is smaller than the packet-wide time-gain,
and the adversary is forced to guess.
However, in the case of the relay attack tRXTHS = t
TX
THS and i = j. Hence, the time gain is:
trelay = Tsym/2 + tPLC − tAdet (4.14)
for every symbol. This is also the upper-bound on the overall time-gain of the relay attack,
as the time-gains achievable for the preamble are larger.
4.2.3 Data: Rake against Energy Detector
ED and LC If honest devices use energy detectors, using a rake receiver allows the adversary
to perform an ED attack with negative delay tED by extracting d
RX
i from the (i-1 )-th symbol.
This attack exploits the structure of the convolutional code: The (i-1 )-th data symbol carries
the position bit dRXi−1 and the polarity bit a
RX
i−1 = d
RX
i−2 ⊕ dRXi . With a rake receiver, ARX can
decode both bits, and obtain dRXi by computing a
RX
i−1 ⊕ dRXi−2. This is all that is necessary to
transmit the corresponding j-th symbol: The adversary can compute dTXj from d
RX
i , and a
TX
j
can be set arbitrarily, as polarity is lost in the squaring operation that the energy-detection
receiver performs. The delay of the rake ED attack extracting di from the (i-1 )-th symbol is:
tED[d
RX
i ] = −(1− dRXi−1) · Tsym/2− Tsym/2 + tRXTHS,i−1 + tAdet (4.15)
HRX is an energy-detector as in Section 4.2.2, hence the same LC attack applies.
Malicious Prover and Relay With the rake ED attack, the malicious prover attacks, but
also the relay attack (as i = j − 1 in this case) are subject to per-symbol variability of the
time-gain due to time-hopping offsets. An additional time-gain variability is due to BPPM,
i.e., the term “−(1 − dRXi−1) · Tsym/2” of the ED delay. As in Section 4.2.2, this presents the
adversary with a trade-off between the distance-decrease, and the probability of a successful
attack. For example, the additional time-gain of the relay attack is at most Tsym/2 + 2 · tmaxTHS,
and Figure 4.7 shows the trade-off for a particular set of parameters. See Table 4.2 for the
malicious prover attack.
Furthermore, a negative ED delay allows for an ED-only distance-decreasing relay attack
to be mounted. Although it has a lower time-gain than an ED+LC relay attack, the ED-only
attack circumvents any countermeasures that prevent LC attacks, e.g., the countermeasure
advocated in Section 4.4.1.
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Figure 4.7: Example trade-off between guessing probability and additional time-gain achiev-
able with 1) Malicious prover attacks in the scenario “Energy Detector against Energy De-
tector” 2) Distance-decreasing relay attack in the scenario “Rake against Energy Detector”.
The guessing probability Pguess(t
+
gain) = FBIN(Nerr|B(Nnonce, t+gain), 12), where B(Nnonce, t+gain)
is the number of bits out of Nnonce that the adversary must guess to obtain an additional
time-gain t+gain. The timing parameter values (notably the time-hopping sequence) correspond
to the mandatory LPRF mode of IEEE 802.15.4a, and Nnonce = 42, Nerr = 2 (corresponds to
security level 2−32).
4.2.4 Data: Rake against Rake
To mitigate the effects of the rake ED attack, an honest rake receiver must demodulate
and check the correctness of both positions bits di and polarity bits ai (without applying
convolutional decoding, see coding assumption in Section 4.1.3). With this precaution in
place, ATX cannot transmit symbol j (with or without LC) without knowing aTXj .
ED and LC The ED delay of demodulating the polarity bit aRXi is:
tED[a
RX
i ] = d
RX
i · Tsym/2 + tRXTHS,i + tAdet (4.16)
The LC delay of committing to the polarity bit aTXj is:
tLC[a
TX
j ] = t
TX
THS,j + d
TX
j · Tsym/2 + tPLC (4.17)
Note that both delays depend on the value of the position bit. For position bits, the delays
for ED of dRXi and LC of d
TX
j are as in Section 4.2.3.
Malicious Prover and Relay The time-gain is computed as the minimum of the time-gain
for the position bits d and the time-gain for the polarity bits a. In the relay attack, i = j,
dRX = dTX, aRX = aTX, and tRXTHS = t
TX
THS, hence the relay time-gain is:
trelay = tPLC − tAdet < tdet (4.18)
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which translates to at most 10m assuming tdet = 32ns (see Section 4.3.5). This is an order
of magnitude lower than the attacks presented so far. The time-gain of malicious prover
attacks, without guessing, is of the same order of magnitude, see Table 4.2. However, a
malicious prover (but not a relaying adversary) can increase the distance-decrease by as much
as Tsym/2 + t
max
THS, by lowering the probability of success.
Furthermore, in the case of the relay attack, if only one of the honest devices uses an
energy-detection receiver, notably without any countermeasures deployed, (and even though
the other one uses a rake receiver) the adversary can achieve a significant time-gain. Even
assuming that the distance-decrease against the rake receiver is negligible, the overall distance-
decrease of the relay attack is c · tEn.D.relay /2, where tEn.D.relay is the time-gain of the attack against
an energy detector.
4.2.5 Processing Delays
In a distance-decreasing relay attack, an additional factor that reduces the relay time-gain,
and hence the amount by which the distance can be decreased, are the ARX’s and ATX’s
processing delays for the IEEE 802.15.4a channel and for the adversarial channel. We discuss
these delays here, and argue that it is feasible to keep them in the order of nanoseconds (or a
few meters). We focus on the data, as it is the bottleneck in terms of the achieved delay (the
adversary has much more time flexibility during the preamble). We distinguish two cases: (i)
ARX and ATX integrated into one device, with appropriate shielding and directional anten-
nas, and (ii) remote ARX and ATX. The latter case can lead to a broader scope of attacks,
as the adversary has the flexibility of placing its devices close to the corresponding victim
devices. On the downside, remote ARX and ATX are subject to an additional processing de-
lay, due to communication over the adversarial channel. Note that in case of malicious prover
attacks, the malicious prover is subject to the same processing delay as an honest device, i.e.,
there are no additional processing delays.
We first consider the processing delay related to the communication with the honest
devices, which applies in both (i) and (ii). At ARX the delay consists of the processing
due to demodulation, after the necessary signal has been received. With an approximate,
linearized maximum likelihood test1 the processing delay would be in the order of a few
nanoseconds. At ATX, the delay is of the same order: after the bit value is received from
ARX, the transmitter only needs to proceed with or abort the transmission of a previously
known burst of pulses (Figure 4.6). Note that these two delays are essentially identical to
the delays that an honest prover incurs during the rapid bit exchange. In [87], the authors
propose an IR implementation of distance bounding, and they estimate the group delay of the
receiver at approximately 4ns. No explicit delay estimate of the transmitter delay is given,
but the authors assume the total processing delay to be 4ns in their performance analysis.
In case (ii), there is an additional delay due to communication over the adversarial channel:
more precisely, the delay of putting the bit value on the adversarial channel at ARX, and
demodulating it at ATX. The exact numbers depend heavily on the technology ARX and
ATX use to communicate. The adversary is most likely to choose a wireless communication
medium, due to its faster propagation speed, but even more so because of the ease of attack
deployment compared to a wired channel.
We emphasize that the adversarial channel has unusual requirements. It does not require
1Details: The approximate decision consists in comparing
∑
ym,npm,n to a pre-computed threshold [115].
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a high bit-rate, as the adversary only needs to transmit a single bit every 1µs. However,
the bit has to be transmitted as fast as possible. Many wireless technologies, even those
with very high bit-rates, such as 802.11n, are not suitable: They achieve these high bit-rates
through large modulation constellation sizes, rather than a short symbol duration. One valid
option is IR-UWB with on-off keying and a receiver similar to the ED receiver described in
Section 4.2.2, or with BPSK and a rake receiver. Naturally, the adversary will ignore the
regulations and transmit with a power high enough to achieve a negligible error rate. To
mitigate the multipath delay spread, a highly directive antenna can be used, as proposed for
a narrow-band communication system in [50]. The coherent two-level PSK scheme proposed
in [50] can also be used as the adversarial channel: It reports bit duration of only 1.6ns.
Overall, in case (ii), a processing delay in the order of 10ns (3.5m) seems feasible.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
The basic simulation setup is described in Section 3.3.3. In this section, we use the residential
non-line-of-sight channel model [99] with a channel delay spread Tspread ≈ 60 ns. We use the
IEEE 802.15.4a ternary preamble code number 5 of length Npcode = 31 given by the standard.
The values chosen for tSFDED and t
SFD
LC are chosen with respect to the structure of this code.
We focus on the LPRF mode. Results for HPRF can be found in [59].
Our main performance metrics are the packet error rate (PER) and the synchronization
error rate (SER). We consider a packet to be in error if it was not acquired during synchro-
nization or if the number of bit errors exceeds Nerr. We assume a desired security level of
Pguess = 2
−32, and performance goals PERcomm = PERdb = 10−2. According to Section 3.1.5,
this results in ranging packets of length Nnonce = 42 with a maximum of Nerr = 2 tolerable
bit errors. We consider synchronization to be in error if the packet is not detected (missed
detection) or if the synchronization is off by too much for data decoding to be performed
correctly (false alarm). Confidence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
To evaluate the cost of the attack, we compare the benign case performance (honest
receiver and transmitter) with the performance under attack. We then express the cost as the
difference in SNR (between the two cases) necessary for the same performance (SER, PER),
which we denote by ∆SNR. This tells us by what factor the adversary needs to improve the
received signal level to obtain the same performance as in the case of an honest execution of
the protocol. He can achieve this by using a high-gain antenna, by transmitting with a higher
power, or by moving closer to the victim transceivers.
4.3.1 Energy Detector against Energy Detector
We first determine the individual performance of the preamble attack primitives and data
attack primitives (ED and LC). The latter translate directly into the performance of malicious
prover attack. We then derive the performance of the distance-decreasing relay attack, which
combines all four primitives.
4.3.2 Preamble Attacks
An honest receiver performing SFD detection takes the entire length Tsfd of the SFD into
account. For LPRF this equals Tsfd = 31.8µs.
4.3. Performance Evaluation 91
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
SNR [dB]
SE
R
 
 
tED
SFD
 = 1 ⋅ 128ns
tED
SFD
 = 4 ⋅ 128ns
tED
SFD
 = 8 ⋅ 128ns
tED
SFD
 = 16 ⋅ 128ns
tED
SFD
 = 29 ⋅ 128ns
benign (a)
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
tED [ns]
Δ 
SN
R 
[dB
]
 
 
Fit
Simulated
(b)
Figure 4.8: SER versus SNR comparing benign performance to ED with varying ED delays
tSFDED . Figure (b) is a more compact representation of the data in (a), showing the loss ∆SNR
with respect to the benign case versus tSFDED for a fixed SER of 10
−2.
Figure 4.8 shows the SER for an honest receiver, as well as for an adversary that performs
early SFD detection with different early SFD detection delays tSFDED . Not surprisingly, the
earlier an adversary performs SFD detection, the more additional received power with respect
to an honest receiver it is going to cost him to reach a given level of SER. If we fix SER = 10−2,
detecting the SFD at tSFDED = 3.712µs costs the adversary ∆SNR = 2.8dB in additional
received power, detecting at tSFDED = 0.128µs entails a cost of ∆SNR = 11.2dB.
For tSFDED , we only consider values shorter than the length of the first SFD symbol. Larger
values for tSFDED do not make much sense for the adversary because they also force him to
commit after the first SFD symbol, which is only possible at a considerable additional cost.
This can be seen in Figure 4.9, which shows the SER of an adversary that commits
late, at time tSFDLC into the SFD. Committing at t
SFD
LC = 8 · 128ns = 1.02µs, or earlier is
within 0.6dB of the benign case and thus comes at practically no additional cost at a target
SER of 10−2. Committing later comes at an ever increasing cost: Committing at tSFDLC =
29 · 128ns = 3.712µs, already costs ∆SNR = 7.5dB. (Note: According to the preamble and
SFD codes, no pulse is sent between the 29th frame of the first SFD symbol and the first
frame of the third SFD symbol. So committing anywhere between tSFDLC = 3.712µs and
tSFDLC = 63 · 128ns = 8.064µs is equivalent to committing at tSFDLC = 8.064µs, which costs more
than ∆SNR = 9dB.)
An important observation is that none of the curves showing the performance under attack
exhibits an error floor. This indicates that by increasing the SNR, the attack success rate can
be made arbitrarily large. The same holds for the data, as we will see shortly.
Alternative Receiver We also evaluated a receiver that uses the correlation-based SFD
detection. This receiver is also vulnerable to the attack, and the attack’s cost in terms of
∆SNR is close to the cost for the baseline receiver: more precisely, up to 1dB greater (for
tSFDLC in the order of Tpsym).
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Figure 4.9: SER versus SNR comparing benign performance to LC with varying LC delays
tSFDLC . Figure (b) is a more compact representation of the data in (a), showing the loss ∆SNR
with respect to the benign case versus tSFDLC for a fixed SER of 10
−2.
4.3.3 Data Attacks
We now look at the effect of ED and LC on the data. The following results do not contain
effects of synchronization: We assume here that the receiving party, ARX in the case of
ED and HRX in the case of LC, is able to perfectly synchronize to each packet. Perfect
synchronization here means that an oracle returns the exact packet time-of-arrival. (Hence,
there are no false alarms or missed detections.) The channel energy-delay profile is still
estimated; but the estimation is performed under the assumption that the packet boundaries
are perfectly aligned. In the case of LC, we further assume that the packet sent by ATX does
not contain any errors due to a preceding ED.
Figure 4.10(a) shows the PER at different SNRs for the LPRF mode. We show the
performance curves for a benign receiver and an adversary performing ED at different ED
delays tED. The optimal ED delay for the adversary is found to be t
OPT
ED = 68ns, which is
very close to the channel delay spread plus the duration of a burst of pulses. Deciding on the
symbol at tOPTED introduces a loss of about 1.6dB with respect to the benign curve at a packet
error rate of PER = 10−2. This can also be seen in Figure 4.10(b). Here we show the loss
in SNR, ∆SNR, with respect to the benign case versus the ED delay tED for a target packet
error rate of PER = 10−2. The curve has been obtained from curves such as those shown
in Figure 4.10(a) via interpolation. Detecting after tOPTED gives a slightly worse performance
because the adversary then merely integrates more noise instead of useful signal. Performing
ED much earlier than tOPTED results in substantially larger loss because a large part of the
useful signal energy is lost: Deciding at tED = 32ns, for example, introduces a loss of 4.8dB.
Figure 4.11 shows the performance of LC on the data in the case of LPRF. As explained
in Section 4.2.2, the LC delay tLC is fixed to tLC = Tsym/2 = 512ns. We show the PER for
different ratios γ of the energies E0 and E1 corresponding to the signal energies transmitted
by the adversary during the 0-block and 1-block, respectively. E1 here corresponds to the
energy a benign receiver would transmit and E0 is typically smaller. A ratio of γOPT = 0.35
gives optimal performance throughout the whole operating range, thus this is the energy ratio
we will use in all subsequent simulations. The optimal ratio gives a loss of about 3.8dB with
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Figure 4.10: PER versus SNR for the data comparing benign performance to ED with varying
ED delays tED. The optimal tED is in the order of the channel delay spread and gives a loss
of about 1.7dB. Figure (b) is a more compact representation of the data in (a), showing the
loss ∆SNR with respect to the benign case versus tED for a fixed PER of 10
−2.
respect to the benign case.
Alternative Receiver We also evaluated the receiver that demodulates without weighting
with the estimated energy-delay profile. This receiver is vulnerable to the attack as well, and
the attack’s cost in terms of ∆SNR is within 0.5dB of the cost for the baseline receiver.
4.3.4 Distance-Decreasing Relay Attack
We now establish the overall performance of the distance-decreasing relay attack. As the relay
attack involves two transmissions, ARX and HRX potentially have different received SNRs,
which we will denote by SNRED and SNRLC. This difference can be a result of the topology,
but it can also be introduced by the adversary. Depending on his abilities, an adversary can,
for example, send with a higher power in order to increase SNRLC, or move closer to HTX,
or use a directive antenna to increase SNRED. Combined with the observation that the same
relay time-gain, trelay, can be obtained with different combinations of ED and LC delays, this
gives the adversary room for a trade-off: Depending on the SNR values achievable for SNRED
(SNRLC, respectively) the adversary can choose to perform ED earlier or later (commit earlier
or later, respectively). If SNRLC is high with respect to SNRED, the adversary will prefer to
commit late in order to be able to detect late as well. If SNRLC is low with respect to SNRED,
the adversary will prefer to detect early in order to be able to commit early.
Figure 4.12 shows the probability of success of an attack that tries to gain 480 ns when
relaying a 42bit packet between HTX and HRX. This relay time-gain is equivalent to a 144 m
distance decrease between HTX and HRX.2 The results shown are for different combinations
of SNRED and SNRLC. For every SNR combination, the probability of success that is reported
corresponds to the triple3 of (tSFDED , t
SFD
LC , tED) yielding best performance among all the tuples
2Here we assume for simplicity that the processing delays at the adversarial transceivers are zero. Processing
delays are discussed in Section 4.2.5.
3Recall that tLC = 512 ns is fixed, thus limiting to some extent the degrees of freedom on the payload part.
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Figure 4.11: PER for LC on the data with varying energy ratios γ. The optimal ratio at
γOPT = 0.35 gives a loss of about 4dB with respect to the benign setting.
that achieve the given relay time-gain of 480 ns. In the benign case we achieve a PER of
approximately 10−2 at an SNR of around 8 dB. In Figure 4.12, a probability of success of
Ps = 0.9896 is achieved for the pair (SNRED = 14dB,SNRLC = 12dB). For all pairs above
(14dB, 12dB) the probability of success is above 99%. With respect to an honest transmitter-
receiver pair, an adversary thus needs an additional 6 dB in SNR for ED and an additional
4 dB for LC, in order to reduce the distance by 144 m with a probability of success in the
order of 99%. Attaining SNR values in this range would not pose much of a challenge to the
adversary.
HRX Not Isolated From HTX
In the threat model for the distance-decreasing relay attack, we assume that the honest
receiver, HRX, cannot receive signals sent by the honest transmitter, HTX. This is inherent
in some scenarios, e.g., picking virtual pockets [81], but there are other scenarios where HTX
will be in range of HRX. In this case, the adversary can prevent communication between
the honest devices through shielding, by placing one of the honest devices in a Faraday cage
(such as a “booster bag” coated with aluminium foil). One adversarial device would then be
connected via a wired link to the second adversarial device placed outside the Faraday cage.
However, in some scenarios HTX will be in range of HRX, and it might not be feasible
for the adversary to shield HRX from HTX. We show here that the attack is still possible,
but the cost of the attack (in terms of SNR) increases.
To make sure that HRX locks on the adversarial preamble, and not the preamble of HTX,
ATX needs to start transmitting the preamble before HRX acquires HTX’s signal. For the
parameters of the synchronization algorithm we assume, this happens no sooner than 18
preamble symbols into the preamble. The sooner ATX starts the transmission, the lower the
cost (as usual, the cost is measured in terms of SNR necessary to achieve a PER of 10−2).
Figure 4.13 shows the relative cost of the preamble and data LC attack (in comparison
with the LC attack where HRX is shielded from HTX) as a function of the SNR obtained
by HTX at HRX, and when ARX starts the preamble transmission with a delay of 8, 12 and
16 preamble symbols. For the former two, the cost is in the order of HTX’s SNR, but for 16
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Figure 4.12: Probability of success, Ps, for a distance-decreasing relay attack trying to achieve
a distance-decrease of 144 m. Ps > 99% is reached at a relative cost of (∆SNRED,∆SNRLC) >
(6dB, 3.8dB).
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Figure 4.13: Cost of LC when HRX is not shielded from HTX. We show the relative cost
∆SNR of the LC attack (both preamble and data) versus SNR of HTX, for different timing
acquisition delays tacq.
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Figure 4.14: Performance of ED on the data if the adversary uses an rake receiver. ED can
be performed by decoding the convolutional code using partial information (“Coding”) or by
neglecting the convolutional code completely (“No Coding”).
the cost grows much faster. Furthermore, ARX needs to perform early timing acquisition to
make this attack possible. The cost, in comparison with regular acquisition after 18 symbols,
is 6dB, 3dB and 2dB, for acquisition before 8, 12 and 16 preamble symbols, respectively.
4.3.5 Rake against Energy Detector
We evaluate the rake ED attack for an optimal all-rake receiver with perfect synchronization
and channel estimation. Figure 4.14 shows the PER for an adversary performing the ED
attack. When mounting the ED attack, ARX has the option to ignore (“No Coding”) or
take advantage of the convolutional code (“Coding”). For reference, the performance of a
benign energy-detection receiver and a benign rake receiver are shown as well. The benign
rake receiver decodes the convolutional code at the end of the packet as in [13], when the
full decoding trellis is available. With ED and taking the code into account, only a partial
trellis containing information about the symbols received so far is available at the time of
decoding. This contributes to the higher cost (in terms of required SNR) of the attack with
respect to the benign rake receiver operation. Ignoring the convolutional code is simpler and
less computationally expensive, but results in an additional 3.5dB increase of the attack cost.
The adversary also has the choice of tAdet. Optimal performance is experienced for t
A
det =
64ns, in the order of channel spread. tAdet = 48ns results in a very minor performance loss,
tAdet = 32ns results in noticeable performance loss (around 1 − 2dB). Assuming tAdet = 48ns,
the attack costs 2.8dB (at a PER of 10−2, corresponding to an attack with a success rate of
99%) if coding is taken into account and the relay attack achieves a time-gain of trelay = 728ns
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(distance-decrease of 218 meters). At the same cost, the alternative, ED-only attack achieves
a time-gain of tED-onlyrelay = 216ns (distance-decrease of 65 meters).
4.4 Countermeasures
When investigating countermeasures and patches, we consider their effectiveness (the maxi-
mum relay time-gain the adversary can achieve with the countermeasure in place), the effects
they have on benign-case performance, and their compatibility with IEEE 802.15.4a. We dis-
cuss first the countermeasures that, in our opinion, provide the best trade-off between these
factors. Then, we discuss alternative countermeasures.
4.4.1 Recommended Countermeasures
Convolutional Code Patch
The rake ED attack is possible due to the specific combination of BPPM/BPSK with the
convolutional code that IEEE 802.15.4a uses. The attack can be prevented by changing the
convolutional code to a code in which the polarity bit ai does not reveal information about
future position bits dj , where j > i. In addition, the code should not allow for decoding ai+1
from the i-th symbol i, as this would enable an effective LC attack against a rake receiver.
We refer to this solution as the convolutional code patch. Alternatively, the convolutional
code can be removed altogether. The former is not compatible with IEEE 802.15.4a, whereas
the latter is compatible to a very limited extent: Although IEEE 802.15.4a provides a few
optional modes that do not use the convolutional code, these modes cannot be used with
energy-detection receivers, because, for these modes, polarity carries data information.
Time-Hopping Patch
Time-hopping allows a malicious prover to trade-off attack success probability for additional
time-gain. A simple way to remove this vulnerability is to modify the time-hopping sequence
such that the corresponding challenge and response symbols have identical time-hopping off-
sets. Removing time-hopping is also a solution, but an inferior one, as it significantly degrades
IEEE 802.15.4a multi-user access properties.
Early Detection at Honest Receiver
The honest energy-detection receiver can choose to only take into account the beginning of the
symbol [68], essentially performing early detection with OOK demodulation at an offset tCdet
from the beginning of the symbol. Then, tLC is reduced from Tsym/2 to t
C
PLC < t
C
det, and the
(malicious prover) time-gain due to ED is limited to (tCdet− tAdet)/2 (assuming that the prover
sends the response symbol immediately after the early detection is done). This countermeasure
does not induce inter-symbol interference and is compliant with the mandatory modes of the
standard.
Moreover, the performance loss that this countermeasure entails due to the ignoring of half
of the symbol, can be compensated for by increasing the length of the nonces Nnonce. We can
derive the required nonce length by using the method introduced in Section 3.1.5. Figure 4.15
plots the resultant Nnonce as a function of t
C
det for performance goals PERcomm = PERdb =
10−2 and 3 security levels. For example, by employing the countermeasure with tCdet = 40ns
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Figure 4.15: Cost of ED countermeasure when the energy-detection receiver decides on the
bit value using OOK demodulation at time tCdet. SNRH = 6.5dB.
and increasing the number of bits per nonce from 42 to 108 we can bring the maximum
theoretically achievable time-gain to 40ns (distance decrease of about 12 m) maintaining
security level Pguess = 2
−32. At the same time, this countermeasure does not reduce the
performance in terms of PER and we also keep the same security level against guessing
attacks. The drawback is generating, sending and receiving of the additional bits required for
the longer nonces. As every IEEE 802.15.4a packet carrying a nonce also includes a preamble
of considerable length, and as a good deal of receiver complexity during reception stems from
synchronization, we argue that the cost of adding a moderate number of bits to the data is
in most cases acceptable.
Furthermore, this countermeasure can be employed by both energy-detection and rake
receivers to prevent the adversary from exploiting the BPPM variability (Section 4.2.3). See
Table 4.3 for upper-bounds on the attack time-gains with the countermeasure and patches
deployed.
The countermeasure has a relatively mild cost as long as tCdet is not much lower than
the channel spread, allowing the receiver to capture a significant part of the symbol energy.
However, reducing tCdet further implies a more considerable cost in terms os packet length. We
explore this further in Section 5.3.
4.4.2 Alternative Countermeasures
Decrease Data Symbol Duration
A straightforward countermeasure is to decrease data symbol duration Tsym [35], as the time-
gain of any PHY attack is at most Tsym. This countermeasure can be even implemented
within the IEEE 802.15.4a standard, as some non-mandatory modes have symbols as short as
32 ns. However, significantly reducing Tsym (e.g., to make the maximum achievable distance-
decrease a few meters), is detrimental to benign performance. Inter-symbol interference (ISI)
manifests itself if the symbol duration is close to or below the channel delay spread. Low-
complexity non-coherent receivers cannot cope well with ISI and even if some solutions exist,
they entail a loss of 5 − 10 dB in the benign-case [150]. Furthermore, shorter symbols have
less resilience to multi-user interference.
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Secret Spreading Codes
To make preamble ED harder, if not infeasible within the constrained time budget available
to the adversary, the honest devices could generate preamble codes from a shared secret.
Alternatively, secret time-hopping sequences could be used to make ED of data symbols more
difficult. Naturally, both approaches can only prevent relay attacks, as a malicious prover
would know the secret spreading codes. Furthermore, the external cicada attack that we
investigate in Chapter 5 is also immune to these countermeasures.
Furthermore, neither countermeasure is directly compliant with the current IEEE 802.15.4a
standard. The standard includes an optional private ranging mode, in which the ranging de-
vices can secretly agree on a preamble code, but there exist only eight publicly known preamble
codes to choose from. This offers little security: The adversary can guess both codes with
decent probability, or perform detection using, in parallel, all eight allowable codes. (This
can be done entirely in the digital domain by correlating the received signal with each of the
8 codes and choosing the one with the highest correlation output.)
Detect Data LC
We investigated a countermeasure that detects the non-standard signal sent by the adversary
during the data LC attack. With this countermeasure, the receiver records, for every bit, the
energy in the first half of the symbol, and compares the distribution of these energies for the
0 bits (bits that were decoded as a 0) with the 1 bits (decoded as a 1). In the benign case,
the first halves of the 0 bits carry more energy, whereas under attack these energies are the
same. To distinguish these cases, one can use a robust statistical test, such as the Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test. This countermeasure prevents the attack presented in Section 4.2.2
with virtually no degradation of benign case performance. However, an adversary can modify
the attack (vary the energy levels between symbols) to severely degrade the performance of
this countermeasure.
Detect Preamble LC
We experimented with countermeasures that attempt to detect the preamble under a LC
attack. For example, a countermeasure could check if the first SFD symbol is entirely 0 (as it
should be). However, this countermeasure can only reliably detect an attack with relatively
high tSFDLC (more S than 0 in the preamble symbol) at high SNR, but not attacks with low t
SFD
LC
(more 0 than S), especially in the lower SNR regions. A countermeasure could also detect the
high number of 0 symbol at the beginning of the preamble – but this can be countered by the
adversary by early time acquisition (which comes at some additional cost in terms of SNR,
see Section 4.3.4). Finally, countermeasures to preamble LC attacks cannot prevent malicious
prover attacks.
4.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have investigated the vulnerability of the IEEE 802.15.4a standard to
physical layer distance-decreasing attacks. We have demonstrated that if honest devices use
energy-detection receivers without appropriate countermeasures, an adversary can decrease
the measured distance by hundreds of meters, with a success rate arbitrarily close to 100%.
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However, minor modifications to IEEE 802.15.4a and implementing a simple countermeasure
on energy-detection receivers used by honest devices, allow honest devices to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of distance-decreasing relay attacks to at most 10m. Alternatively, this can be
achieved (even without IEEE 802.15.4a modifications) if honest devices use the more sophis-
ticated rake receivers. Furthermore, to reduce the effectiveness of malicious prover attacks
to around 10m, the honest receivers (energy detector and rake alike) should implement the
same simple countermeasure, and a time-hopping patch should be applied to IEEE 802.15.4a.
In conclusion, with appropriate countermeasures on the receivers and patches to the IEEE
802.15.4a standard, the standard can be used as a DB PHY.
More generally, our investigation has identified PHY features that, although they improve
system performance in the benign case, can create vulnerabilities against distance-decreasing
PHY attacks if used carelessly. One such potential point of failure is the interaction between
the modulation and the coding scheme. Another, perhaps more fundamental one, is data
time-hopping, which allows the adversary to additionally decrease the distance by lowering
the attack’s probability of success. Such features should be approached with caution, or not
used at all, in any DB PHY.
The countermeasures that we consider in this Chapter do not prevent PHY attacks com-
pletely. Rather, they limit it to a value in the order of the channel spread, roughly 10 meters.
In Chapter 5, we show how the adversary can mount attacks that exploit this gap, even
without knowing the preamble code. We also investigate countermeasures that can limit the
effectiveness of PHY attacks down to a value in the order of the accuracy of the receiver, in
particular early detection with very low tdet.
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Chapter 5
Physical Layer Attacks against ToA
Estimation
In this Chapter, we explore a new physical-communication-layer (PHY) attack vector that is
targeted at time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation algorithms. The distance-decrease achievable by
this attack vector is in the order of the channel spread. Hence, it is relevant if precise ranging
or DB is required. The ToA attack vector exploits the uncertainty inherent to ToA estimation
in multipath channels that spread a transmitted signal in time (Section 3.3.1). In typical
indoor environments, this channel spread is in the order of tens of nanoseconds [99], which
translate to at least a few meters. For ranging to be precise, the receiver needs to accurately
identify the ToA of the first path, which is not necessarily the strongest path – notably
under weak non-line-of-sight (weak NLOS) conditions.1 Impulse-Radio Ultra-wideband is
particularly well suited for this task, because the very narrow (in time) pulses it transmits
make the task of resolving the channel relatively easy.
The ToA attack vector is most effective against precise ToA estimation algorithms that
attempt to detect the first arriving path. However, is can also achieve a distance-decrease
against ToA estimation algorithms that only detect the strongest path. More specifically, we
show the following:
I If a receiver implements a precise ToA esitmation algorithm, the adversary can use the
ToA attack vector to mount a type of malicious interference attack that we term the cicada
attack: an external attack that can decrease the measured distance by a value in the order of
the channel spread (10-20 meters). Compared to the previously known external PHY attack –
the distance-decreasing relay (Section 4.2) – the cicada attack has two substantial advantages:
It is significantly easier to mount, as it only requires a IR transmitter, and it works even if
a secret preamble code is used. The disadvantage of the cicada attack is that the achieved
distance decrease is random. We show with simulations and experiments on an IR test-bed
that this attack is effective against a wide class of modulation schemes and receivers.
I The ToA attack vector can be used in malicious prover attacks and distance-decreasing
relay attacks. This is true even if the ToA estimation algorithm is designed to detect only the
strongest path. Assuming that the countermeasures proposed in Section 4.4.1 are in place, the
ToA attack vector allows the adversary to decrease the measured distance by the amount that
these countermeasures permit. Moreover, in a malicious interference attack, if the adversary
1In weak NLOS conditions, the direct line-of-sight path is obscured by an obstacle that attenuates the LOS
path but does not block it completely.
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can synchronize its transmission with with the honest transmitter and knows the preamble
code, it can achieve a distance-decrease against strongest-path ToA estimation algorithms.
I In terms of countermeasures, we identify a secure ToA estimation algorithm for rake re-
ceivers [52], and we propose a new secure ToA estimation algorithm for energy-detection
receivers; both are precise and secure against the ToA attack vector, if the preamble code
is secret and long enough (increasing the length of the code improves the security and/or
precision). An alternative countermeasure is to decrease the receiver data detection window
(tdet, Section 4.4.1) to values in the order of the receiver ranging precision. The latter coun-
termeasure provides higher ranging precision but has a higher failure rate than the secure
ToA estimation algorithms. Finally, we propose a hybrid countermeasure that achieves the
best of both worlds. These countermeasures allow for implementing DB that is both secure
against PHY attacks (in particular the attacks presented in Chapter 4) and is close in preci-
sion to non-secure ranging. However, this comes at a cost: To achieve good ranging precision,
the ranging packet needs to be orders of magnitude longer than for the countermeasures in
Chapter 4 that limit the distance-decrease to values in the order of the channel spread.
Chapter Outline Our basic assumptions about the modulation scheme, channel and re-
ceivers are presented in Section 3.3. In Section 5.1 we introduce additional assumptions on
the receivers, and the adversary model. We explore the ToA attack space in Section 5.2.
Section 5.3 is devoted to an investigation of countermeasures. In Section 5.4 we describe
experiments performed on an IR test-bed to confirm the feasibility of the cicada attack. We
conclude in Section 5.5.
IEEE 802.15.4a In this Chapter, we assume a generic IR modulation scheme, which gives us
more flexibility than IEEE 802.15.4a. Naturally, the attacks and countermeasures apply to
IEEE 802.15.4a. We evaluate the performance of the cicada attack against IEEE 802.15.4a
in [127].
5.1 System Model
5.1.1 Modulation Scheme
We assume that an IR-UWB packet is composed of two parts: 1) the preamble, 2) the data.
More precisely, the transmitted signal is:
s(t) =
NP∑
i=1
aPi p(t− iTPf − tPi ) +
ND∑
i=1
aDi p(t− iTDf − tDi − Tdata) (5.1)
where a P,D index stands for preamble, or data, respectively; N is the number of frames, Tf
is the duration of a frame, ai ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is the amplitude of the ith frame, ti < Tf is the
time-hopping offset of the ith frame, Tdata ≥ NP · TPf is the time-offset between the preamble
and data, and p(t) is the pulse shape. We assume that the frame duration and time-hopping
sequences are such that there is no inter-frame interference.
The difference between the data and the preamble is that the former is modulated accord-
ing to the sequence aDi , which is known only to the transmitting party. In contrast, for the
preamble the sequence aPi is known to both the verifier and the prover. The sequences t
P
i and
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tDi are known to both parties; they can also be publicly known. Note that a sequence which
is only known to the verifier and the prover is derived from a secret shared between them.
Note on Data Modulation For the generic modulation scheme, we assume that one bit is
encoded into one data frame, with either on/off keying (OOK) or binary phase-shift keying
(BPSK). In contrast, IEEE 802.15.4a uses a combination of binary pulse-position modulation
(BPPM) and BPSK. This assumption is dictated by security considerations: As we show in
Chapter 4, BPPM leaves room for effective PHY attacks.
5.1.2 Receivers
We distinguish between a number of different algorithms implemented by the receivers: vanilla
(basic algorithms), PID (Power Independent Detection [53, 58]), and MINF (min-filter [140,
44]) for the energy-detection receiver, and vanilla and PID for the rake receiver. The PID
and MINF receivers are designed to be robust to interference. They are relevant because the
malicious interference attack we consider is based on creating interference. Such algorithms
could prevent the attack; we show this is not the case.
The receiver operation stages (listed in Section 3.3.2) most relevant for this Chapter are
coarse and fine synchronization. The latter three stages (channel estimation, SFD detection
and data demodulation) are less crucial. In short, for these stages, the receiver uses classical
maximum likelihood algorithms for the vanilla energy detector and the rake (maximal ratio
combining), or variants of these algorithms robust to multi-user interference [57] for the PID
and the MINF energy detector.
Coarse Synchronization
This stage is performed using a traditional synchronization algorithm, based on correlating
the received signal with the known preamble template. More precisely, the baseline method
from [58] is implemented by the vanilla and MINF energy detectors, and the conventional
method from [53] is implemented by the vanilla rake. Given a sequence of samples yi, the
correlator output is computed as:
zj =
ntemp∑
i=1
bi · yi+j (5.2)
for a block j = 1, . . . ,m, where ntemp is the template length in samples, and bi the the
binary (ternary for the rake) template sequence corresponding to the preamble. The packet
is detected if the output from the correlator exceeds a noise-based threshold. Then, the index
jtoa = arg maxj |zj | (5.3)
becomes the candidate for the coarse ToA estimate. Subsequently, the receiver verifies the
estimate by checking whether it corresponds to the maximum of the correlator output in M
subsequent sample blocks.
The PID receivers rely on the Power-Independent Detection (PID) method [58, 53]. In this
method the received signal is first compared to a noise-based threshold, and converted into a
binary (energy detector) or ternary (rake) sequence (we call this the PID filter). The output
of the PID filter is then correlated with the preamble template. Detection and verification
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is performed as described above. In all cases, coarse synchronization locks on the strongest
path component of the received signal.
Fine Synchronization
ToA estimation performs a back-search [43, 65] in a window of duration TBS preceding the
rough synchronization point found by coarse synchronization. The back-search window du-
ration TBS should be in the order of the channel spread. The back-search identifies the first
time-offset in the window at which a noise-based threshold is exceeded – this is considered to
be the first arriving path, i.e., the ToA. All receivers except MINF perform the back-search on
the output of the correlator zi (5.2). MINF [140, 44] uses an average of a number of preamble
frames, filtered with a moving min filter before averaging. (We set the min-window length
Wmin = 8.) The min filter removes interference based on the assumption that the interference
is present in at most Wmin − 1 consecutive frames (typical for MUI).
Noise-based Thresholds
The synchronization algorithms use three noise-based thresholds: coarse synchronization
threshold, fine synchronization threshold, and PID threshold. These thresholds are com-
puted based on the noise statistics. Under AWGN, the noise-only samples are distributed
according to the central χ2 distribution for energy-detection receivers [60], and according to
the gaussian distribution for rake receivers. The noise variance can be estimated in a robust
fashion [60]. We fixing a probability of false detection, i.e., the probability that a noise-only
sample is above the threshold. Then, we compute the threshold by inverting the cdf of the
respective noise distribution.
We fix the false detection probability for the coarse synchronization and fine synchroniza-
tion thresholds to be PFD = 10
−4. For the PID filter, we fix PFD = 0.2. The latter was
derived experimentally; we have optimized it to give a low missed detection probability.
In case of the MINF receiver, the fine synchronization threshold is determined experimen-
tally, assuming the presence of a benign interferer (multi-user interference). This results in a
threshold that is quite conservative compared to the vanilla receiver.
5.1.3 Adversary Model
Recall that we consider three classes of distance-decreasing attacks: An internal malicious
prover attack and external distance-decreasing relay attack and an external malicious inter-
ference attack. In this Chapter, we mainly focus is on the latter attack. In this attack, the
honest receiver (HRX) receives a ranging packet (5.1) from an honest transmitter (HTX).
The honest signal interferes at HRX with the adversarial signal generated by an adversarial
transmitter (ATX):
sA(t) =
∞∑
i=−∞
aAi p(t− iTAf − tAi ) (5.4)
where TAf is the duration of a frame, a
A
i is the amplitude, t
A
i < T
A
f is the time-hopping offset
of the ith frame, and p(t) is the same pulse shape as used by the honest transmitter.
We further distinguish between different types of malicious interferers. The simplest blind
adversary is not equipped with a receiver. This adversary does not attempt to synchronize
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frame length TPf ,T
D
f 256ns
preamble length NP 64 · 31
data length ND 32
preamble code aPi IEEE 802.15.4a code 5
back-search window TBS 64ns
energy detector sampling time Tint 2ns
Table 5.1: Default parameter values used in simulations. The default IEEE 802.15.4a pream-
ble length is used. The back-search window is chosen to match the channel spread.
its transmission with the honest transmitter – i.e., it transmits the adversarial signal blindly.
A reactive adversary is equipped with a receiver, and synchronizes its transmission to the
transmission of HTX. The level of synchronization can be rough (in the order of microseconds)
or precise (in the order of a few nanoseconds).
Furthermore, we consider adversaries with different levels of knowledge. First, an adver-
sary can be oblivious to the codes used by the honest devices. Next, the adversary can know
in advance the preamble codes (amplitude and time-hopping). Finally, it can in addition
know the data time-hopping code. We assume the adversary never knows the amplitude data
code (the payload of the ranging packet) and we assume the adversary always knows the
frame lengths in the honest signal (TPf , T
D
f ).
Finally, the target of the adversary can be all devices in range; this takes advantage of
the broadcast nature of the wireless channel. Or, the target can be a specific device, with
a location known to the adversary, or a specific location, where an honest device might be
located. We term those broadcast or targeted attacks respectively.
The most sophisticated malicious interference attack we consider is targeted, reactive and
precisely synchronized with the HTX, and mounted by an adversary that knows the preamble
codes and the data time-hopping code. Such an attack is – from the perspective of HRX –
essentially equivalent to a distance-decreasing relay attack or a malicious prover attack. We
elaborate on this in Section 5.2.4.
5.1.4 Simulation Setup
As explained in Section 5.1.3, the malicious prover attack and the relay attack are essentially
equivalent to a sophisticated malicious interference attack. Hence, we simulate malicious
interference attacks only. We assume that an honest receiver (HRX) is exposed to the adver-
sarial signal transmitted by an adversarial transmitter (ATX) at signal-to-noise ratio SNRA.
HRX receives, at random times, ranging packets transmitted by an honest transmitter (HTX)
with SNRH. (In both cases, the SNR is defined as
Ep
N0
, where Ep is the energy of a single
pulse, and the power spectral density is N0/2.) We use the residential (weak) NLOS channel
model [99] with a channel spread of roughly 60ns. Unless otherwise stated, we assume the
parameter values summarized in Table 5.1. In particular, the back-search window TBS = 64ns
is chosen long enough to account for the channel spread.
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(2) (1)
(3)
(d)(c)
(a)
(b)
Figure 5.1: The cicada attack (blind constant 1-attack) mounted against a vanilla energy-
detection receiver. (a) Benign transmitter T sends a ranging preamble modulated with a
preamble code [−1, 0, 1,−1, 0, 0, 1, 1, . . .]. (b) Adversary transmits the adversarial signal. (c)
Both signals propagate through the multipath environment before they are received by R.
(d) R aggregates the received signal over a number of pulses, and finds the strongest path (1).
It then searches back for the first path (2), but instead selects the bogus path introduced by
the adversary (3).
Metrics
We consider that distance-decrease occurs if a packet is received and the data is recovered
without errors, but the estimate ToA is at least Tdd = 4ns below the actual ToA. (Tdd is
chosen such that the probability of obtaining such a ToA in benign conditions is negligible.)
We consider that denial occurs, if the packet is not correctly received – either due to failure to
detect the packet in coarse synchronization or due to failure of subsequent reception stages.
In our performance evaluation, we measure the percentage of packets subject to distance-
decrease or denial. As an additional metric, we measure the amount ot distance-decrease
(ToA error) for the packets for which distance-decrease was successful.
5.2 ToA Attack Space
In this section, we look at various variants of the attack and evaluate their effectiveness against
different modulation schemes and receivers. This provides an overview of the attack space,
and guides the design of countermeasures in Section 5.3. We assume that the ToA estimation
is performed only during preamble reception.
We proceed in growing attack complexity. We first explore the simplest cicada attack that
is designed against modulation schemes with no preamble time-hopping, and demonstrate that
it is effective against most receiver. Furthermore, we show that this attack is effective against
most receivers even if preamble time-hopping is applied. Next, we look at the generalized
version, the coded cicada attack, and show how this attack can defeat the vanilla rake receiver
that is robust to the basic cicada attack. Then, we discuss how an reactive adversary can
improve the attack effectiveness. Finally, we consider the most sophisticated version of the
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attack, where ATX is tightly synchronized and knows the preamble code. We show that this
attack is highly effective, even against strongest-path ToA estimation algorithms. Note that
we omit some of the less interesting (but valid) combinations of adversarial capabilities (e.g.,
a tightly synchronized adversary that does not know the code).
5.2.1 The “Cicada” Attack
The cicada attack2 is mounted by a blind adversary transmitting an infinite sequence of
identical equally spread pulses: aAi = 1, t
A
i = 0. The adversarial frame duration is T
A
f =
1
ρT
P
f ,
where the attack rate ρ is an integer. We term this the constant ρ-attack. Note that this
attack does not require the knowledge of any codes. Recall that there is no synchronization
with the honest transmitter, hence the adversarial pulses are located randomly with respect
to the honest signal. The attack’s target is broadcast.
This attack is tailored to modulation schemes without preamble time-hopping. The prin-
ciple is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The signal of the honest transmitter T (Figure 5.1(a)) and
the adversarial signal (Figure 5.1(b)) interfere at the honest receiver R (Figure 5.1(c)). If
the adversarial signal is weaker than T ’s signal, R should correctly detect T ’s signal. How-
ever, there is a good chance that the fine synchronization algorithm will incorrectly find the
“first arriving path” in the adversarial signal (Figure 5.1(d)). The estimated ToA is then
significantly lower than the actual ToA, resulting in a distance-decrease.
If either the honest signal, or the adversarial signal, or both use (random) time-hopping,
the honest and adversarial pulses are not going to be aligned. Rather, from the perspective
of the honest receiver, the adversarial pulses are randomly spread over time in any of these
3 cases. Still, if the adversary transmits with appropriate power, such random interference
turns out to be sufficient, for the most part, to introduce false peaks into fine synchronization,
and not disrupt the other reception stages. To show this, we only consider the case where the
honest modulation scheme uses random preamble time-hopping, as the other two cases are
essentially equivalent.
Preamble without Time-Hopping
The main factor determining the attack outcome is SNRA. This can be seen in Figure 5.2(a),
which shows the performance of the constant 1-attack against the vanilla energy-detection
receiver at SNRH = 20dB. For low SNRA, the adversarial signal is too weak to influence the
receiver operation. From SNRA ≈ 0dB distance-decrease begins, and it reaches its maximum
of around 36% for SNRA ≈ 15dB. Beyond the maximum point, denial begins to take over,
and for SNRA ≈ 25dB, it reaches 100% – partially due to coarse synchronization failure
(DenialSYNC), and partially due to failure of subsequent reception stages (DenialpostSYNC).
More generally, the distance-decrease begins at SNRA ≈ 0dB and ends at SNRA ≈ SNRH, as
confirmed by Figure 5.2(b).
To increase the probability of distance-decrease, the adversary can increase ρ. This is
because with low ρ, the adversarial signal, even spread by the channel (Figure 5.1c), is not
always present in the back-search window. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.3. Note that
increasing ρ also results in distance-decrease ending at lower SNRA – this is because there
is more interference that disrupts other (than fine synchronization) stages of the receiver
operation, causing denial. In subsequent experiments, unless otherwise stated, we fix ρ = 8,
2We use the term cicada attack, because the ATX signal is reminiscent of a cicada song.
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Figure 5.2: Performance of constant 1-attack mounted against a vanilla energy-detection
receiver. (a) Ratio of packets for which distance-decrease and denial occurs at SNRH = 20dB
(b) Success ratio of distance-decrease at varying SNRH.
which strikes a balance between achieving a high maximum distance-decrease rate and not
interfering too much with other stages of the receiver operation.
We observe a similar attack performance for the MINF and PID energy-detection receivers
(Figure 5.4). Both methods were designed with benign interference in mind but, as expected,
neither can prevent the attack. In case of the MINF receiver, this is because the min filter
cannot remove the adversarial signal present in every frame. Distance-decrease is less pro-
nounced than for vanilla, because of a more conservative back-search threshold (inherent to
MINF). In the case of the PID receiver, distance-decrease ends at SNRA approximately 5dB
lower than for vanilla. This is mostly due to coarse synchronization failure. The reason is
the PID method: As soon as the adversarial signal peaks rise above the PID noise threshold,
they are converted to 1. The honest signal peaks, even if they are stronger, also account for
only 1. Hence, essentially, the adversarial signal drowns T ’s signal sooner than for the vanilla
receiver (causing coarse synchronization to fail).
The adversary can overcome this limitation by not transmitting some of the adversarial
pulses, thus lowering the PID correlator output for the adversarial signal. In Figure 5.5, we
show the performance of such intermittent 8-attack, in which the adversary transmits only
every 3rd frame.3 As expected, the intermittent attack ends at considerably higher SNRA
than the constant attack. Compared to the constant attack, the attack begins at a higher
SNRA, because overall ATX introduces 67% less interference. This is also why the attack
ends later than the constant attack against the vanilla receiver.
Overall, we note that the performance of the attack improves slightly if the modulation
scheme uses time-hopping for data. This is most pronounced for the MINF receiver, hence we
show only the curve for this receiver (Figure 5.4). The reason is that the interference with the
data part of the packet is the main factor limiting the distance-decrease performance. With
time-hopping, not all data pulses are aligned with the adversarial pulses, which prevents losing
some ranging packets to data demodulation failure.
3Transmitting only 1/3 of the frames is sufficient to spoof the ToA, and at the same time low enough not
to interfere with a median-based channel estimation, improving the attack performance slightly.
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Figure 5.3: Success ratio of distance-decrease achieved by constant ρ-attack mounted against
a vanilla energy-detection receiver at SNRH = 20dB
For the vanilla rake receiver, the effectiveness of the attack depends on the sum of the
amplitudes of the fine synchronization template. On one hand, if the sum is non-zero, distance-
decrease will occur. This is confirmed in Figure 5.6 (“no pTHS”). The figure shows the attack
performance at SNRH = 10dB when the template amplitudes follow the IEEE 802.15.4a
preamble code 5. In this code, for every 10 frames with ai = 1, there are only 6 frames with
ai = −1. The attack performance follows the familiar pattern, and the distance-decrease
reaches 80% - 100% depending on the data modulation scheme (not shown in the figure). As
with the MINF receiver, data demodulation is the main liming factor for attack performance.
Hence, applying time-hopping in the data improves attack performance.
On the other hand, if the fine synchronization template sums to zero, the constant cicada
code causes the adversarial pulses to cancel each other out, and no distance-decrease occurs.
Preamble with Time-Hopping
The cicada attack is effective against the vanilla and PID energy-detection receivers even with
preamble time-hopping, as shown in Figure 5.7. Compared to the case without preamble time-
hopping, distance-decrease begins at higher SNR. This is because the adversarial pulses are
not aligned, but rather spread from the perspective of the receiver. Hence, it takes more
power to raise them above the fine synchronization threshold. For vanilla, distance-decrease
ends at the same SNR with and without preamble time-hopping, because the limiting factor
is data demodulation. However, for PID, distance-decrease ends significantly later for the
case with preamble time-hopping. This is because for PID without time-hopping, the limiting
factor is coarse synchronization (see Section 5.2.1). Preamble time-hopping circumvents this
limitation.
For the vanilla rake receiver, the attack performance is shown in Figure 5.6, and it follows
the same pattern as for the vanilla energy detector, with data demodulation being the limiting
factor. However, it should be noted that with preamble time-hopping the attack works even
with a zero-sum template.
For MINF, the min filter is relatively efficient in diminishing the effects of the attack once
the adversarial pulses are randomly spread due to the time-hopping. In Figure 5.7 we show
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Figure 5.4: Success ratio of distance-decrease achieved by constant 8-attack mounted against
a vanilla, PID, and MINF energy-detection receivers SNRH = 20dB; for the latter we shown
performance against modulation with and without data time-hopping (dTH).
the performance of one instance of the attack, which manages to reach almost 20% probability
of distance-decrease. This is significantly lower than for the other receivers, but still far from
negligible.
Ranging Error
To illustrate the magnitude of the distance-decrease, we show in Figure 5.8 the median ab-
solute error of the ToA under the 8-attack taken over packets for which distance-decrease
occurs. The error increases with SNRA, because more adversarial peaks rise above the fine-
synchronization threshold. We can also observe that even for high SNRA, the variance of the
error is quite high. This implies that with the blind attack, the adversary has relatively low
control over the amount of distance-decrease introduced. All receivers experience similar ToA
error patterns.
Clock Drift
An unsophisticated or blind adversary will not have the means to adjust its clock speed to
exactly match the clock of HTX. We hence explore the effect of clock drift on the distance-
decrease performance. We introduce a clock drift of 40ppm (the largest allowed by IEEE
802.15.4a) between the HTX and ATX, while the HRX’s clock runs at the speed of the HTX’s
clock. For the rake receiver, this drift causes the attack to begin at an SNRA approximately
5dB larger than for the no-drift case, whereas for energy detectors there is no difference. For
both receiver classes, the drift shifts the end of distance-decrease to higher SNRA. This is
because between channel estimation and the subsequent stages that use the channel estimate,
the adversarial signal drifts out of sync with the channel estimate – essentially diminishing
the weight of the adversarial signal.
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Figure 5.5: Success ratio of distance-decrease achieved by an intermittent (“i”) 8-attack against
a PID energy-detection receiver at SNRH = 20dB. For comparison, we also show the perfor-
mance of the constant 8-attack against PID and vanilla energy detectors.
5.2.2 Coded “Cicada” Attack
In Section 5.2.1 we showed that the adversary can use time-hopping to mount a successful
attack against a vanilla rake receiver with zero-sum fine synchronization template (without
time-hopping). Alternative, the adversary can achieve this with a coded ρ-attack, in which
he modulates the amplitudes of the pulses using a non-constant code. We term this attack
the coded cicada attack ’ except for the non-constant code it is identical to the basic cicada
attack: It is blind, broadcast, and it does not require the knowledge of any codes.
We evaluate the probability of success of this attack against a vanilla rake receiver ana-
lytically. Assume that the number of non-zero elements in the fine synchronization template
is N . In fine synchronization, the ToA is estimated as the first time-offset t for which:
|
N−1∑
i=0
aPi yi(t)| > NΘ (5.5)
where yi(t) are the rake samples taken at time instances corresponding to the preamble code
and time-offset t, and Θ is a (noise-based) threshold for a single frame.
Assuming that offset t contains only the adversarial signal, and that noise is negligible,
(5.5) boils down to:
|
N−1∑
i=0
aPi a
A
i x| > Nθ (5.6)
where x is the power with which the adversary transmits, aAi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is the adversarial
code, and θ = CΘ is a threshold normalized by a factor C.
We chose a pseudo-random preamble code, which is the worst case for the adversary. This
implies P(aPi aAi = −1 | aPi 6= 0) = P(aPi aAi = 1 | aPi 6= 0) = 0.5. Assuming that there is a
single adversarial frame in the back-search window, the probability of spoofing the ToA for
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Figure 5.6: Success ratio of distance-decrease achieved by constant 8-attack mounted against
the vanilla rake receiver at SNRH = 10dB. We show the effectiveness of the attack when
no time-hopping is used (“no TH”), when only data time-hopping is used (“no pTH”), and
when both data and preamble time-hopping is used; for the latter we distinguish between a
non-zero-sum template (“not-0-sum”) and a zero-sum template (“0-sum”).
time-offset t is:
P(A) = P(|2B(n, 0.5)− n| > Nθx−1) (5.7)
= 2 · P(2B(n, 0.5)− n > Nθx−1)
= 2 · FBIN(0.5n− 0.5Nθx−1|n, 0.5)
≤ 2 exp(−N2θn−1x−1) ≤ 2 exp(−Nθx−1)
where n ≤ N is the number of non-zero elements in the adversarial code aAi , B(n, 0.5) follows
the binomial distribution with parameters n and 0.5 and FBIN(.|n, 0.5) is the binomial cdf;
the first bound follows from the Hoeffding’s inequality.
Although the probability of spoofing decreases exponentially fast with N , the transmission
power x is under the control of the adversary. By increasing x, the adversary can achieve a
reasonable spoofing probability for practical values of N . Indeed, Figure 5.9 shows practical
instances of this attack with N = 120. To increase the attack success probability, the attack
rate is ρ = 16, meaning that 4 to 5 adversarial frames fall into the back-search window.
Although (5.7) suggests to set n = N , this does not take into account the interference created
by the adversarial signal during other reception stages. Indeed, Figure 5.9 shows that the
adversary achieves better results with n = 12, rather than n = 120, where N = 120 in both
cases.
5.2.3 Reactive Attacks
From the adversarial perspective, one of the drawbacks of the cicada attack is the sensitivity
of attack effectiveness to SNRA. Indeed, notably for the MINF receiver (Figure 5.4), the
SNRA region for which the attack has high probability of success is quite narrow. This
is because at high SNRA the adversarial signal causes too much interference during coarse
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Figure 5.7: Modulation with preamble time-hopping: Success ratio of distance-decrease
achieved by constant 8-attack (16-attack for MINF) mounted against energy-detection re-
ceivers at SNRH = 20dB. Performance without preamble time-hopping (“no pTH”) is shown
for comparison.
synchronization, channel estimation, SFD detection and/or data demodulation, and prevents
the ranging packet from being received correctly.
A reactive adversary can try to overcome this. It is reasonable to assume that the ad-
versary, knowing the algorithms run by the honest receiver, will know (roughly) when the
receiver is performing which stage. Then, the reactive adversary can transmit the adversarial
signal only when fine synchronization is performed, with arbitrary high power and high rate ρ,
which guarantees that the ToA is spoofed. If no other stage is performed on this signal, then
the adversary will not interfere with those stages, which guarantees correct packet reception.
However, a receiver can perform two or more stages on the same signal as fine synchro-
nization. On one hand, if that stage is coarse synchronization, SNRA cannot exceed SNRH.
Otherwise the honest signal will be overshadowed by the adversarial signal, and coarse syn-
chronization would fail. On the other hand, if that stage is channel estimation, SNRA can be
increased more substantially, but not indefinitely. Intuitively, the ratio between SNRA and
SNRH in channel estimation determines how much weight is put on the bogus part versus the
honest, information-bearing part of the data symbols. The upper limit on SNRA depends on
what the adversary does in the data part. We elaborate on this in Section 5.2.4.
5.2.4 Known Code Attacks
We now look at a targeted version of the malicious interference attack, in which the adversary
knows the preamble code, and is tightly synchronized with HTX. Under these assumptions,
the adversary can spoof the ToA easily, by transmitting a copy of the preamble that arrives
at the receivers k nanoseconds before the honest preamble. HRX has no means of detecting
this attack. In the data part, the adversary knows the time-hopping sequence, but not the
amplitudes which are determined by the challenge/response bits. Hence, ATX transmits a
pulse k nanoseconds before each honest pulse, with SNRDA. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the adversarial pulse has a constant amplitude, whereas the honest pulse has
amplitude 0/1 for OOK modulation, or ±1 for BPSK modulation.
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Figure 5.8: ToA median absolute error under constant 8-attack against the vanilla energy-
detection receiver at SNRH = 20dB (over packets for which distance-decrease was successful),
modulation without time-hopping. 5% and 95% percentiles are also shown.
Note that in case of a distance-decreasing relay attack or a malicious prover attack, the
adversary would transmit a signal which is the combination of the honest signal and the
adversarial signal described above. We hence focus on the malicious interference attack in
what follows.
We can see in Figure 5.10 that this attack achieves virtually 100% distance-decrease across
a relatively broad range of SNRA. (By default, we set SNR
D
A = −∞.) Furthermore, the
distance-decrease is much more deterministic that with the blind attacks. With the offset
k set to k = 20ns, the 5% and 95% percentiles of absolute ToA error are 10ns and 22ns at
SNRA = 10dB and 17ns and 22ns at SNRA = 15dB. The adversary can further improve the
ToA spoofing performance by making the ATX to HRX channel as close as possible to a single-
tap channel (i.e., no multipath), e.g., by moving very close to the victim receiver and/or using
a highly directional antenna. In this case, the absolute ranging error percentiles are between
19ns and 22ns. Furthermore, with this attack, the adversary can succeed in spoofing not only
the 1st arriving path but even the strongest path, albeit with a lower success probability.
This would circumvent a simple “countermeasure” that estimates ToA based on the strongest
path (Section 5.3).
In general, the adversary can choose the values of SNRA and SNR
D
A that optimize the per-
formance on the data. Not surprisingly a good choice is to set SNRA large enough to achieve
a desired success ratio of distance-decrease, but not larger. With this choice, the adversarial
contribution to the channel estimate, and the resulting influence on data demodulation are
minimized. For such small SNRA, the choice of SNR
D
A plays a negligible role. Small values,
e.g., SNRDA = −∞dB give good attack performance, meaning that denial rate is low. Indeed,
consider as a baseline the SNRH necessary to achieve a packet error rate below 1% if no
attack takes place, denote it SNRbenH . Under attack, denote by SNR
att
H the SNRH necessary to
achieve a packet error rate below 1%. Then, the difference between SNRattH and the baseline
SNRbenH is below 0.2dB for energy-detection receivers and rake receivers alike.
However, the adversary can decide to choose a large SNRA. This makes sense notably
if the adversary is not targeted, but mounts a broadcast attack and wants to extend the
5.3. Countermeasures 117
SNRA [dB]
 
 
10 20 30 40 500%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
n = 120
n = 12
Figure 5.9: Success ratio of distance-decrease achieved by a coded 16-attack against a vanilla
rake receiver at SNRH = 20dB. The number of frames during which adversary transmits (out
of 120) is denoted by n.
geographical area effected. In that case, the optimal adversarial strategy depends on the
receiver algorithms and SNRH. For example, we established via simulations that for the
vanilla energy detector at SNRH = 20dB the optimal strategy is to set SNR
D
A = SNRA−5dB.
In Figure 5.10 we can see that for this attack the upper limit on SNRA is roughly 7dB greater
than the attack with SNRDA = −∞dB.
In contrast, for the rake receiver it is easy to show that the optimal attack is to set
SNRDA = −∞dB. Under such an attack, at SNRH = 10dB the success ratio of distance decrease
drops below 5% at SNRA = 15dB (not shown in a figure) compared to SNRA = 12dB, 14dB
and 15dB for the cicada attack mounted against various modulation schemes (Figure 5.6).
5.3 Countermeasures
In this section, we use the insight we gained in Section 5.2 to evaluate and propose counter-
measures that can thwart the ToA attack vector. We start with a few naive countermeasures.
Then we discuss two groups of countermeasures that are secure against the attack. The first
group is based on secure ToA estimation. We consider two algorithms, the PID method for
rake receivers and a novel PIDH for energy-detection receivers. The second group relies on in-
secure ToA estimation, and verification of the ToA estimate in the data part. The verification
is performed with early detection countermeasure from Chapter 4 with very short detection
time (very early detection, VED). We study the performance of both countermeasures in the
benign case, and show that VED has better ranging precision but is more prone to fail. We
then propose an extension of VED that we term VEDG (very early detection with graceful
degradation) and show that it combines the best performance properties of PIDH and VED.
5.3.1 Naive Countermeasures
An obvious way of countering the attack is to disable fine synchronization, and estimate ToA
based on the strongest path. This has, however, the significant disadvantage of decreasing
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Figure 5.10: Success ratio of distance-decrease achieved by known-code attack mounted
against a vanilla energy-detection receiver at SNRH = 20dB. We show the performance un-
der two adversarial channel models: the default one and a single-tap channel (“1-tap”). We
distinguish between the usual success in spoofing the 1st path (“1st”), and spoofing of the
strongest path (“Str”). In the data, we fix SNRDA = −∞dB, except for “opt” where we use the
optimal attack, i.e., SNRDA = SNRA − 5dB.
the ranging precision. Furthermore, we have seen in Section 5.2.4 that a more sophisticated
adversary that knows the preamble codes and that is precisely synchronized with the honest
transmitter can circumvent this method.
Another way to counter the attack is to repeat the ranging over multiple packets, and de-
tect the unusually high variability of the measured distance caused by the attack (Figure 5.8).
This again has the disadvantage that it can be circumvented by a precise reactive adversary.
Finally, in Section 5.2.1 we have seen that the MINF energy-detection receiver, if coupled
with random preamble time-hopping, can offer some degree of protection against the attack.
However, the adversary still has a non-negligible probability of success, making this a relatively
weak countermeasure.
5.3.2 Secure ToA Estimation
The key to secure ToA estimation is the PID method. Indeed, we have seen in Section 5.2.2
that a rake receiver that does not use PID is vulnerable to an attack by an adversary that
transmits with high power.
PID Rake
We first consider the PID rake reciever. Assume that the amplitudes of non-zero frames are
independent and P(ai = −1) = P(ai = 1) = 0.5. Then, for the PID rake, we can apply an
almost identical reasoning as in (5.7) to estimate the probability of spoofing the ToA:
P(A) = P(|2B(n, 0.5)− n| > Nθ) (5.8)
= 2 · FBIN(0.5n− 0.5Nθ|n, 0.5) ≤ 2 exp(−Nθ)
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where N is the number of non-zero frames in the fine synchronization template, n ≤ N is
the number of non-zero frames in the adversarial code aAi , and θ is a noise-based threshold.
The difference with (5.7) is that the power factor x disappears. This is crucial, because the
adversary can no longer increase the transmission power to compensate for an exponentially
fast decline of P(A). This implies that the PID rake is secure against the attack with an
arbitrary transmission power, if the values of N and θ are chosen appropriately and if the
amplitudes are unknown to the adversary.
PIDH Countermeasure
We now propose a secure ToA estimation algorithm for energy-detection receivers. It also
relies to the PID method. The input to algorithm is a sequence of samples yi=1,...,N ∈ {0, 1}
(after applying the PID filter) corresponding to some time-offset t, and the known template
ai=1,...,N ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the time-offset t is considered a valid ToA candidate if:
d(yi, ai) ≤τ (5.9)
where d is the Hamming distance and τ is a threshold. All time-offsets ti in the back-
search window are validated, and the resulting ToA is the first valid ToA. Essentially, in
this algorithm we replace correlation with the Hamming distance, hence we denote it Power
Independent Detection with the Hamming distance (PIDH).
For optimal security, we assume that the template ai is a pseudo-random binary sequence
(P(ai = 0) = P(ai = 1) = 0.5), unknown in advance to the adversary. Under this assumption,
for a single time-offset t (without benign signal contribution), the adversary can spoof the
ToA with probability:
P(A(t)) = FBIN(τ |N, 0.5) (5.10)
Given that there are NBS time-offsets in the back-search window that the receiver evaluates,
the total probability that the adversary achieves a distance-decrease can be upper-bounded
by:
P(A) = P(
⋃
j
A(tj)) ≤
∑
j
P(A(tj) = NBS · FBIN(τ |N, 0.5) (5.11)
For a desired security level Pattack we can invert (5.11) and obtain the threshold τ that achieves
this security level:
τ = F−1BIN(Pattack ·N−1BS |N, 0.5) (5.12)
The security and performance of the PIDH and the PID rake ToA estimation algorithms
are independent of time-hopping.
5.3.3 Security through (Very) Early Detection
VED Countermeasure
An alternative to secure ToA estimation is to perform ToA estimation in a non-secure fashion,
and rely on data demodulation with a very short detection time (tED = Tint) to detect attacks.
This is a natural extension of the early detection countermeasure advocated in Section 4.4.1,
and we term in (very) early detection (VED). It proceeds as follows:
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1. ToA estimation. Perform non-secure fine synchronization to find the first arriving
path. Denote the template length by Ntoa.
2. Verification. Perform data demodulation with detection time tdet = Tint (on the time-
offset determined by fine synchronization); reject the packet if the number of errors is
above Nerr. The data length is Nnonce.
The values of Nnonce and Nerr can be determined by (3.3).
If is not hard to see the similarities between VED and the PIDH ToA estimation algorithm.
Indeed, applying the PID filter is similar to performing OOK demodulation with detection
time equal to the integration time (tdet = Tint). Furthermore, computing the Hamming
distance to the template is identical to counting the number of errors in a demodulated bit
sequence (Section 3.1.4), and (3.3) is equivalent to (5.12).
Naturally, there are also differences between the PIDH method and the VED method.
These have an effect on benign-case performance. First, in the former methodNBS time-offsets
are evaluated versus only one time-offset in VED. Hence, to obtain the same probability of
attack success Pattack, the PIDH threshold τ is lower than the corresponding Nerr threshold
for VED. This means that that PIDH is more likely to reject a valid time-offset. Second, the
threshold of the PID filter in PIDH is determined using the estimated noise level only, whereas
in the VED method the OOK demodulation threshold can be determined based on the noise
level and the signal level. This means that VED has a higher reliability of demodulation.
In both cases, the VED method has a slight performance advantage over PIDH, which is
confirmed in Section 5.3.4.
However, the VED method is less robust than the PIDH method, in the sense that it is
more likely to fail in benign conditions. This is because if the first pulse detected by the
insecure ToA estimation algorithm in VED is low, there is a chance that verification will fail,
causing packet rejection. In contrast, in such a case PIDH does not reject the packet, but
rather reports a ToA obtained at a stronger, but later pulse. In other words, PIDH offers
graceful degradation of service, reporting a ToA that is both secure, and as close as possible
to the actual ToA (but never lower, i.e., distance-decrease does not occur).
VEDG Countermeasure
To address the above drawback of VED, we propose an extension, very early detection with
graceful degradation (VEDG). In this method, instead of performing data demodulation at
only one time-offset (the first detected pulse), data demodulation is performed independently
at multiple time-offsets (the first few detected pulses). The resulting ToA is the fist time-
offset for which verification is successful. With multiple time-offsets, the acceptable number
of errors (Nerr) must be decreased to maintain a fixed security level Pattack. This decreases
the ranging precision. To minimize this negative effect we select time-offsets such that their
number is low compared to the PIDH method. The VEDG method proceeds as follows:
1. ToA estimation. Perform non-secure fine synchronization that selects multiple time-
offsets ti:
(a) t1 is selected as the first offset in the back-search window that is above the noise-
based threshold (regular ToA estimation).
(b) ti+1 is selected as the first offset in the back-search window that is above the ith
time-offset.
2. Verification. Perform data demodulation with detection time tdet = Tint (on the time-
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Figure 5.11: Countermeasures benign case performance: We show the precise-ToA rate
(“PIDH”, “VED”, “VEDG”), as a function of the number of frames N at (a) SNRH = 6.5dB
(the same as in Figure 4.15) (b) SNRH = 20dB. For PID (the non-secure ToA estimation
algorithm used in VED), N = Ntoa (the template length). For PIDH, N is the template
length. For VED/VEDG, N = Ntoa + Nnonce, the latter being the length of the data. In
addition, we show the failure rate of all methods (“failed”).
offset determined by fine synchronization) for every time-offset ti; the ToA estimate is
the first ti for which the number of errors is below Nerr.
With this method, the number of time-offsets is kept small compared to PIDH.
5.3.4 Performance Evaluation
The PIDH, VED and VEDG methods offer the same level of security, but perform differently
with respect to other metrics. We evaluate the performance of the countermeasures in the
benign case. Our primary metric pertains to ranging precision: We count the percentage of
packets for which the receiver finds the first path, i.e., the ranging error is below 2ns. We
term this metric precise-ToA rate. We find it to be more informative than the rather coarse-
grained mean absolute ranging error, or mean root square error. Furthermore, we count the
percentage of packets which are not received properly, and we term this metric failure rate.
Finally, the imprecise-ToA rate is the percentage of packets that are received, but with a ToA
estimate greater than the actual ToA (by more than 2ns). We do not report the values for
the last metric, as it sums to 100% with the other two metrics. This is because it is almost
impossible (probability below Pattack) that the ToA estimate is below the actual ToA, i.e.,
the distance-decrease rate is approximately zero. The exact values that we obtain are specific
to the channel model (the residential NLOS model from [99]), but we are more interested in
relative performance of different algorithms.
We assume Pattack = 2
−16 and derive the thresholds for PIDH, VED and VEDG according
to (5.12) and (3.6). Compared to the non-secure PID ToA estimation algorithm4 used in
VED/VEDG, the PIDH ToA estimation has a relatively low benign-case probability of false
detection of PFD (approximately, the per-time-offset PFD ≈ 10−9 for PIDH, compared to
PFD ≈ 10−4 for PID). Hence, the probability of missed detection, PMD, is higher for PIDH.
This means that for the same template duration, the PIDH algorithm misses some of the lower
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Figure 5.12: Countermeasures performance under constant 8-attack (at SNRA = 8dB). We
show the precise-ToA rate (“PIDH”,“VED”,“VEDG”), as a function of the number of framesN
at SNRH = 20dB. For PIDH, N is the template length. For VED/VEDG, N = Ntoa +Nnonce,
where Ntoa is the template length and Ndata is length of the data. We also show the failure
rate of all methods (“failed”).
peaks, captured by the PID algorithm. Thus, the latter exhibits better ranging precision. This
is confirmed in Figure 5.11, which shows the performance of the PID and the PIDH algorithms
for the same template length N . PID performs significantly better.
However, we need to consider the full VED/VEDG operation. In the PIDH method, all
detected pulse are automatically secure. In contrast, in VED/VEDG a pulse detected by the
non-secure ToA estimation algorithm still needs to be verified as secure. Hence, a considerable
number of data frames (Nnonce) needs to be devoted to provide verification with an acceptable
probability of false rejection (as hinted by Figure 4.15). In fact, increasing Ntoa decreases the
power of pulses that can be detected by the PID algorithm. Reliably verifying such low pulses
requires an increase of Nnonce.
To compare PIDH with VED/VEDG, we assume that for VED/VEDG the number of
frames N is equal to Ntoa + Nnonce. For a fixed N , we set Ndata = kNtoa, where k ranges
from 5 to 7 depending on SNRH. We established this ratio experimentally. In Figure 5.11 we
see that for both low and high SNR (SNRH = 6.5dB and SNRH = 20dB) the chosen ratio of
Ntoa and Ndata allows VED to outperform PIDH in terms of ranging precision. Furthermore,
VEDG achieves an almost identical ranging precision as VED. This is because the number of
time-offsets for which VEDG demodulates is relatively small: below 6 for 99% of packets. At
SNRH = 20dB, to achieve precise-ToA rate of 80%, VED/VEDG requires N ≈ 65, compared
to N ≈ 115 required for PIDH. In contrast, PID requires a fine synchronization template of
length only N ≈ 8. The cost of precision and security is indeed quite high.
The second metric of interest is the failure rate, i.e., the number of ranging packets that
are not received correctly either due to synchronization failure or due to rejection by the
VED/VEDG verification. For SNRH = 6.5dB, all three methods experience similar failure
rate. However, for SNRH = 20dB, and N > 70 the failure rate of VED is in the order of 2
to 3%. In contrast, for PIDH the failure rate of PIDH is negligible for N > 70, whereas for
4Other ToA estimation algorithms can also be used.
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VEDG it is negligible altogether. This confirms our expectation that PIDH and VEDG are
more robust than VED in the benign case.
We also evaluate both countermeasure under attack. More specifically, in Figure 5.12
we show the countermeasures’ performance at SNRH = 20dB against a constant 8-attack
with SNRA = 8dB. (We choose SNRA according to Figure 5.4.) Compared to benign case
operation at SNRH = 20dB, the PIDH method experiences a relatively minor degradation of
performance (decrease of precision, increase of failure). VEDG performs almost as well as
the PIDH for large N , and better for small N . In contrast, the VED method experiences a
significant performance degradation, notably as N increases. The reason for this is that as
N increases, the template length Ntoa increases. Hence, the insecure PID ToA estimation
algorithm is more likely to fall victim to distance-decrease. If this happens, VED verification
must fail. This confirms that the PIDH and VEDG countermeasures are more robust than the
VED countermeasure under attack. However, note that by increasing SNRA, the adversary
can cause a denial against both PIDH and VEDG.
5.4 Experiments
To further demonstrate the feasibility of the cicada attack, we test it on an Impulse-Radio
test-bed that is being developed in the scope of the MICS project [56]. The primary goal of the
test-bed is time-difference-of-arrival (TDOA) localization of a mobile transmitter. However,
at the current stage of development, the test-bed has certain limitations, which do not allow
us to replicate the experiments simulated in Section 5.2. We hence design a different set of
experiments compatible with the test-bed. With these experiments, we are able to show the
distance-decreasing effect of the cicada attack.
5.4.1 IR Test-Bed
The test-bed is comprised of a set of static receivers and a set of mobile transmitters. To
perform TDOA localization of a mobile transmitter, the receivers should be synchronized.
However, at the current stage of development, there is no synchronization between the re-
ceivers or, more generally, any pair of receiver/transmitter devices. Hence, we are not able to
implement ranging, or even pseudo-ranging. This is the primary reason for a new experiment
design.
Transmitter A transmitter is composed of an analog front-end described in [36] and of a
simple modulator module. The transmitter can send a train of pulses with pulse repetition
frequency (PRF) of 10MHz. The train of pulses can be modulated with a binary sequence,
i.e., with on/off keying modulation. Pulses have a bandwidth of 500MHz at 4.25GHz central
frequency.
Receiver A receiver front-end is described in [56]. It is an energy-detection receiver, i.e.,
the received signal is squared. However, in contrast to a traditional energy-detector assumed
in rest of this Chapter, the test-bed receiver uses I/Q demodulation. The goal of I/Q demod-
ulation is to prevent a beat that could occur due to a small frequency mismatch between the
receiver and transmitter local oscillators. However, from the perspective of the attack perfor-
mance, such a difference in architecture is of little consequence, as observed in Section 5.4.3.
This confirms that the universal nature of the attack.
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The receiver back-end is composed of a dual 1.5GS/s ADC08D1500 analog-to-digital con-
verter (ADC). It samples the signal at a rate of 2.842GS/s with 8 bit resolution. These samples
are then handled by an Altera Cyclone II EP2C70 Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).
The FPGA has relatively limited memory of 140Kb, which influences the experiment design.
The FPGA is connected to a PC with a serial-to-USB converter.
5.4.2 Experiment Setup
As explained in Section 5.4.1, the test-bed has two limitations that make it necessary to design
a new set of experiments. The first is the lack of a synchronization, i.e., a common clock base,
between any two devices. This causes the following difficulty: When the receiver estimates
the ToA, there is no ground truth ToA that the estimate could be compared with. Hence, we
cannot immediately determine if a distance-decrease has occurred.
We can resolve this issue as follows. We make HTX transmit a number of consecutive
ranging packets. At the same time, ATX periodically turns the cicada attack on and off, for
periods of time longer than the ranging packet length (see Figure 5.13 (b) and (c)). As a
result, some of the ranging packets will be affected by the cicada signal, some will be affected
partially, and some will not be affected at all. Assuming that we can (roughly) determine
when the cicada signal is on/off, HRX can use the ToA computed for unaffected ranging
packets as the ground truth.
The second limitation is the modest memory on the FPGA. To overcome this issue, we
refrain from using complete ranging packets, with a preamble and payload. Rather, HTX
only transmits short preambles, and HRX only performs coarse synchronization (simplified)
and fine synchronization.
Configurations The experiments involve the usual set of devices: an honest receiver (HRX),
an honest transmitter (HTX) and an adversarial transmitter (ATX). We consider two con-
figurations: In configuration (A), there are no obstacles between either transmitter and the
receiver. In configuration (B) we attenuate the ATX signal by putting a tin-foil obstacle
between ATX and HRX. In both configurations, the distances between HTX and HRX and
ATX and HRX are in the order of one meter. The test-bed is located in the corner of a 10m
by 10m electrical engineering lab room filled with working benches and other equipment.
We define SNR as the ratio between the signal power and the noise power.5 In both
configurations, SNRH ≈ 22dB. In configuration (A), SNRA ≈ 21dB. In configuration (B),
SNRA varies between 6dB and 17dB with mean 11dB.
Experiment In a single experiment, we capture 12µs of samples from the ADC (maximum
that the FPGA memory allows), and send them to the PC. There, we perform the remain-
ing receiver operations in MATLAB. This allows us to minimize implementation overhead,
compared to implementing the receiver on the FPGA. Note that the results are not affected.
It also allows us to process the samples off-line, and run different receiver algorithms on the
5Recall that in other sections of the thesis we define SNR as the ratio between the pulse energy and the noise
spectral density, Ep/N0. Converting Ep/N0 to Psignal/Pnoise entails subtracting roughly 24dB. For example,
SNRH = 10log10(Ep/N0) = 20dB in Figure 5.4 translates to 10log10(Psignal/Pnoise) ≈ −4dB. Hence, the signals
in the experiments are significantly stronger than the signals used in the simulations. This is because of the
short distances between devices in the experiment setup.
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same input. For each configuration, we perform 1000 experiments. During an experiment
both HTX and ATX are transmitting.
Honest Transmitter HRX transmits an infinite sequence of preamble symbols, almost iden-
tical6 to the preamble symbols used in IEEE 802.15.4a. We consider each preamble symbol
to be a separate ranging packet. In more detail, a preamble symbol is composed of 31 frames,
modulated according to the IEEE 802.15.4a preamble code no 5. The frame duration is 100ns.
Hence, the duration of a preamble symbol is 3.1µs. Figure 5.13(a) shows the received samples
for one experiment with only HTX transmitting.
Adversarial Transmitter ATX transmits periodically a sequence of 4 · 31 frames modulated
with a sequence of 2 · 31 ones followed by 2 · 31 zeros. The frame duration is 100ns. Examples
of the ATX signal are shown in Figure 5.13(b) and (c). Note that this is a simple variant of
the cicada attack with rate ρ = 1.
Honest Receiver Operation HRX operation is adjusted to the signal transmitted by HTX.
Most notably, the receiver only performs synchronization, but no channel estimation, SFD
detection or data demodulation. Coarse synchronization can be significantly simplified com-
pared to Section 5.1.2, as HRX can a priori assume that the HTX signal is always present.
Recall that a a single preamble symbol is the entire “ranging packet”. Hence, HRX sim-
ply correlates the received signal with a template that corresponds to one preamble symbol.
Then, the receiver finds the maximum in the correlator output of duration 3.1µs, which is the
“ranging packet” duration (i.e., one preamble symbol). The index at which the maximum is
found is deemed the coarse ToA estimate.
Fine synchronization is performed on the same signal as coarse synchronization. It follows
exactly the description in Section 5.1.2, searching back from the coarse ToA estimate for a
time-offset above a threshold. The only differences are the duration of the back-search window
(32ns in place of 64ns, corresponding to the observed channel spread) and the MINF window
size (4 in place of 8, to account for honest signal imperfections).
Given the number of samples in a single experiment, and the preamble symbol duration,
in one experiment we obtain a ToA estimate 3 times (dashed lines in Figure 5.13(a)). Because
there is no synchronization between HTX and HRX, there is no way of knowing what should
be the ToA estimate, i.e., the ground truth. However, we can compare the 3 ToA estimates
within an experiment, and obtain a relative ToA estimation error. In other words, we assume
that one of the 3 ToA estimates is the ground truth. More precisely, this is the estimate
corresponding to the “ranging packet” (preamble symbol) not affected by the cicada signal.
6The differences are in the frame duration, and in a signal modulated by a binary, rather than a ternary
signal. The latter is enforced by the available transmitter and is irrelevant for an energy detector receiver
because of the squaring operation.
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Figure 5.13: Samples from the HRX’s ADC for a single experiment. (a) HTX signal only, the
dashed lines show the start of preamble symbols. (b), (c) ARX signal only.
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Metrics For a preamble symbol received by HRX we define coverage as the percentage of
the preamble symbol (“ranging packet”) that is covered by the ATX signal. For example, in
Figure 5.13, if (a) and (b) are received simultaneously, than the coverage of the 1st symbol
is 1, the 2nd symbol is around 0.8 and the 3rd symbol is 0. If (a) and (c) are received
simultaneously, the coverage is roughly 0.8, 0 and 0.2, for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd preamble
symbol, respectively. In practice, we compute the coverage based on the position of the
cicada signal, which we detect with the PID method combined with computing the Hamming
distance from the cicada template (rather than correlation). We use this detection method
due to its robustness. We note that the detection is not extremely accurate (it can be off by
a few frames), but this is good enough for our purposes.
Based on the coverage, we define the ground truth ToA estimate as the HRX ToA estimate
for the preamble symbol with coverage 0. If no preamble symbol has such coverage, we discard
the experiment. We measure the ToA estimation error by comparing the other two ToA
estimates (coarse or fine) to the ground truth ToA estimate.
For a preamble symbol we consider that denial occurs (synchronization fails) if the coarse
synchronization error is greater than 100ns. We consider that distance-decrease occurs if
denial does not occur and if the fine synchronization ToA estimate is lower by more than
4ns than the ground truth estimate. We then measure the denial rate and distance-decrease
rate as the percentage of preamble symbols for which denial or distance-decrease occurs,
respectively.
Note that contrary to simulations performed in Section 5.2, denial can occur due to a be-
nign failure. This is because we are working with prototype-grade hardware, which sometime
results in imperfections in the received signals. (For example, note the variation across pulse
amplitude in Figure 5.13, notably (c)).
5.4.3 Experimental Results
We show the distance-decrease rate and the denial rate as a function of coverage in Figure 5.14.
The results follow our expectations. Consider first configuration (A), where the ATX signal
is roughly as strong as the HTX signal. For low coverage, the vanilla receiver shows some
distance degradation which increases up to roughly 20% as the coverage increases, but for
coverage beyond 0.3 denial starts to take over. To explain this behavior, recall that the
vanilla receiver sums the samples from the frames indicated by the template. Hence, the
coverage effectively works as a multiplying factor for the total adversarial signal power; e.g.,
at coverage 0.5, SNRA can be considered approximately 3dB lower than SNRA at coverage
1 (where SNRA ≈ SNRH). Thus, the distance-decrease rate and denial rate follow the same
pattern that we have seen in Section 5.2. A similar coverage interpretation can be applied
to MINF receiver, although it should be noted that the min filter provides some non-linear
distortion. In particular, at low coverage, the min filter removes the cicada signal completely,
and thus no distance-decrease is observed. In general, the performance pattern of the attack
is similar as for vanilla, but the distance-decrease rate reaches only roughly 10% due to a
conservative threshold value.
In contrast, for the PID receiver, there is no simple parallel between the coverage and
SNRA, but we can find an equally simple interpretation. The output of the PID correlator
at a time-offset corresponding to the true ToA (the start of the “ranging packet”) is equal to
N , the number of non-zero frames in the template (in noiseless conditions). With coverage
x, the output of the correlator at a time-offset with adversarial signal contribution is roughly
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Figure 5.14: Distance-decrease rate and denial rate as a function of coverage. Configuration
(A) results are shown in (a) for vanilla, (b) for PID and (c) for MINF. Configuration (B)
results are shown in (d) for vanilla, (e) for PID and (f) for MINF. We shown 95% confidence
intervals for distance-decrease rate.
x · N . This explains why in Figure 5.14(b) denial becomes dominant only at coverage close
to 1. This allows the distance-decrease rate to reach roughly 35%.
In configuration (B) the ATX signal is weaker then the HTX signal. Hence, for the vanilla
and MINF filters, Figure 5.14 can be considered to show the performance for a low SNRA
only. This explains why denial occurs marginally, and the distance-decrease rate increases
with coverage. In contrast, for the PID receiver the power of the adversarial signal plays a
smaller role, as long as it is above the PID filter threshold. Hence, the attack performance in
configuration (B) is close to the performance in configuration (A).
Finally, we verify that no distance-decease occurs with the PIDH fine synchronization
algorithm.
5.5 Conclusion
We have identified a novel attack vector against IR-UWB ranging, based on disrupting the
time-of-arrival (ToA) estimation. This ToA attack vector allows an adversary to decrease
the measured distance in malicious prover attacks and distance-decreasing relay attacks. It
also creates a novel type of PHY attack based on malicious interference. We have demon-
strated, with simulations and experiments on an IR test-bed, that even a simple-to-mount
variant of the malicious interference attack (the cicada attack) is effective against a number
of modulation schemes and receivers that are designed for precise ranging, i.e., attempt to
find the first arriving path rather than the strongest path. We have also shown that more
sophisticated variants of the malicious interference attack can decrease the distance measured
by less precise receivers that only detect the strongest path.
Furthermore, we have investigated countermeasures that mitigate this attack vector and
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thus achieve distance bounding that is both precise and secure. “Precise” means that the DB
protocol can achieve a ranging precision close to the optimal ranging precision of the receiver,
even in weak NLOS conditions. “Secure” means that the DB protocol prevents the adversary
from decreasing the measured distance (by more than the ranging precision of the receiver).
We have shown that this can be achieved by secure ToA estimation algorithms. One example
of such an algorithm is the known PID algorithm for rake receivers with appropriately adjusted
parameters. Another is the novel PIDH algorithm for energy-detection receivers. We have
also revisited the early detection countermeasure from Chapter 4, decreasing substantially
the detection time. We term the resulting countermeasure VED (for very early detection).
We have shown that this countermeasure is as secure as PIDH and exhibits higher ranging
precision than PIDH, but has a higher failure rate. Finally, we have proposed a hybrid
countermeasure, VEDG, that achieves the ranging precision of VED and has a failure rate
close to PIDH.
Compare these countermeasures with the countermeasures considered in Chapter 4. Fore-
most, the latter countermeasures allow an adversary to achieve a distance-decrease in the
order of the channel spread, in contrast to a negligible distance-decrease allowed by Chapter 5
countermeasures. However, in terms of benign case ranging precision, the countermeasures in
Chapter 4 offer the ranging precision of insecure ranging. In comparison, the countermeasures
in Chapter 5 offer lower benign case precision, even with ranging packets orders of magnitude
longer; The cost of having precision and security at the same time is quite high. Nevertheless,
using the countermeasures in Chapter 5, a reasonable ranging precision can be achieved while
keeping the packet duration below 100µs; this should not be prohibitive for most applications.
It is an interesting open question whether it is possible to design countermeasures that have
lower communication cost.
Acknowledgments
I would like to extend my thanks to the designers and implementers of the MICS IR test-
bed: Alexander Feldman, Alexander Bahr, James Colli-Vignarelli, Stephan Robert, Catherine
Dehollain, and Alcherio Martinoli. They give me access to the test-bed and provided me with
invaluable help in performing the experiments.

Conclusion
In this thesis, we focus on two fundamental elements of secure wireless networking: neighbor
discovery and distance bounding. We investigate two aspects crucial for the security of these
protocols, which nevertheless have received relatively little attention: formal analysis and
security on the physical-communication-layer. Our motivation stems from a basic security
principle: A system is as secure as its weakest link. Indeed, if physical-communication-layer
attacks are not properly addressed, any cryptographic protocol that attempts to provide
distance bounding or neighbor discovery based on message propagation time can be defeated.
Furthermore, informal arguments for protocol correctness have repeatedly proven insufficient
as new attacks are discovered against published protocols.
Our first contribution is a formal framework for reasoning about time- and location-based
neighbor discovery (ND) protocols. The framework is among the first to incorporate no-
tions such as propagation time, node location, or the neighbor relation into formal reasoning
about security protocols. We consider two general classes of protocols: time-based proto-
cols (T-protocols) and time- and location-based protocols (TL-protocols). The framework
allows us to analyze and design concrete provably secure communication ND protocols in
both classes. It also allows us to formally prove a fundamental limitation: No T-protocol
can provide two-part communication ND if adversarial nodes can relay messages faster than a
particular threshold. The threshold is determined by the honest nodes’ communication range.
This result is a useful measure of the security achieved by ND T-protocols that we believe are
one of the more practical and universal solutions to ND.
Our second contribution is an investigation of physical-communication-layer (PHY) at-
tacks against ranging and distance bounding, and of countermeasures against such attacks.
We focus on a technology particularly well suited for ranging and distance-bounding: Impulse-
Radio Ultra-wideband (IR-UWB). We demonstrate that de facto standard for IR-UWB, IEEE
802.15.4a, is vulnerable to distance-decreasing attacks, first introduced in [35]. In particu-
lar, if honest devices use energy-detection receivers without appropriate countermeasures, an
adversary can decrease the measured distance by hundreds of meters, with a success rate
arbitrarily close to 100%. This is in part because of features of the standard that improve
benign-case performance. We propose minor patches to IEEE 802.15.4a, which improve its
security while retaining the benefits introduced by these features. With appropriate counter-
measures implemented by honest receivers, these patches thwart distance-decreasing attacks:
At a mild cost in terms of packet length, the maximum distance decrease can be limited to
values in the order of the channel spread. Furthermore, we discover a new attack vector that
disrupts time-of-arrival estimation algorithms. It allows an adversary to decrease the mea-
sured distance by a value in the order of the channel spread; hence, it is a threat for precise
ranging. This vector also creates a new type of PHY attack based on malicious interference;
it is much simpler to mount than alternative external PHY attacks. Finally, we propose
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countermeasures against the ToA attack vector; they enable ranging that is both precise and
secure, although at a non-negligible cost in terms of packet length. In summary, the coun-
termeasures we propose allow a system designer to trade off security, ranging precision and
packet length.
Future Work
The formal framework we propose in Part I is used for reasoning about communication ND
and can be easily extended to physical ND and distance bounding. However, the assumptions
on which the framework is constructed are reasonable only if both nodes participating in the
ND/DB protocol are honest. To capture internal attacks, we need a framework that models
messages at the bit level and that is probabilistic, making it possible to express attacks that
work with non-negligible probability. (The only work we are aware of that takes a step in
this direction is [119].) Furthermore, the framework should also model PHY attacks in some
way. A simple solution would be to incorporate those as ToA estimation error, but a more
direct modeling could also be explored: This could reveal a yet undiscovered hybrid attack
that exploits the interaction between PHY attacks and cryptographic protocols. Ideally, the
framework should allow for mechanization or even automation.
In Part II, we evaluate PHY attacks and countermeasures with simulations. We also
provide a simple proof-of-concept implementation of the attacks in an IR-UWB test-bed,
limited to the synchronization phase. The next logical step is to create a more elaborate
implementation that would include all receiver operations. This would allow for a complete
validation of the attacks, as well as the VED and VEDG countermeasures. The ultimate
goal is a complete implementation of an IR DB protocol secure from PHY attacks. The most
challenging step in such an implementation is to build a prover able to perform the rapid
response in the rapid-bit-exchange. (An interesting proposal for an analog rapid response,
along with a prototype implementation, can be found in [136]).
In Chapter 5 we propose countermeasures that limit achievable distance-decrease to values
below the channel spread. However, they introduce a large cost in terms of packet length,
compared to countermeasures in Chapter 4. The existence and design of less costly counter-
measures is an interesting open question.
In Part II we focus on one particular technology, Impulse-Radio Ultra-wideband. Any
other PHY technology envisioned to be used for time-based secure ND or for DB, should
be evaluated for feasibility of PHY attacks. This, in particular, includes an investigation of
feasibility of the malicious interference attack we discovered.
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